The 1967 Naksa relived through the memoirs of Abdel Nasser’s top generals

On 9 June 1967, Nasser gave a solemn speech that was aired on television, taking full responsibility for the defeat and nominating his colleague Zakariyya Muhiddine to replace him as president. During this speech he famously calls the war Al-Naksa, meaning "setback" or "defeat." 

The name held on, but Nasser's resignation didn't and was quickly withdrawn in response to thousands taking to the streets in most major Arab cities. King Hussein reportedly said: "Only Abdel Nasser got us into this and only Abdel Nasser can get us out."

The war itself has been debated to death, along with who bears responsibility for what happened. Most historians blame the defeat on Abdul Hakim Amer. So did Nasser himself who less than a month later would have him arrested, along with 50 other officers including Defence Minister Shams Badran.

Amer would die in jail — reportedly from suicide — on 13 September 1967, at the age of 47. Another argument says that Amer was scapegoated by Nasser, who as president, should have known the state of the armed forces before sending his troops into a lop-sided confrontation with disastrous consequences.

On the 56th anniversary of the war that changed everything and everyone in the Arab World, we delve into the memoirs of ranking Egyptian officials who were close to Nasser that summer, asking the one-million-dollar question that has stood the test of time: "Who is responsible for what happened on 5 June 1967? Who is to blame for al-Naksa?"

The memoirs of Anwar Sadat

When released in 1978, Anwar Sadat's memoirs were a hit, and have since been subsequently translated into English under the title "Search of Identity."

They were penned eight years after he had succeeded Nasser as president and here is what the third president of Egypt had to say about 1967: "We knew that our armament was complete, and our weapons were indeed 10 times stronger than what we had in the October War of 1973."

"And that is why when Abdel Nasser asked our opinion about closing the Straits of Tiran (to Israeli ships) we all approved except for Prime Minister Sidqi Ismail."

"He asked us deliberation and for us to take into account our economic situation and the ambitious plans that in most cases, were never completed, especially after US aid was suspended."

Nasser was in full favour of closing the straits and therefore, paid little attention to his prime minister's caution. He was the hero of the Arab world and Arabs across the world were expecting him to stand up to Israel, just like had done during the Tripartite Aggression of 1956.

When asked how Egypt would respond to any intervention by US's Sixth Fleet, his defence minister Badran said: "We have what it takes to destroy it."

In less than a month, Shams Badran would end up in jail, along with Abdul Hakim Amer, only to be released in May 1974 by Anwar Sadat. He would die an old man in exile in 2020.

Also jailed in the August 1967 crackdown was commander of the Egyptian Air Force Sidqi Mahmud, who, when asked about the readiness of his troops prior to the outbreak of war and said to Nasser: "We are prepared, and our losses will not exceed 10%." Within a week, he realised that had been off by a whopping 75%.

Sadat places heavy blame on Abdul Hakim Amer, who decided to conduct an aerial inspection of Sinai, thus halting missile command while onboard his plane with his top lieutenants.

And that is at that specific moment that Israeli decided to strike at the Egyptian Air Force." Sadat notes: "Basically, we can say that the war started and ended while Amer was still in the sky."

But like all his colleagues, he too felt that victory was within reach.

"The Israelis will be taught a lesson that they will never forget," he wrote in his memoirs.  

Sadat then explains: "I shaved, got dressed, and drove my car to army command. I arrived at army command at approximately 11 am and saw the Russian ambassador's car ahead of mine, so I said to myself: 'He is undoubtedly here to congratulate us.' I then asked for the latest and was told that we had just downed four airplanes. I said to myself: Great!"

Then came Sadat's meeting with Abdul Hakim Amer.

I entered Amer's office and found him with a blank expression. "Good morning" I said but he didn't respond. I seconded my greeting and he only replied after a minute had passed."

"Just then I realised that something major had happened. I asked some of those present and they replied that our air force was down. A few minutes later Gamal Abdul Nasser came out and Amer began blaming everything on the Americans, saying that the US Air Force was the one that hit us, not the Israelis."

"Nasser replied: 'I cannot believe that nor will I put it in an official statement unless you get me an airplane wing with a US emblem on it.'"

Sadat then describes how the people of Egypt took to the streets to celebrate what they believed was a sweeping and ultimate victory.

"I pitied them. I felt sorry for them and resented those who had deceived them, and in fact, all of Egypt. While watching the honest yet delusional celebrations I prayed to God for a heart attack so that I don't have to see the generous and good people walking up to the truth; realising that the victory that they were celebrating was actually a disaster."

And finally, Sadat writes how two days into the war, he tried contacting his boss on 7 June 1967 but was told that he was at home, rather than at army headquarters.

"I was stunned. Why didn't Nasser assume command on 5 June? It's true that we had lost our air force, but we were still capable of holding our lines in the straits. Why did he stand cross-armed to an order given by Amer for our troops to begin withdrawing west of the canal?"

Memoirs of Abdul Latif al-Baghdadi

A former deputy to Gamal Abdul Nasser and ex-speaker of the national assembly, Abdul Latif al-Baghdadi was also one of the original Free Officers who overthrew the Egyptian monarch in 1952.

In his diary entry on 5 June 1967, al-Baghdadi wrote: "At 8:45 am I heard heavy anti-aircraft artillery fire near my house, as well as the sound of muffled explosions from aircraft bombs coming from afar."

"I told my wife that the war had begun and turned on the radio to listen to the news. At around 9:30 am, we heard that Israeli warplanes were raiding our country and hitting all our airports."

Al-Baghdadi then turned to Israeli radio, only to hear that 150 Egyptian plans had been hit before even taking off the tarmac. At midday, he headed to army command with his colleagues to meet with Abdul Hakim Amer, placing themselves at his disposal.

He initially gave them a very promising update, saying: "We've managed to down 73 Israeli planes until now."

When confronted with the very contradictory reports coming out of Israel, Amer confessed and said: "We've lost most of our warplanes, although we don't have an exact number yet because we don't know how many planes we originally had."

Al-Baghdadi explains: "We then asked what they were planning to do after our forces lost sufficient air cover. Abdul Hakim got up from behind his desk and headed towards a map of Sinai, pointing to the position of his ground troops."

"He said that he was completely satisfied with it, adding that they were fully capable of defending themselves, even without any air cover."

Every few minutes, Amer would get a phone call from one of his various field officers. The commander of the Egyptian Air Force called him many times, sometimes weeping, having collapsed into a fit of panic. 

In one of his calls, he said that the Israelis had just struck Egyptian airplanes grounded Luxor Airport. They had been moved there from another airport in the morning, where ostensibly they would be safe from Israeli bombs, only to be destroyed.

The Air Force commander said that he had been briefed on the attack by a young pilot named Husni Mubarak, based at Luxor. Abdul Hakim Amer got on the phone and spoke directly to Mubarak, asking exactly how many planes had been destroyed.

That evening, al-Baghdadi returned to Amer's office, only this time, Nasser was there as well. Amer boasted that they had just downed an American plane, but Nasser corrected him saying that it was Israeli.

Al-Baghdadi goes into great detail about that evening encounter, referring to his comrades by their first names: "Gamal asked Abdul Hakim about our airplane losses, but Hakim evaded the question, claiming that the list was incomplete and yet to be sent to him."

"At Gamal's insistence, however, Hakim looked at a list placed right in front of him and said: 'We have 47 remaining aircraft, of which, only 35 are usable while the rest are in repair.' Gamal went silent and didn't say a word."

"He then asked about the situation on the frontlines but Hakim again avoided giving a direct answer by pretending to be busy with phone calls or giving very petty orders; orders unfit for an army commander."

Then came Defence Minister Shams Badran carrying a detailed report on the war's latest. Nasser began to read, and his expression dropped. "Khan Yunis has fallen. Rafah is besieged and its communications are suspended. Gaza is under attack."

He then looked at Amer in bewilderment, who was still busy with his phone calls. Al-Baghdadi says that Nasser asked him for 15 minutes of his attention, but Amer continued to play busy.

"Gamal's patience ran out; he got up and entered a bedroom attached to Abdul Hakim's office. I entered to go to the bathroom and found Gamal lying on the bed, in deep thought about the predicament we were in and how to get out of it. I told him: "God willing, Allah will grant us victory."

That victory — of course — never came. 

Memoirs of Mahmud Riad

Foreign Minister Mahmud Riad, who went on to become secretary-general of the Arab League, was more nuanced, and brief, in his portrayal of 1967.

He steers clear from directly blaming Nasser and Amer for wartime mistakes but is slightly critical of Nasser for calling him in the morning to ask that he suspend diplomatic relations with the US.

This was on 6 June 1967, 48 hours into the war. The minister politely tried explaining that although he fully agrees with the president, such a move could currently prove counterproductive and might actually backfire.

"Gamal Abdul Nasser had a different view and he said to me: The US needs to pay a price for this complicity." Again, Mahmud Riad tried explaining that it would be Egypt paying the price, not the US, to no avail.  

"Israel's decision to attack us, especially the air strikes, was not a surprise for the military command. The president had met with them as early as 2 June and said that according to his information, Israel will attack by 4-5 June and its main target will be the Egyptian Air Force."

"Despite hearing all that, the military command did not take any action to minimise our losses. Those losses could have been restricted to 20%."

Mahmud Riad then says something very important: that an encrypted wireless cable reached Cairo from Ajloun, Jordan, about Israeli warplanes headed towards Egypt.

They were caught by Jordan, but the cipher codes had just been changed on that very same day" notes Riad, "resulting in (us) being unable to understand the cable in time."

The Memoirs of Mohammad Fawzi

The chief-of-staff of the armed forces Mohammad Fawzi also mentions a ciphered message coming from Jordan, without telling whether it reached on time and was de-coded ahead of the attack on 5 June.

He also says that Nasser met with his top generals as early as 2 June and told them that an attack will take place either on 4 or 5 June.

And then Fawzi pins down the losses inflicted on the Egyptian army —the number that Abdul Hakim Amer refused to tell: "Within four hours of the start of the Israeli attack, the Egyptian air force was destroyed by 85%." 

"Amer summoned me in the afternoon of 6 June and said: I need you to present me with a quick plan for withdrawal from Sinai to the west of Suez. You've got 20 minutes to do it."

Mohammad Fawzi went into session with his generals and presented Amer with the plan, without exceeding the 20-minute deadline. A timetable for withdrawal was suggested, with Amer listening standing behind his desk, with one of his feet resting on a chair.

When Mohammad Fawzi was through with the withdrawal plan Abdul Hakim Amer snapped: "Four days and three nights Fawzi?"

"I have already ordered the withdrawal. It's over!"