Niger coup: Lessons learned and the dark road ahead

French and American approaches

Over the past three years, blatant anti-Western sentiment has developed in certain parts of Africa. This shift has effectively garnered support from groups of military and political leaders within the Sahel nations.

Notably, anti-French sentiment and France's failure to effectively combat extremist armed groups despite possessing the necessary resources have provided fertile ground for such coups to take place.

The approach of French forces to armed groups in the Sahel region has consistently been founded solely on their military capabilities, with no attention paid to the ethnic, social, and economic dynamics that contribute to these groups' viability.

This dynamic has enabled extremist entities to exploit prevailing conditions and win popular favour to further solidify their presence and expand their capabilities, despite international and regional military efforts to rein them in.

Notably, the United States reacted carefully to the developments Niger, with the Biden administration refraining from formally labelling it a coup. Instead, it advocated for a non-military resolution, emphasising the importance of diplomatic avenues in addressing the crisis.

While the US is treading measurably to ensure uninterrupted reconnaissance and intelligence operations from the Agadez drone base, the French response to Niger's developments is rooted in far more complex considerations.

Safeguarding unhindered access to Niger's uranium reserves, crucial for meeting energy production demands, is a strategic priority for France. Additionally, its wish to preserve its long-established colonial influence also contributes to its determination.

On its part, Niger has also adopted a nuanced approach to dealing with both nations. Following President Mohamed Bazoum's removal, the military council voided military cooperation agreements with France and demanded the withdrawal of French military forces.

However, it has not asked American forces to leave nor is it likely to do so. On the contrary, the leaders of the coup have greenlit American military flights, including operations involving unmanned drones.

Potential scenarios

The disparity between the French and American approaches in addressing the military coup in Niger has had implications for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

While ECOWAS has hinted at the possibility of a military response if diplomatic efforts fail to restore deposed President Mohamed Bazoum, the organisation is struggling to come to a unified decision due to the divisions and tensions created by the coup across the region's nations.

The growing support for the military council and the potential opposition to any military intervention have strengthened the coup leaders' determination to maintain their grip on power.

ECOWAS member states are well aware that a large-scale armed conflict would worsen the region's existing instability. The mere mention of a military intervention has been enough to divide West African nations and the Sahel region.

Additionally, Nigeria, which is currently serving as ECOWAS' rotating president, has faced internal pressures, as evidenced by large protests in cities like Kano in northern Nigeria, opposing the prospect of a military invasion of Niger.

In contrast, as reported by the Associated Press, supporters of the coup have begun recruiting volunteers to counter any potential military intervention. This development occurred only a few days after ECOWAS announced its intention to mobilise the African Standby Force to invade Niger and restore democratically-elected President Mohamed Bazoum to power.

The challenges impeding ECOWAS from carrying out its ultimatums autonomously and without the support of France and the United States are becoming increasingly apparent. Alongside the intricate internal security dynamics that Nigeria — as the potential leader of any military action — must navigate, the potential involvement of Burkina Faso and Mali casts a shadow.

These nations have indicated a willingness to align with the coup leaders in Niger if the regional bloc proceeds with an invasion. Eli Tenenbaum, associated with the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), posits that the African Standby Force was not fundamentally designed to restore constitutional order in a country that has experienced a coup.

The question remains whether France will, indeed, launch a military intervention in Niger, and, also, whether or not the United States will become engaged, considering its foreign policy priorities after its protracted involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Grim prospects for military intervention

If the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) coalition opts for military intervention in Niger, it is possible that Burkina Faso and Mali will join forces with the coup leaders to defend them. This could turn the effort to reinstate President Bazoum into a wider conflict in the Sahel region.

External powers and security entities backed by China and Russia would likely provide weapons and financial support to prolong the conflict, under the guise of challenging French and American interests in the region. The repercussions of a military intervention would be far-reaching and would further compound the existing complexities of ongoing crises across Africa.

First, the negative consequences of military intervention in Niger would be felt most acutely by the countries that are currently participating in the regional anti-terrorism campaign.

These countries would need to divert their armed forces and resources away from fighting terrorism to focus on securing the military council and the transitional administration. This would divert attention from the ongoing struggle against terrorist groups, who would exploit the vulnerabilities created by the new conflict, further exacerbating the challenge posed by their operations.

Nigerian forces are currently actively engaged in the G5 Sahel coalition and the Multinational Joint Task Force, countering threats posed by entities such as Boko Haram, the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), and other extremist factions across the Lake Chad basin and beyond Nigerian borders.

An ECOWAS-led offensive against Niger would necessitate a realignment of priorities for Nigerian forces, focusing on securing the military council and the transitional administration. This shift in focus would divert attention from the ongoing struggle against terrorist groups, who would exploit the vulnerabilities created by the new conflict.

Secondly, the armed conflict in Niger would likely lead to a significant influx of refugees into the seven neighbouring countries. This would further strain the resources of these countries and could lead to instability. A significant portion of these displaced individuals may also attempt to move to Europe, compounding the refugee crisis there.

Thirdly, nations aligned with Niger would probably perceive ECOWAS' military intervention as an effort to safeguard the interests of France and its affiliated partners. This perception could potentially prompt these countries to shift their allegiances toward Russia — a country that has expressed reservations against military intervention.

While Russia has maintained a cautious stance to avoid overtly endorsing the coup leaders, considering its relationships with African allies such as South Africa and Namibia, who oppose the coup, an extensive military intervention could potentially provide Moscow with an avenue to participate and cultivate new alliances through the engagement of the Wagner Group, an entity with an established presence in neighbouring Mali.

American options 

The United States, based on its openly articulated stances concerning the military coup in Niger and antecedent occurrences in West Africa, does not appear to position itself as a security enforcer focused on imposing Western democratic norms through coercive means.

Rather, a discernible US inclination exists to foster African engagement in counter-terrorism efforts and to facilitate the peaceful expansion of its military bases, while refraining from direct engagement with the established governing entities.

The prospect of a military confrontation, if it materialises, could potentially compel the United States to contemplate one of two alternatives.

The first option involves withdrawing from direct confrontation and revisiting the concept of constructive chaos. This approach would involve redirecting attention from conflict zones toward West African countries characterised by democratic governance and economic prosperity, such as Ghana and Senegal.

Limiting involvement to reconnaissance, remote data collection, and offering supportive measures makes the transition strategy a more logical choice for Washington.

The second option entails leading a Western transition toward a new approach centred on security stabilisation and bolstering state capabilities in West Africa.

Stephanie Savell, the director of the Costs of War Project at Brown University, asserts, "This juncture compels us in the United States to look at what's happening as a wake-up call and to recognise that a new approach is imperative... We must be courageous enough to acknowledge that our previous efforts have proven ineffective."

The inclination towards militarising regimes in West African Sahel nations has emerged as an alternative paradigm for removing democratically-elected authorities, often justified by framing these leaders as extensions of Western influence.

Will the Western world learn from the lessons learned from the experiences in Niger, subsequent to the events in Mali and Burkina Faso?