Paramilitary groups: Do the benefits outweigh the risks?

The existence of these non-state organisations can lead to rival power centres and have dire consequences.

Paramilitary groups: Do the benefits outweigh the risks?

The rebellion of the Russian Wagner Group, a private military company founded in 2014, drew attention to a specific type of non-state organisation – the kind that raises questions about its purpose and feasibility, as well as its impact on the regime that established it, or facilitated its establishment.

It also raised questions about the state’s monopoly over security and military force apparatuses.

The Wagner uprising, which posed a threat to the regime and presented a challenge to the military in a nation as vast and influential as Russia, was swiftly suppressed this past June.

However, a different scenario unfolds in other corners of the globe. In Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – which originated from the Janjaweed militia in 2013, with the initial objective of suppressing tribal insurrections in Darfur – have been engaged in clashes with the Sudanese army since April. This ongoing conflict imperils the nation's unity, sovereignty, and overall security.

This is not a new phenomenon for totalitarian regimes. For example, when the Baath Party assumed power in Syria in a military coup in March 1963, it established the National Guard, a paramilitary group that it used to consolidate its rule.

This is not a new phenomenon for totalitarian regimes. For example, when the Baath Party assumed power in Syria in a military coup in March 1963, it established the National Guard, a paramilitary group that it used to consolidate its rule.

Later, in the early 1970s, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad formed military divisions parallel to the army. The most important of these was the Defense Brigades.

Assad entrusted the group's command to his brother Rifaat, bestowing upon him a great authority that enabled him to form a strong power centre, parallel to the position of the president himself.

Rifaat even aspired to replace the president, taking advantage of his illness in 1983. While he failed in his mission, it still proved to be a major shock to the regime at the time.

Many similar military divisions still exist in Syria today.

Global influence

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran is the most prominent non-state military group that has emerged from a Middle Eastern regime.

Founded in 1979, the IRGC is the strongest and most instrumental power when it comes to protecting the prevailing regime and expanding its influence. It has achieved this, in part, by establishing regional arms across the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, factions of the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq, and the Islamic Jihad in Palestine.

All these forces are birthed by the regime itself, as parallel armies, to protect it from internal threats coming from popular movements, or possible coup attempts, bearing in mind previous experiences in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, and Turkey.

Some governments even use these forces across borders to maximise their regional or global influence, while at the same time avoiding any political or legal ramifications brought on by their actions in other countries.

Some governments even use these forces across borders to maximise their regional or global influence, while at the same time avoiding any political or legal ramifications brought on by their actions in other countries.

There are evident differences among various groups. The Syrian special military divisions are there to protect the regime, as were the Sudanese RSF under al-Bashir. However, the Russian Wagner forces assembled to carry out missions beyond Russian borders, operating in Syria, Libya, Sudan (and several other African countries), and more recently, Belarus and Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the IRGC in Iran undertakes the task of protecting the regime at home. Yet their biggest role is concentrated abroad, as evidenced by attempts to strengthen and expand Iran's influence from Tehran to Lebanon, through Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and the their success in building local branches in those countries.

A distinction can be made between this type of non-state organisation and those that arise as political movements against a certain authority – or as national liberation movements that plead for armed struggle.

Nevertheless, some of these latter groups are an extension of the first type of organisation – that is, an extension of the influence of a particular country (Iran, for example).

This applies to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq, whose primary function is to serve regional interests rather than achieving local or national goals. This is also true of certain armed groups in Syria and the functional arm of the Syrian regime in Lebanon and Palestine, for example.

However, what "Putin's chef" Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of Wagner, and Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti), the commander of the RSF – and before them, Rifaat al-Assad in Syria – did, opens the door to competition between these groups and the armies of their respective countries.

They bring about the possibility of creating a rival power centre in the country, which was the case with Wagner. After the failed rebellion attempt, the Russian president did not punish Prigozhin, despite his undermining of the Russian army.

Complex, dangerous 'monster'

Putin initially stated that the Wagner group was not legally recognised, as Russian law prohibits private military entities. But on 27 June, he contradicted himself when he publicly conceded that the Russian government had indeed financed Wagner's activities.

He revealed that the government had allocated a substantial sum, approximately "86bn rubles" ($1bn), to Wagner's endeavours between May 2022 and May 2023. Furthermore, the Wagner Group sourced its arsenal of weapons and ammunition entirely from the stockpiles of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

It's worth noting that the Russian authorities also permitted Wagner to enlist criminal offenders incarcerated in Russian prisons, offering them clemency in exchange for their participation in hostilities in Ukraine.

Concurrently, Sudan continues to be engulfed in ongoing conflicts across the nation, as two opposing armed forces confront each other with an array of weaponry. The devastating consequences include the displacement of over three million Sudanese citizens, a substantial loss of life, and the widespread destruction of urban centres and vital infrastructure.

In Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, parallel military formations and militias are still more important than the "regular" army; they are stronger in terms of armament and influence.

In Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, parallel military formations and militias are still more important than the "regular" army; they are stronger in terms of armament and influence.

They have become more powerful than the state, as they majorly control decision-making in the country. They also form the governments, as has happened and is happening in Lebanon and Iraq.

In Sudan, they shared power with the army after toppling al-Bashir following the Sudanese revolution of 2019. This led to the country exploding in a struggle for power between the two military forces, at the expense of the Sudanese people.

The problem with these organisations becomes even more complex and dangerous when they act as an extension of another country and operate as a regional arm for it.

Such entities often draw support from an ideological and sectarian faction, a characteristic that holds true for numerous armed militia groups across Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. These groups are widely recognised as direct extensions of the IRGC, strategically advancing Iran's regional interests.

Ultimately, the monster born out of some authoritarian regimes has not benefited its creators. As experience has shown, two authorities – a state and a militia – cannot coexist. Nor can we talk about sovereignty, and a state's monopoly of power, if armed organisations are established that will sooner or later compete over resources and control.

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