Deterring Russia's horizontal escalation in Syria

While 2022 saw an uptick in incidents between US and Russian forces, the recent escalation in fact began in March when Russian aircraft violated the airspace above the US Al-Tanf Garrison (ATG) over 25 times in a single month.

Read more: From the Black Sea to Syria, Russian provocation of US troops intensifies

Since the Russian military entered Syria in 2015, such issues were successfully handled via the US-Russian military deconfliction "hotline". But unfortunately, as early as last September, Russia started reportedly calling only intermittently.

As to be expected, Russian officials claim it is in fact the US who is escalating —and even training Islamic State (IS) elements at the ATG.

According to statements on 29 July by Rear Admiral Oleg Gurinov, the deputy head of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in Syria, so far this year "the coalition's aircraft made 23 dangerous close encounters with the aircraft of the Russian aerospace forces". 

This includes 11 incidences where Russian aircraft were exposed "to weapons guidance systems which led to the automatic operation of onboard defence systems and the shooting of false thermal targets", including "two such cases in April, one in May, four in June and five in July."

Just what has led Moscow to decide to escalate with the US in Syria as its losses mount in Ukraine?

In June 2022, US General Michael Kurilla attributed recent Russian military posture to General Aleksandr Chayko's return to Syria after his troubled tenure commanding forces in Ukraine. 

But how to account for Moscow's recent decision-making, as well as reports of increased collusion between Russian, Iranian, and Syrian-backed groups in Syria? 

Counterproductive US policy decisions

American Syria policy decisions that have changed the political context in Syria certainly have not helped. Following a devastating earthquake on 6 February along the Turkish-Syria frontier, the US Treasury Department issued General License 23, which allowed for transactions outlined as "earthquake relief" under current US sanctions on Syria.

While the license was justified in the face of the scale of destruction and humanitarian need in Syria, the license language was particularly broad.

No definition of what constituted "earthquake relief" was outlined, it permitted transactions with "the Government of Syria" (otherwise known as the al-Assad Regime) despite a horrific track record of diverting humanitarian aid away from its opponents and provided an extended duration of six months instead of the standard three.

Official US policy opposes normalisation with al-Assad, but US regional allies read the license as permission to normalise relations with the al-Assad regime, leading to Syria's readmittance to the Arab League at its latest summit last May in Jeddah.

Read more: Arab summit brings together odd pairing: Putin's ally al-Assad and foe Zelensky

With al-Assad once again being welcomed back to the Arab fold and Russia's project of Turkish-Syrian rapprochement remaining an open issue, Moscow has not only read the license as permission for US allies to engage directly with al-Assad but also as the latest indication that Washington cares little about Syria policy and it believes the time is ripe to push US forces out of Syria.

And as also witnessed last month, Russia is vetoing any United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning continuing cross-border aid.

Recent US statements stating that it is not leaving Syria, combined with calling out Russia's escalation in Eastern Syria, have not been enough to deter Moscow.

While military action is the best way to send messages to an adversary, it is laden with risk, which perhaps can explain the White House's continued reticence to highlight that Russian aerospace damaged two US drones last week.

Best way to deter Moscow in Syria

The best way to deter Moscow from escalating with Washington over Syria is to change the political context there. Washington should show in deeds and not just words that it is opposed to the Kremlin's client in Damascus.

An opportunity to do so involves the possible extension of General License 23, which is due to expire on 8 August.

While some kind of sanctions relief may still indeed be appropriate to deal with destruction in north-east Syria, the administration should focus on using pre-existing carveouts that predate the General License, waiver authorities under Syria Caesar sanctions, and working with banks on what transactions are permitted in Syria, allowing bonafide assistance to flow.

If an extension is once again granted, the duration should be limited to the standard three months, "earthquake relief" should be clearly defined, and transactions with the al-Assad regime ended.

This would be an appropriate response to Russia's recent refusal to renew the crossborder aid resolution, and allow Washington to build an appropriate Plan B with humanitarian NGOs in non-Assad-controlled areas of Syria.

Only by showing Moscow that Washington and the West have options in Syria — militarily and politically — will Russia be dissuaded from further horizontal escalation that endangers US forces and partners there, and ultimately come to the peace table in Ukraine.

-Andrew J. Tabler is the Martin J. Gross Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the former Director for Syria, National Security Council and Senior Advisor at the US Department of State.