Politics

Why Arabs are increasingly joining the SDF in Syria's northeast

The bloodshed and brutality of Syria's long war have re-cast allegiances, with tens of thousands of Arabs fighting for the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces

AFP

Relatives and members of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) carry the coffin of an Arab fighter in SDF who was killed the previous week in the eastern Deir Ezzor province, during his funeral.

Why Arabs are increasingly joining the SDF in Syria's northeast

Rustum Mahmud

last update on 09 Jun 2023

Raqqa: The bloodshed in Syria’s far northeast is continuing, with many Arabs fighting as part of the separatist Kurdish army in opposition to the Damascus government.

While Al Majalla was travelling by car on the road between the cities of Qamishli and Raqqa – controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) –the local radio station reported that Aslan Ahmed Alkan, the leader of these forces, was a victim of a bombing in the city of Manbij, one of the areas under SDF control.

An encounter with his relatives helped explain the forces at work in Syria and how they have reshaped ethnic and other allegiances after the toll taken by such a long period of conflict.

We contacted the family of the victim several days after the attack, in the villages within the Raqqa Governorate. They had been displaced from their original area when the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition factions took control of it in the winter of 2019.

Aslan is the brother of Jamal Alkan, another leader in the SDF, who was killed during a confrontation with Islamic State (IS) members in the city of Raqqa.

Their other brother, Haqqi Alkan, has been affiliated with the internal security forces associated with the SDF since 2012, while their fourth brother holds a high-ranking security position within the SDF in Raqqa.

The family belongs to the Arab Al-Walda Tribe, specifically the Al-Howiwat branch, which is widespread throughout the northern countryside of the Raqqa Governorate.

AFP — A woman mourns while holding up the portrait of an Arab fighter in the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who was killed.

Alternative to regime forces

Many of the family's members joined the SDF after their cousin, Judge Ahmed Al-Khalif, was assassinated with a car bomb in Ras al-Ayn in the autumn of 2012. At that time, the city was partially controlled by extremist organisations that exerted various forms of domination over the local population.

Aslan's family told Al Majalla that their sons' affiliation with the SDF came primarily from their belief that these forces represented a distinct alternative to the Syrian regime, dark forces, and regional hegemony over Syria.

Their sons' affiliation with the SDF came primarily from their belief that these forces represented a distinct alternative to the Syrian regime, dark forces, and regional hegemony over Syria.

They mentioned that their sons had served in various parts of the SDF, including the highly secretive internal security apparatus known as the HAT Kurdish Special Forces.

A visit to the dedicated cemetery for SDF members in the cities of Raqqa and Tabqa reveals that this family's situation is not unique.

It shows just some of the thousands of Arab families whose sons became associated with the SDF in different capacities. Unofficial figures indicate that the number of Arab fighters within the ranks of the SDF exceeds 65,000 out of nearly 100,000 fighters overall.

The presence of Arab fighters is evident everywhere the SDF is deployed in northeastern Syria. They are on security checkpoints, patrolling city centers and towns, and serving within the military, as well as the security, intelligence, and civil institutions of the organisation.

Ethnic and national diversity is on show, with a range of dialects and regional backgrounds represented throughout the institutions.

A local cemetery tells a story

A visit to the dedicated cemetery for SDF members in the cities of Raqqa and Tabqa reveals that this family's situation is not unique.

AFP — People mourn as they attend the funeral of an Arab fighter in the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who was killed.

The presence of Arab fighters is evident everywhere the SDF is deployed in north-eastern Syria. They are on security checkpoints, patrolling city centres and towns, and serving within the military, as well as the security, intelligence, and civil institutions of the organisation.

Ethnic and national diversity is on show, with a range of dialects and regional backgrounds represented throughout the institutions.

Unofficial figures indicate that the number of Arab fighters within the ranks of the SDF exceeds 65,000 out of nearly 100,000 fighters overall. Ethnic and national diversity is on show, with a range of dialects and regional backgrounds represented throughout the organisation.

The area under SDF control east of the Euphrates is extensive, encompassing over 50,000 square kilometres, which constitutes approximately one-third of Syria's territory.

Within it, the majority of the population is Arab, comprising around 75% of the approximately 5.5 million residents, as indicated by credible sources. The remaining population mainly consists of Kurds, along with other smaller minority groups such as Syriacs, Chechens, Turkmens, Armenians, and Circassians.

The SDF is still often referred to as "Kurdish forces" by many, and while the number of Arab fighters within it has grown, there are contrasting perspectives on their role and representation within it.

One argues that the core of the SDF consists of the People's Protection Units (YPG) and the Women's Protection Units (YPJ), which were initially established with a predominantly Kurdish character and identity in the Kurdish-majority areas of northern Syria.

According to this view, the Arab elements within the SDF are seen as having a less influential role and authority compared to their Kurdish counterparts.

Symbolic presence

Supporters of this perspective say the presence of Arab fighters within the SDF is primarily symbolic, despite constituting such a high proportion. They argue that Arab fighters do not hold key positions of power or participate in making the political decisions that shape the SDF's actions and do not have sole control over any specific geographic territory.

Some say Arab fighters' presence within the SDF is primarily symbolic, despite constituting such a high proportion. They argue that Arab fighters do not hold key positions of power or participate in making the political decisions that shape the SDF's actions.

They believe that the majority of Arab fighters joined the SDF due to the economic crisis the region's population endured. Monthly salaries of around $200, are significantly higher than the average of around $60 paid to government employees.

Conscription has also meant more Arab enlistment, with a mandatory year of service by the SDF on all residents within their areas of control.

Arab civil and social circles in the region support these points and back this perspective. The Syrian regime's propaganda apparatus continuously stokes tribal and civil Arab leaders against the Autonomous Administration and the SDF, accusing them of separatism and collaboration with the United States.

The regime organises periodic popular conferences and forms tribal military brigades in areas adjacent to SDF-controlled territories, often with military support and financial backing from Iran. Notably, Iranian-affiliated militias from Syria and Iraq control the entire southern border strip adjacent to the SDF-controlled areas east of the Euphrates.

Syrian political and military organisations aligned with Turkey incite Arab tribes and figures in the region to oppose the SDF for their own political purposes.

The Syrian regime's propaganda apparatus continuously stokes tribal and civil Arab leaders against the Autonomous Administration and the SDF, accusing them of separatism and collaboration with the United States.

Diversity correspondents to region's composition

The SDF itself firmly rejects the notion that its forces are dominated by any single ethnicity and emphasise that its fighters come from diverse backgrounds.

They assert that the composition of their forces corresponds to the population ratio of the region, representing all ethnicities, religions, and sensitivities present in the northeast.

Al Majalla spoke to reliable sources within the SDF about the group's Arab fighters. They explained that the SDF is not a fully centralised military organisation but rather an alliance of various military formations.

That means there are all-Arab divisions within the SDF, including the Al-Sanadid Forces and the Raqqa Revolutionaries Front. Local councils represent the respective populations in each region, such as the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, Manbij Military Council, and Raqqa Military Council, which are entirely managed and supervised by Arab leaders.

Prominent Arab leaders – such as Haval Amira in the Euphrates Region Council and Ahmad Al-Khalil Abu Khawla, commander of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council – hold influential positions within these councils.

AFP — Relatives mourn at a funeral for an Arab man fighting alongside the mainly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on March 10, 2020 in the Syrian Kurdish-majority city of Qamishli.

From a political standpoint, the SDF maintains that its strategy and military doctrine are inclusive and founded on an alliance between the various components of the region.

They explicitly deny having any separatist or anti-Arab Kurdish nationalist tendencies. This approach is rooted in the principles of partnership within the SDF.

The SDF is fully committed to its Syrian identity and actively seeks comprehensive solutions to all Syrian issues, including the Kurdish question and determining the appropriate administrative status for the eastern Euphrates region in collaboration with the central authority and other Syrian regions.

There are all-Arab divisions within the SDF, including the Al-Sanadid Forces and the Raqqa Revolutionaries Front. These are entirely managed and supervised by Arab leaders.

An acknowledged partnership

Moreover, the structures of the SDF are designed to respect and uphold this partnership. Arabic is an official language within the ranks of the SDF in Arab-majority regions, as well as in all military and security institutions associated with the SDF.

The symbols, slogans, doctrines, and internal regulations of the forces fully acknowledge this partnership. The SDF sources also emphasise that there is no discrimination based on ethnicity, nationality, language, or region within their ranks.

Rights and responsibilities are equitably distributed among all members of the forces, and disciplinary measures and military trials are enforced against individuals who violate these principles.

Rights and responsibilities are equitably distributed among all members of the forces, and disciplinary measures and military trials are enforced against individuals who violate these principles.

Gradual transformation

Arab fighters' integration within the SDF has been through various transformations, closely linked to the political and military developments in Syria, particularly during the early years of the Syrian revolution, between 2011 and 2015.

These transformations can be attributed to four key factors:

1: Influence of extremist opposition factions

Since mid-2012, the spread of Syrian opposition groups in the east, including extremist organizations like Ghuraba al-Sham and The Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades, significantly impacted the Arab grassroots in the region.

These factions imposed strict security measures, totalitarian governance, and social regulations, creating a psychological and political divide between the local Arab population and the ruling factions.

2: Role of Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG)

The involvement of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) in countering extremist opposition factions played a crucial role in building confidence in the SDF.

The YPG established alternative institutions to those of the Syrian regime and refrained from interfering in the daily lives and economic activities of the Arab communities under their control.

3: Impact of the Kobani/Ain Arab battle

The first battle of Kobani/Ain Arab in the autumn of 2014 marked a turning point in the relationship between Arab fighters and the SDF. During this protracted confrontation, Kurdish forces demonstrated remarkable combat capabilities and military potential by successfully defeating IS.

Members of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) deploy outside Ghwayran prison in Syria's northeastern city of Hasakeh on January 26, 2022, after having declared over the facility following its takeover by Islamic State (IS).

This victory instilled greater confidence in the Kurdish-led forces, which was further bolstered by military, logistical, and financial support from the US and the Global Coalition against IS. At the time, statements from the YPG indicated that out of their 30,000 fighters, only 5,000 were Arabs.

The first battle of Kobani in the autumn of 2014 marked a turning point in the relationship between Arab fighters and the SDF. During this protracted confrontation, Kurdish forces demonstrated remarkable military potential by successfully defeating IS. This victory instilled greater confidence in the Kurdish-led forces.

4. Preparation for the liberation of Raqqa

In late 2015, as preparations for the battle to liberate Raqqa from IS gained momentum and received support from the US and the international community, Arab fighters were drawn closer to the SDF, deepening a sense of belonging.

Initially, the formation of the SDF was based on a military alliance between Kurdish forces and several Arab military factions, including the Al-Sanadid Forces and the al-Nukhba Forces, which acted as military extensions of local Arab tribal leaders.

This alliance diminished the predominantly Kurdish character of the YPG and led to a shift in the identity and political ideology of the military formation. Consequently, more Arab individuals and families were inclined to join these forces, particularly due to the significant military support provided by the US, including air support and the establishment of military bases across the eastern Euphrates.

A US armoured vehicle on the outskirts of the town of Rmeilan in the northeastern Syrian province of Hasakah, bordering Turkey, on March 27, 2023.

A military consensus was also reached with Russia and the Syrian regime, ensuring their abstention from military intervention in the eastern Euphrates region.

Unity in resisting IS

At the same time, Raqqa and the surrounding areas were under the control of IS, subjecting the Arab population to severe social and political oppression.

Saleh Al-Bush – a real estate trader and a prominent figure from the Al-Afadlah tribe in Raqqa – recounted the extreme measures imposed by IS, including his personal experience of physical flogging in the central market for smoking.

Syrian Kurdish Asayish security forces stand guard outside a house during a raid against suspected Islamic State group fighters in Raqa, the jihadist group's former de facto capital in Syria, on January 29, 2023.

These circumstances compelled him to leave the city at any cost, and he encouraged three of his children to join the SDF in their fight against IS. Tragically, he lost one of his children in the battle to liberate Raqqa.

Many other residents of Raqqa and the surrounding countryside faced similar hardships, binding them into the cause. Over time, as more young Arabs joined the SDF, it established the Autonomous Administration that governs the northeast of Syria, encompassing various aspects of public life.

The extremist rules of IS compelled many Arabs to leave Raqqa and join the SDF in their fight against IS. The inclusive nature of the administration and its alternative governance institutions inspired many individuals from the lower and middle social classes to join it.

This administration provided a better alternative to the governance structures of both the Syrian regime and opposition factions.

The inclusive nature of the administration and its alternative governance institutions inspired many individuals from the lower and middle social classes to join it, particularly the military, as it represented a new source of social empowerment and material influence.

Despite the expectations of various local and regional political forces, such as Turkey and the Syrian regime, mass defections by Arab fighters within the SDF have not occurred, even during major battles fought against these forces by Turkey.

The areas governed by the SDF have not had ethnic clashes between Kurds and Arabs, neither socially nor militarily. The relative internal cohesion within the SDF stands as the fundamental reason behind this stability.

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