Turkey’s influential ‘Erdoğanism’ is not about empire building

A president, not a sultan

Turkey has a strong notion of its own statehood. National identity is deeply ingrained in the Turkish collective consciousness and the national story it tells itself.

Talk of a new Ottoman ambition often comes from opponents to Erdoğan's positioning of the country, primarily from left-wing Israeli analysts and their European and Arab peers, who are critical of Turkey's Islamic focus during Erdoğan's time in office.

Many observers, aligned with the Arab regimes that perceive Erdoğan's rise as a threat, have fed into media campaigns portraying a president with aspirations for sultanate-like power. This is an inaccurate representation of Erdoğanism.

Like the contemporary adherents of its forerunner – Kemalism, named after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – the current president's supporters are also fundamental backers of Turkey as a nation-state, not a potential empire. In fact, Turkey is a pioneer of the concept of the nation-state in the region, along with Egypt and Iran.

That means they view the national interest and security matters from a perspective defined by the country's geographic boundaries and population, along the foundations laid a century ago.

Turkey's 2023 presidential election campaign was the zenith of internal debates dating back over two decades since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) assumed power in Turkey in 2002. It also had clear echoes of the country's birth as a modern nation, where we start our survey of Turkey, its politics and their broader significance.  

Westernisation and a new modern nation

Erdoğanism's origins go back much further than the president's time in office. The movement is the latest brand of politics rooted in the emergence of the Turkish Republic a century ago.

Its founder – Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – successfully reformed the governance system, instilled modern nationalist ideals and brought about systematic changes in social and cultural orientations.

He was primarily influenced by the adoption of European ideas, secularism, and Westernisation. The shift in the statutes faced opposition from conservative, Eastern, and Islamic tendencies that believed it would distance Turkey from its religious and social heritage, as well as from the values commonly associated with Eastern or conservative culture.

Turkey's internal divisions

Those contrasting forces set the divisions within Turkey's politics to this day. The struggle between parties keen to preserve Atatürk's legacy and conservative opponents seeking to take Turkey closer to the East and the Islamic world has persisted throughout democratisation.

Military coups against civilian rule, particularly since 1960, can only be properly understood in that context.

Erdoğanism is defined by its embrace of the nation-state and the pursuit of its interests. But the movement also distinguishes itself from secular forces and those advocating for Turkey to be a culturally and socially Western and European state.

Erdoğan's vision is for a strong nation-state but one restoring traditional, conservative Islamic and Turkish values to the public sphere. Erdoğan's vision is to restore conservative Islamic values.

He wants to align policy with the aspirations of the majority of Turks to match their social and cultural ambitions, including religious ones while fostering closer ties with the Middle East and the Islamic world.

At the same time, the current president's reduced emphasis on European-style secularism is gradual. He wants to stay reconciled with Kemalism without seeking to overturn its achievements.

Erdoğanism does not seek to undermine the foundations of the nation-state or the prioritisation of Turkish identity as formulated by Atatürk a century ago. It also has economic priorities, to establish a reasonable level of prosperity. Its foreign policy seeks less reliance on Europe and the United States while entertaining other global powers, including China and Russia.

Populist approach

In order to get the power he needed to put these policies into action, Erdoğan adopted a populist approach. He appealed to religious and nationalist sentiments and promised to uplift people from poverty. He incited opposition toward social, economic, and political elites, and backed traditional cultural norms that prevailed before Kemalism.

Erdoğan consistently highlighted Turkey's strength and independence, positioning it as a pivotal nation with significant influence in both the Arab region and Eastern Europe.

Identity politics prevail 

Erdoğan received a similar level of support in 2023 as he did in 2018, even with the country in economic crisis. This reveals much about what defines Turkey's politics.

The distribution of votes showed that public opinion is almost evenly divided between the president and his opponents which shows that the division of Turkish society into two evenly matched sides, along conservative and modernist lines, is deep enough to outweigh the country's current problems — from the devaluation of the country's currency to the devastating impact of the earthquakes in the country's southeast.

Although there have been some changes in voting patterns for the parliament, they mostly fall within the framework of political voting blocs in the legislature, rather than being defined by support for Erdoğan or opposition to him.

Predictions that the economic problems in Turkey would translate into less popular support for Erdoğan were wrong. Turkey's internal divisions remained largely intact.

On the one side are supporters of Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) alongside right-wing parties and activists, including some from the far-right.

Meanwhile, the other side is primarily made up of the Kemalist Republican Party, along with left-wing parties and groups representing the Kurds, all unified by their opposition to Erdoğanism.

Kurdish parties affect a geographical trend within the distribution of votes, helping underpin a majority for the opposition in areas where Kurds make up the majority in the east. The biggest issue for them is usually the desire for a route toward independence.

Read more: Dissecting Turkey's Kurdish vote: Turnout, trends and alliances

This demonstrates the significant influence of identity politics. It remains a significant factor despite attempts over the past century to create an inclusive Turkey-wide identity based on citizenship above all other factors, Atatürk's approach.

Coastal regions and cities voted for the opposition. These areas are more culturally, economically and socially connected to the outside world and have a predominantly youthful and pro-Western population.

Inland, most regions voted for Erdoğan. These areas have previously felt marginalised and have historically existed on the periphery of cultural, political, social, and even economic life.

The president's conservative and populist AKP consider them the centre of their Islamic-nationalist agenda. They are also opposed to Kurdish independence, as is the president.

Foreign policy priorities shift east

Turkey is seeking a more independent foreign policy as it shifts its political centre of gravity to the east, toward Islam and the Arab world and away from secularity and Europe. This means Erdoğan's movement has sought closer ties with Arab causes.

Turkey has increased its support for the Palestinians in their struggle against Israel. It is more aligned with the ideological and organisational framework of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Erdoğan's country has also shown support for wider democracy in the Arab world, or at the very least, those that advocate it alongside maintaining Islamic or conservative social and cultural principles to some extent.

This demonstrates both the president's commitment to conservatism and his commitment to improving the lives of Turks at home and Arabs elsewhere.

This also means that Turkish influence in the Arab world has notably grown since Erdoğan's rise to power as he has cemented his hold on power. His party has won five elections since 2002, effectively putting an end to a history of coups and failed governments.

Read more: What does Erdoğan's win mean for the Middle East?

Erdoğan's rule brought about economic and political reform, successfully combining religion and a free-market economy. It has made Turkey and the AKP into role models in the Arab world.

Political Islam and democratic integration

The country's brand of political Islam is seen in the same way by many Arabs. Its leadership, guided by Islamic principles, has pursued integration with democratic elements while upholding religious values that resonate with the people.

The AKP is committed to a balance between moderate Islamic values and democratic decision-making processes, reflecting the importance of religion in day-to-day life.

Until the recent financial crisis in Turkey, it had also been making significant economic progress.

It was, for a time, also seen as a model for the Arab world in this respect. Even with the recent turbulence, the Turkish economic approach is seen as more suitable for the Arab world compared to other models and countries.

It has, after all, been shaped in part by Turkey's geographical, demographic, cultural, economic, and historical proximity to the Arab region.

A champion of the Palestinian cause

Additionally, the Arab street sees Turkey as a strong opponent of Israel, and a country capable of challenging and confronting the government there.

It gave Ankara leadership over the Palestinian cause, in the absence of any alternative coming from elsewhere. Turkey's influence here rose during the Arab Spring, only to decline in line with its economic fortunes, which undermined Erdoğan's relative strength.

Given the significance of the Palestinian cause for most Arabs, Turkey, under Erdoğan's leadership, is seen as fulfilling this role in the absence of strong Arab leadership elsewhere.

A survey conducted by the University of Maryland in five Arab countries in 2011 found half the respondents believed Turkey played the most constructive role in responding to events in the Arab world. All the other countries combined made up the remaining 50%.

However, Erdoğan's rapprochement with Israel as Turkey's economy has struggled in recent years has eroded that perception.

However, closer relations with Israel do not mean that Turkey has forgotten the Palestinians. It still gives sanctuary to some of its activists and remains capable of inspiring the cause. Serious commentators still refer to Turkey's support for the Palestinians as a significant achievement.

It is one of the many reasons that Erdoğan is still seen as a role model in large parts of the Arab world and a mainstay of his popularity.

Different visions

Turkey's politics has offered the country two different visions of what it is and what it can be.

A majority of its people agree that it is a clearly defined nation-state and that its future and its security depend on preserving its population and geography. They also continue to back the vision set out by its modern founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his colleagues, a century ago.

Within this consensus, there is significant competition between two main currents.

One aims to align Turkey more closely with Western values and culture, distancing itself from its Turk-Ottoman/Islamic-Arabic past.

The other recognises the importance of maintaining the benefits of the more European approach while also seeking to reintegrate Eastern, Islamic, and Arabic values.

That does not necessarily rule out parallel openness in the relationship with Europe, and even pursuing potential economic and political gains by joining it, but it does emphasise stronger ties with the Arab and Islamic world while establishing an independent foreign affairs path separate from Europe.

These two visions can be observed firsthand as visitors can see how the country blends Western and Eastern influences. It is a common occurrence in Third World societies and Arab societies in particular.

It often involves learning from Europe and incorporating Western models into fundamental social, cultural, and structural changes.

One crucial aspect of this transformation is the adoption of democratic patterns in the state and bureaucratic reforms that directly connect citizens with the state, eliminating regional intermediaries. This sets Turkey apart from what is typically observed in Arab states.

Nonetheless, Erdoğan's current national transformation involves a significant shift toward Arab, Eastern, and Islamic patterns, which contrasts with the previous century of Westernisation initiated by Atatürk.

This sets the debate in Turkey apart from the discourse in much of the rest of the Arab world. Erdoğanism may have much to teach it, but the context will vary from country to country.

Through all its internal upheaval, it has always shown support for Arab causes, especially Palestine, alongside its commitment to democracy.

That commitment is revealing of the political forces that have shaped Turkey into a beacon for the Arab world.