Dissecting Prigozhin's failed power play: Is this the end of the road for Wagner PMC?

Staged coup?

Moreover, judging by the polls on social networks and the independent media, most Russian citizens believed that the events were staged in one way or another.

"We only know, at most, 10% of the real situation, which, unfortunately, is very common with our government," was one of the most popular comments among residents of the Russian capital.

A popular theory is that Prigozhin was, in fact, staging the 'coup' on Vladimir Putin's orders. They justify the decision by saying that Putin, because of formal and informal connections that he had formed, could not otherwise get rid of the existing military and political top brass.

Many are still wondering how Prigozhin managed to move so many columns in one night from Luhansk Oblast in different directions and then take control of the centre of the million-strong city of Rostov-on-Don and its military facilities without any intelligible photo and video evidence from eyewitnesses.

Strangely, the first photos of the mercenaries — captured by journalists and eyewitnesses — appeared only in the morning.

According to some reports, only four columns moved more than 1,000 units of Wagner equipment through the Voronezh region to Moscow. The first column (about 350 vehicles) crossed the border of the Voronezh region immediately after midnight on 24 June, the second and third columns arrived at 5 and 7 am respectively (about 375 and 100 vehicles), and at 9 am the fourth column of military equipment - 212 vehicles - crossed the border of the region.

In addition, the circumstances surrounding the negotiations to end mutiny, the return of the mercenaries to the camps 'according to plan' as Prigozhin put it, the mediation of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, and the agreement to grant Prigozhin and some of his fighters Belarusian residency, only sparked more questions — not answers.

There were even comments that, because of these movements, Russia was able to quickly regroup its forces, withdraw Ramzan Kadyrov's detachments with heavy weapons to the border with Rostov-on-Don and Belgorod, as well as increase the threat to Ukrainian troops in the Kyiv direction from the territory of Belarus.

Prigozhin overplayed his hand

These theories put aside, the most plausible explanation is that Prigozhin was testing his limits after a fallout with Putin where the two men were not on speaking terms. In fact, his mercenary group was under threat of disbandment following a presidential decree mandating that it signs contracts with the Defence Ministry.

According to political analyst Tatiana Stanovaya, Prigozhin likely overplayed his hands. He was caught off guard by Putin's punishment and the army and National Guard's (Rosgvardia) deployment as the first line of defence to stop his march on Moscow.

"All he cared about after the morning of the 24th was being able to get out alive from a game that had gone radically wrong for him," Stanovaya believes.

In any case, Prigozhin managed to conduct a comprehensive test of the politico-military system in one day: from assessing the capacity of regional officials and the ability of Russian security forces to stand up to a disgruntled, battle-hardened force in revolt, as opposed to a handful of unarmed oppositionists.

Domestic implications

All influential Russian experts agree that the 'march' of Prigozhin's mercenaries on Moscow will lead to changes in the Russian power centre — including legislative amendments, personnel reshuffles, and intra-elite changes — depending on demonstrated loyalty to the president and who sided with whom during the 'coup'. However, it will not happen immediately as Putin rarely makes reactionary decisions.

On 26 June, the press office of the Defence Ministry released footage showing Shoigu inspecting the Western grouping of Russian troops in Ukraine. But there are enough reasons to believe that this footage was recorded in advance and distributed on Shoigu's personal account, to squash speculation over his imminent resignation.

Despite statements by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov that charges against Prigozhin have been dropped, the Russian media reports that the criminal case of organising an armed insurgency has not been legally dropped and continues to be investigated by the Russian Federal Security Service investigation department.

But according to independent sources, these reports appeared for two reasons: to encourage Prigozhin not to delay his departure from Russia (according to some reports, he has already arrived in Minsk) and to boost the reputation of investigating authorities, which suffers from poor credibility.

Media sources in the Defence Ministry confirm what this Al Majalla journalist previously reported — that Wagner forces will be afforded the opportunity to integrate into existing law enforcement agencies of the MoD and Rosgvardia — but the PMC as a whole will not remain intact.

In the meantime, the activities of the Wagner PMCs in various regions of Russia — nearly 40 cities, including 16 cities with a population of a million — have resumed and continue recruitment as usual, offering salaries higher than the average wage of military contract soldiers. This could just be inertia at play, but it is possible that Prigozhin will continue recruitment as a way to pressure the authorities.

The Kremlin can, in fact, disband the Wagner network of recruitment centres without major repercussions. It can work directly with mercenary units in Ukraine combat zones — especially given the fact that not all Wagner staff supported the decision to rebel.

Foreign implications

But managing Wagner's presence and influence in foreign countries may be more challenging. It was Wagner's flexible structure and speed of decision-making that allowed it to become a driving force that paved the way for the official Russian agencies abroad and allowed local authorities to take Russian activities seriously.

The Wagner Group has numerous ongoing projects in Africa. For example, it is known that the agreement to establish a military facility in Sudan was originally prepared by Prigozhin's people. However, when it was handed over to the military, it failed.

Read more: Sudan clashes point to broader battle for control in Africa

Fortunately for the Kremlin, there are no active combat operations in Syria and Libya, which could further cement the role of Wagner PMC in these countries. Thus, in Libya, over the past year, the Wagner's units have served only as a standby force.

However, in the past, there were cases when the interests of Prigozhin conflicted with the Kremlin, and the actions upset the balance that the Foreign Ministry tried to maintain by interacting with various competing forces in Libya.

In Syria, the presence of Wagner's mercenaries has also remained nominal and limited to controlling a few facilities in Homs and administrative structures in Damascus and Latakia. In addition to military personnel in Syria, other mercenary groups affiliated with the Defence Ministry and not related to Prigozhin, such as Redut PMC, have long operated.

According to some reports, the official decision of the Arab League to restore Damascus' membership in the organisation made Prigozhin consider, in May 2023, moving additional mercenary units to Syria to demonstrate intentions of maintaining a presence in Syria against the backdrop of the changing political landscape.

Prigozhin independent actions pose a threat to the Kremlin, both inside and outside of Russia. The Defence Ministry still has considerable leverage over Wagner PMC, since all logistics of mercenaries are based in official Russian facilities, and the hub for their operations in Africa has been the Khmeimim air base in Syria. If it is closed to his mercenaries, Prigozhin will have to orchestrate his foreign operations from Belarussia.

It's important to note that Alexander Lukashenko — who not long ago faced a serious wave of protests — is unlikely to welcome the gathering on his territory of a serious private army led by Prigozhin, who still has not only political ambitions but also the desire to prove to the Kremlin that it is wrong about him.