Germany leads the charge in European security

The manoeuvres encompass tactical and operational exercises in Germany, as well as in the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Latvia. According to Emily Goldman, the United States ambassador to Germany, the exercise aims to send a strong message to Russia's President Vladimir Putin, demonstrating the alliance's strength and resolve.

Germany is facing increased pressure, both internally from the governing coalition and externally from the US, to offer deeper support to Ukraine as the war goes on, with Washington calling for allies to provide Kyiv with equipment, including German Leopard 2 tanks and US-made F-16 fighter jets.

Berlin steps up

As Germany takes a lead role in the Nato exercises, there is an implication it could imply a potential commitment to aerial operations in Ukraine, by controlling the airspace or providing ariel support to Ukrainian ground units, which have been experiencing significant losses in personnel and equipment.

There is also speculation that Germany may offer support to ground units in the event of deteriorating conditions, while the Nato manoeuvres also look at Nato's options for an offensive on Belarus via Estonia and Latvia.

Germany's wider strategic overhaul also indicates that Berlin could take on a spearhead role for Nato in future confrontations with Russia.

This decision stems from Ukraine's inability to achieve significant battlefield progress in eastern and southern regions, which has not shifted the balance of the conflict enough to halt the Russian military operation or prevent Moscow from annexing further territory.

The goal is to initiate a political process that allows Washington and its allies to save face while establishing a new phase.

Since President Volodymyr Zelensky came to power and expressed a desire to join Nato, Ukraine has lost its role as a buffer state between Russia and the countries of the alliance.

A new buffer zone

Zelensky's actions – including overturning agreements made since the fall of the Soviet Union – have contributed to an evolving power imbalance and increasing threats between Washington and Moscow.

As a result, the Russian threat may expand into central and western Ukraine, nearer Nato's eastern member states such as Poland, and the Baltic states of Lithuania and Latvia.

This would eliminate the minimum defence depth of their borders, reinforcing Nato's need to establish new boundaries for a buffer zone, this time in Ukraine's west,  to create a new balance with Russia. Washington sees Germany as capable of leading the Baltic states and shouldering the military and economic burdens this would involve.

Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the concept of a buffer state has not been abandoned by the West.

Although Poland and the countries to the east of Germany have joined Nato, they are still regarded as second-tier allies.

Polish President Andrzej Duda, in an interview with The Financial Times prior to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, expressed the view that Nato treats his country "as a buffer state," with the arrangement of bases indicating that Germany is still considered the eastern side of the alliance.

As a result, Poland and other countries in the region feel that they do not enjoy the same rights, privileges, and protections as the countries located further west.

Lessons from history

Colonial history shows that major powers often choose to establish buffer states, which is seen as an inevitable tactic. The purpose of a buffer state is to absorb the consequences of conflicts between competing powers, thereby helping to maintain a geopolitical balance.

Consequently, these states are destined to exist in a risky environment and may even be shared by rival major powers instead of being directly contested.

A historical example of this is the division of Poland following the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Germany's foreign ministers in August 1939. Although Hitler and Stalin were not allies, they were willing to share Poland, making it a buffer between them.

Ukraine experienced a similar situation long before Putin's invasion in 2022 due to its geographical position between major adversaries.

During Viktor Yanukovych's presidency from 2010 to 2014, Ukraine found itself leaning towards appeasing Russia rather than aligning with the goals of Ukrainians who sought closer relations with the European Union.

Then, Petro Poroshenko, Yanukovych's successor, faced significant challenges in dealing with a divided country as a result of ongoing activities by pro-Russian separatists and Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. The election of President Zelensky in 2019 marked the end of Ukraine's role as a traditional buffer state.

Questions over the future

The goals outlined in Germany's National Security Strategy extend beyond the defence of Germany itself.

It appears that Germany is willing to assume the responsibility of leading Nato in managing the military aspect of the conflict with Russia, as well as addressing the cyber and economic aspects of the challenge posed by China, particularly after Zelensky's reduced influence.

In this context, several questions arise: Does the German strategy aim to establish new borderlines and define the parameters of Western confrontation and settlement conditions with Russia?

Is there a potential risk of history repeating itself with a situation resembling the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in Ukraine, where Ukraine pays the price for being caught in the establishment of a buffer zone between Russia and the West?