Is Germany's first National Security Strategy all bark and no bite?

According to the more analytical section of the document, Russia, in the German government's view, represents the biggest threat to its security whereas China is identified as a hybrid actor as Beijing is considered a partner in several fields, but also a rival in others. 

The Middle East, traditionally perceived in Europe as a permanent source of unpredictable mischief, seems to hold much less of a paramount role in the government's strategic considerations.

Three pillars

These rest on three pillars of 'integrated security', namely the upscaling of Germany's military and defence capacities, strengthening the resilience of society against foreign interference, in particular through disinformation and cyber warfare, and sustainable development.

This last element underlines the strong belief in Berlin that threats like climate change will lead to existential crises in Europe and the European neighbourhood and, therefore need, to be reckoned with as security concerns. So far, so good, on paper.

However, Germany may have another strategic choice to make, one that is rather not debated too much in public and one that concerns its security mentality rather than its technical skills.

No other major economic power has benefited like Germany from the so-called peace dividend after the end of the cold war. Germans traditionally believe in the economic advantages of a multilateral global order that favours trade over hegemony.

This narrative worked supremely on the German voter since, at times, the country implicitly delegated the safeguarding of its own security interest to allies such as the United States or France. But apart from the latter's nuclear capacities, there is something else that distinguishes these two nations from Germany — namely their ability and willingness to deter, or even take national security matters rather personally.

It might be the professional deformation of a Middle East expert like myself to look for evidence by turning to the Arab world. But the region and its political players make this difference rather clear.

European commentators often pride themselves in claiming that the US had withdrawn from the Middle East to the benefit of their geopolitical rivals, and, therefore, are no longer to be feared. Whereas there might be some truth to the first part, the second claim could not be more absurd.

Middle Eastern leaders know fairly well that America is not only able but also unabashed to use its omnipotent and ubiquitous power against those who threaten its security or geopolitical interest. Cross certain lines with the Americans and, tomorrow, you may find your name blacklisted by banks across the globe. Or perhaps a 'Reaper' combat drone could make an undesirable celebrity appearance over your weekend hideaway.

Even the French, Germany's favourite sister in the great and rules-based civilisation project called the European Union, can be quite ruthless when it comes to national security – which can well include the duty to protect the Republic's honour.

It is widely accepted, if not beyond debate, in France that the president can literally sentence to death by decree individuals suspected of plotting terrorist attacks.

These details are part of a much larger framework of security mentalities: It is the idea that the state is entitled not only to safeguard its interest beyond legal impediments but also to deter and exercise retribution. Imperial legacy or not, in the cases of France and the US, the state can take things rather personally.

Other than its major Western allies, the German Federal Republic is not involved in the business of projecting power beyond its territorial borders, which are identical to its jurisdiction. Therefore, Germany did not feel the imminent need to develop a system, let alone a mentality, of deterrence other than its law enforcement.

The German public, since the end of the cold war, has been sceptical of empowering its security apparatus. And the critics often had themselves proven vindicated whenever too much legroom was given to the 'intelligence community'. German spy adventures sometimes resulted in a travesty.

Some barons of Germany's secret services — namely the foreign intelligence service BND and the domestic Secret Service dubbed "protection of the constitution" (Verfassungsschutz) — have gained notoriety rather by venturing into bizarre political activities or shady private consultancy work after their retirement.

Until today, espionage is not fancied as a very glamorous career in Germany. You might end up a provincial bureaucrat with your privileges limited to discounts for shopping for unfashionable clothes.

In such a climate, it is hard to imagine that intelligence figures take the fight against a foreign state (or non-state) opponents to a level that would require too much personal commitment and personal risk. This however may be needed at times when the other side is quite personally involved.

If Germany is to be taken seriously in its assessment of the threats as outlined in its recent national security strategy, it may need to assess another capacity, namely a capacity to harm and, at times, inflict painful disadvantages on those who are up to no good.

For sure, it is a major achievement of Germany that the rule of law and respect for international order overrule all reflexes of vindictiveness. But as a part of Germany's defence against external and internal threats — namely threats that originate in places out of Germany's jurisdiction—  it may need to develop adequate tools for raising the cost of an attack for its opponents. This applies mainly, but not exclusively, to the world of cyber warfare.

Germany may also need to reassess the legal and practical boundaries between a retributive counterstrike and what can still be counted as an act of self-defence against an imminent threat. Those who the German government have recently identified as a major source of danger to its national security are rather rational players in the field.

According to the German government's own assessment, they operate indiscriminately and without limits, as long as, by default, they never fear being paid back in kind. Respect may not yet be a widely accepted currency in Germany, but it is so certainly among those who target its security.

So, since it is no real option for Germany to follow France's, or America's example, it needs to find new, creative ways to dissuade and keep its enemies at bay.

-Daniel Gerlach is a German Middle East expert and editor-in-chief of Zenith Magazine.