Understanding Iran's pragmatic approach in Afghanistan
Safeguarding its water interests, securing its borders and preventing other regional players from gaining a foothold in Afghanistan are all reasons behind Tehran's practical approach.
AFP
Members of the Taliban security forces arrive as Afghan women march during a demonstration they call ‘Stop Hazara genocide’ a day after a suicide bomb attack at Dasht-e-Barchi learning centre, in Kabul on October 1, 2022.
Understanding Iran's pragmatic approach in Afghanistan
The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan marks a critical turning point in the country's relations with its neighbouring nations, particularly Iran. Iran now finds itself in a precarious position, facing significant geopolitical challenges that necessitate a re-evaluation of its security, political, and economic role.
With the swift territorial gains made by the Taliban following the withdrawal of US forces and their allies, Tehran detects a genuine threat to its interests in Afghanistan. Consequently, Iran is compelled to seek ways to protect its own interests and prepare for potential future scenarios.
On 7 July 2021, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif took the initiative to convene a meeting between representatives of the Kabul government and the Taliban. The objective was to bridge differences and address the Afghan crisis, given its potentially negative consequences for neighbouring countries and their interests.
Zarif stressed the importance of returning to the inter-Afghan negotiation table and embracing political solutions as the best options for Afghanistan's leaders and political movements. He also expressed Iran's "willingness to contribute to the dialogue between the various parties involved, aiming to resolve the conflicts and crises in the country."
Iran's urgency in bringing together the Afghan parties for dialogue immediately after the US forces evacuated the Bagram airbase was not solely driven by the pursuit of crisis resolution. It also sought to gauge intentions and identify opportunities for reordering priorities within Afghanistan.
Iran's urgency in bringing together the Afghan parties for dialogue immediately after the US forces evacuated sought to gauge intentions and identify opportunities for reordering priorities within Afghanistan.
Reflecting Iran's concerns about the Taliban's advances and its threat to Iranian interests, Hussam Razavi, the Director General of the Foreign Affairs Office of Tasnim News Agency, affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, cautioned Hazara Shiites in Afghanistan against joining the war against the Taliban.
This warning coincided with the Taliban's assault on northern Afghan regions, severing communication links between Afghan minorities and the Central Asian republics that had previously been part of Iran's sphere of influence.
Iran relies on cultural, ethnic, linguistic, historical, and religious commonalities to foster relationships that enhance its regional influence and safeguard its political interests and security. By advising Hazara Shiites not to fight against the Taliban, the Iranian regime acknowledges the group's significant role as an undeniable actor in the Afghan landscape.
Members of the Taliban security forces arrive as Afghan women march during a demonstration they call 'Stop Hazara genocide' a day after a suicide bomb attack at Dasht-e-Barchi learning centre, in Kabul on October 1, 2022.
Central Asian geopolitics
A report published by the Russian newspaper Izvestia, authored by Ksenia Loginova, highlights the historically tense relations between Iran and the Taliban.
The Taliban movement is viewed as unreliable, resistant to negotiation, and posing a significant threat. Farhad Ibragimov, an expert at the Valdai International Discussion Club, further emphasised that hopes for normalising relations between Tehran and Afghanistan have diminished since the Taliban took over the government.
The halt in communications between Tehran and the Taliban, coupled with the Taliban's explicit threats to seize Iranian territories, has contributed to this deterioration.
In the same report, researcher Vasily Ustanin-Golovnya asserts that Afghanistan represents a ticking time bomb for Central Asia, particularly within the triangle of anti-Western resistance involving Russia, China, and Iran. Ustanin-Golovnya claims that destabilising Central Asia through Afghanistan aligns with the interests of the West, as it simultaneously undermines Russia, China, and Iran.
He further points out that the United States, upon withdrawing from Afghanistan, left behind a significant amount of weaponry and equipment, in addition to signing a peace agreement with the Taliban in Doha on 29 February 2020.
This agreement involved representatives from both sides, Nato Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, and the US Secretary of State at the time, Mike Pompeo. The United States also pledged annual financial aid to support the training of Afghan security forces.
Within the international context, recent border developments between Iran and the Taliban shed light on China's involvement. China aims to fill the void left by the United States and expand its influence in Afghanistan, potentially as a means to reassure Washington.
Taliban fighters hold Taliban flags in Kabul, Afghanistan, Monday, Aug. 30, 2021.
China has reached an agreement with the Taliban government regarding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and there are ongoing reports of Chinese business activities in Afghanistan, which primarily serve China's foreign agenda. Following the Iranian-Saudi agreement, China has demonstrated its capability to forge alliances in the Islamic world.
Regarding Afghan-Russian relations, it is likely that the withdrawal of US forces and Nato will result in the establishment of solid alliances in counter-terrorism efforts and economic cooperation. Moscow and Beijing are already collaborating in this domain, providing opportunities to deepen their security presence through joint military exercises and enhanced military coordination.
Pakistan was not the sole country redefining its role in the geopolitical stage of Afghanistan. Qatar has also played a significant role by hosting the Taliban's political office for years and facilitating diplomatic communications between the United States and the Taliban.
While Qatar maintains generally positive relations with Iran, the two countries differ on key regional issues, such as the Syrian crisis. This divergence gives Doha influence in the Iranian-Afghan crisis.
Additionally, Turkey, a close ally of Qatar, has been actively involved in Afghanistan, including securing Kabul International Airport and engaging in economic cooperation with the new regime.
This could potentially create a challenging situation for Iran, as Turkey's growing presence in Afghanistan, coupled with its establishment of a foothold in the South Caucasus, could lead to Iran feeling geopolitically encircled by its regional competitors.
Turkey's growing presence in Afghanistan, coupled with its establishment of a foothold in the South Caucasus, could lead to Iran feeling geopolitically encircled by its regional competitors.
Three reasons for pragmatism
Iran has three main reasons to adopt a pragmatic strategy towards the developments in Afghanistan, despite a history of hostility with the Taliban. Firstly, it needs to maintain access to water resources. Secondly, it aims to secure its borders. Lastly, it seeks to prevent the encroachment of other regional governments into Afghanistan.
An aerial view from a medevac helicopter shows the Helmand river in Helmand province.
The Hazaras, Afghanistan's third-largest ethnic group, constitute approximately 10 to 15 percent of the country's population. Their importance has increased with the militarization of Iranian foreign policy, which utilises an ideological and sectarian factor in forming networks of regional proxies.
The Fatemiyoun Brigade was created by Afghan Shiite refugees in Iran and members of the Shiite Hazara minority in Afghanistan to fight alongside the Syrian regime.
Former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif previously proposed to the Afghan government the utilization of the Fatemiyoun Brigade to combat the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISK) and suggested integrating these forces under the leadership of the National Army to fight terrorism.
Zarif emphasised Iran's readiness to support the Fatemiyoun Brigade under the Afghan government's command. These statements targeted not only the Afghan government but also the Taliban and the United States if their interests in Afghanistan were threatened.
Iran has pragmatically navigated the political developments following the US withdrawal by choosing not to oppose the Taliban and acknowledging its advancements. In doing so, Iran seeks to safeguard the Shiite Hazaras, who were at the forefront of the fight against the Taliban.
Iran has three reasons to adopt a pragmatic strategy in Afghanistan. Firstly, it needs to maintain access to water resources. Secondly, it aims to secure its borders. Lastly, it seeks to prevent the encroachment of other regional governments into Afghanistan.
Iran has integrated them into the deal with the Taliban to protect them from being targeted. However, now that the Taliban controls Afghanistan, Iran will face challenges persuading them to incorporate the Fatemiyoun Brigade into the government's security forces.
Therefore, it is unlikely that Iran can replicate the Iraqi scenario of forming Shiite militias and integrating them into the political system or armed forces, as seen with Hezbollah or the Popular Mobilization Forces.
Currently, with the conflict in Syria subsiding and militias returning to Iran and Afghanistan, there are considerations to potentially reuse the Fatemiyoun Brigade in new conflicts, with Afghanistan being one of the theatres.
Their experience gained during the past years in Syrian cities, coupled with their strong relationship with the Tehran regime and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, make them viable assets.
Afghan fighters with the Fatemiyoun Brigade in Syria.
However, reintegrating these militias to protect Iranian interests within Afghanistan would introduce a sectarian dimension to the conflict and result in serious repercussions threatening regional security and further involvement of other states and sectarian militias.
On the other hand, experts argue that Tehran faces limited options in preserving its interests in Afghanistan. Unlike the Middle East, where Iran has allies through which it exercises influence, it lacks such a foothold in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is crucial for Tehran to redefine its interests and adopt new strategies to navigate the changing power dynamics in the region.
Arrangements and calculations
Tehran should swiftly seek arrangements with the Taliban to contain the tense situation and establish alliances and structures for continuous consultation with regional powers, particularly China and Russia. These countries have rejected the American presence in their backyard and will aim to shape a regional system capable of managing the consequences of two decades of American influence.
Iran's calculations regarding the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban's return to power have not aligned with its hopes. Tehran had anticipated the new geopolitical landscape to strengthen its relations with China and Russia, positioning itself as an indispensable power in the Middle East while affirming its shift toward the East.
A US Air Force aircraft takes off from the airport in Kabul on August 30, 2021. Rockets were fired at Kabul's airport on August 30 where US troops were racing to complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan.
However, the winds blowing in Afghanistan have not been favourable to Iranian interests. Iran recognises the potentially catastrophic consequences of Afghanistan descending into civil war or becoming a base for extremist terrorism once again.
It also acknowledges the uncertainty that comes along with the evolving global landscape. The limits of Iran's adventurism in Afghanistan will depend on Tehran's rational assessment of its objectives and fears in the country.
