Erdogan’s victory and Syria’s divisions

How Erdogan’s victory has disappointed Damascus, concerned Syrian Kurds and Americans, and reassured Syrian refugees

Erdogan’s victory and Syria’s divisions

The Syrians’ interest in the Turkish presidential elections — more so than others in the region — is understandable.

Turkey is a neighbouring country separated from Syria by an approximately 1,000-kilometre border. It hosts about four million Syrian refugees, and its army is stationed in northern Syria and spread across pockets where approximately four million Syrians live, half of whom are displaced.

Syrians, however, do not share uniform feelings over the election results.

The Turkish presidential elections have become yet another subject of disagreement and cause for division. This fragmentation is natural given Syria's deepening divisions over the last decade.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan is the 13th Turkish president. He handed himself the key to the palace, ensuring a smooth transition from the first to the second centenary of the republic. This is the reality that Syrians — with their diverse backgrounds — must deal with in the next five years.

Within this context, there are three Syrian trends that beg many questions and few answers.

Russia and Damascus-Ankara tensions

First, is the situation in Damascus.

It is well known that Russian President Vladimir Putin exerted significant pressure on President Bashar al-Assad to hold a trilateral Syrian-Turkish-Russian summit (with Iranian participation as well). The Tsar’s goal was to collect cards for his friend, the Sultan, in order to extend his stay in the palace.

Al-Assad refused to hold this meeting before the Turkish military withdrew from northern Syria, agreed to withdraw or set a timetable for the withdrawal.

However, the real reason for al-Assad's refusal was that he did not want to help his opponent, Erdogan, to win a new term. In fact, he was betting on his rival Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who had ties and alliances with Damascus.

Under pressure from Putin and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, al-Assad agreed to send his foreign minister, Faisal Mekdad, to meet his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu in Moscow.

This essentially meant that Syrian-Turkish normalisation shifted from the security track to the political track without/before withdrawal or commitment to withdrawal.

This was al-Assad’s gift to Putin.

And now that Erdogan secured the presidency once again, it is very likely that Russia and Iran will push to maximise Syrian-Turkish rapprochement. But the difference now is that Erdogan is no longer under the pressure of time and the ballot box.

Didn't Cavusoglu say a few days ago that the Turkish military presence would remain until the elimination of the terrorist threat? There is a new reality now, Erdogan will be around for years, and so will al-Assad. And they both need Putin.

But the question here is how will they deal with this new reality.

There is a new reality now, Erdogan will be around for years, and so will al-Assad. And they both need Putin. But the question here is how will they deal with this new reality.

Part of the answer lies with Putin — that is if the Ukraine war gave him enough time to think about the Syrian issue.

The Syrian Kurds and the Americans

The second situation to keep an eye on is in Qamishli.

The Syrian Kurds also bet on the Ottoman Sultan's departure from the palace. It was not just a bet but a conviction that Erdogan was on his way out, and his opponent — an ally to the Kurds and the Alawites — was coming.

The Kurds are just as disappointed at the election results as al-Assad.

Erdogan, the 13th Turkish president, now feels empowered to combat terrorism and confront the Kurdish People's Defence Units (YPG), the Syrian counterpart of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and the ally of the Special Units, i.e., the US forces, in north-eastern Syria.

Secondly, the United States, which is stationed east of the Syrian Euphrates, sees Erdogan as an existing reality in the coming years. He is part of the equation concerning the relationship with Russia, Nato, and the war in Ukraine.

The United States, which is stationed east of the Syrian Euphrates, sees Erdogan as an existing reality in the coming years. He is part of the equation concerning the relationship with Russia, Nato, and the war in Ukraine

One of the possible scenarios is that Erdogan is given the freedom to manoeuvre militarily east of the Euphrates and exert pressure on America's Kurdish allies. Also, there could be Russian pressure for a Syrian-Turkish understanding against America's allies, i.e., the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Syria's refugees and displaced

The third situation to follow is in Idlib — its residents, displaced people, and refugees. The initial reaction of many Syrian refugees in Turkey after the announcement of Erdogan's victory was a sense of relief.

The discourse of the Turkish opposition spread fear and concern among approximately four million Syrians in Turkey and an equal number in northern Syria.

The impression was that Kilicdaroglu's victory meant pressuring refugees to return and cooperating with Damascus at the expense of the opposition. Erdogan's victory was met with celebrations from opponents and refugees.

Time alone will prove whether they were right to have these feelings and calculations amid Arab, regional, and international equations that involve numerous deals and geopolitical considerations.

One of the plans was a Turkish-Arab cooperation to build housing projects in areas of Turkish influence in northern Syria, aiming to facilitate Syrians' voluntary and secure return to their country.

The Syrian repercussions of Erdogan's victory are significant.

It is most likely that this victory will expedite the Arab normalisation process with Damascus, which gained new momentum after Damascus' return to the Arab League and al-Assad's attendance at the Arab summit in Jeddah. 

It is most likely that Erdogan's victory will expedite the Arab normalisation process with Damascus, which gained new momentum after Damascus' return to the Arab League and al-Assad's attendance at the Arab summit in Jeddah.

Turkey intervenes in many Arab states — from Libya to Iraq, Syria, and others.

Some people see Syria as a doorstop to Turkish expansion and incursion in the Arab world. Damascus should be a partner in this equation, and this means strengthening the Syrian state and enhancing the Arab role in Damascus.

What helps reinforce this trend is Erdogan's retreat from his normalisation policies in the region after winning the elections. At that time, Syria will experience many transformations, surprises, and deals.

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