A landmark political moment for Turkey’s Alevis breaks a big taboo

The country's political landscape is divided into two major camps. One of them – President Erdoğan's AKP, along with the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), – has been accused of playing on religious sensitivities.

Alleged discrimination

Alevis have long maintained their own political narrative, which revolves around their collective history in modern Turkey, which is primarily one of oppression.

They believe that successive governments and authorities over the past century regarded them as second-class citizens, albeit indirectly.

They argue that this perception stems from the founding structure of the Turkish state, including the constitution, political system, ruling elites, and the demographic dominance of other religious groups.

The Alevis, who are clustered in central Anatolia, and the southern and western coastal cities, support this claim in various ways. They point to a lack of legal recognition for their faith and places of worship. There are accusations of discrimination within the administrative structure of government.

There have been allegations of violence and threats, including hate speech, with subsequent claims that no legal action has followed against those responsible.

Alevi children are compelled to undergo compulsory programmes on Islamic/Sunni religious education, with no such provision for their own beliefs. That contrasts with other Islamic sects that receive financial and administrative support for their clergy.

Alevis have long felt marginalised and discriminated against in Turkey, more so in recent years under the rule of centre-right parties and factions that conflate Turkish nationalism with political Islam.

Read more: Is Turkey's political Islam experiment coming to an end?

These groups have governed Turkey for a significant portion of its modern era, with President Erdoğan's AKP representing the latest — and particularly intense — phase.

Populist politics takes a toll

The populist nature of current politics has amplified sectarian rhetoric against Alevis, especially during periods of political crisis when identity discourse is exploited.

Alevis and the Kurds have been subtly accused of attempting to divide Turkey rather than having their legitimate social and cultural grievances addressed. 

Alevis have faced threats and intimidation targeting their religious institutions and members of their community. They argue that these incidents have escalated significantly during the AKP's rule with perpetrators often going unpunished.

The community attributes this to populist rhetoric from the AKP and its affiliates, including in the religious establishment and the media.

These circles view the Alevis as a threat to the Muslim Turkish identity, associating them with subversion, support for the Syrian regime, alignment with Western values, or involvement with the Fethullah Gülen network or the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). 

The AKP has found the Alevi community to be a convenient target for its populist discourse, even if only indirectly and unofficially.

Concurrently, Alevis claim that the AKP's long rule has excluded them from critical structures of governance, including the judiciary, bureaucracy, diplomatic representation, and security services.

Exclusion has extended to the economy, particularly within the business elite, which has become predominantly composed of conservative Anatolian business figures aligned with the AKP, leading to a significant reduction in Alevi representation.

Better conditions away from AKP areas

Alevis claim that their living conditions in cities controlled by mayors from opposition groups, the Republican People's Party or the Democratic People's Party, are generally better.

That extends to civil institutions, places of worship, and public life compared to those living in cities and towns under the control of the AKP Party or its partner, the National Movement Party.

Alevis point out the ruling party's reluctance to implement landmark judicial decisions made in their favour.

They highlight the landmark ruling of the European Supreme Court issued in 2014, which condemned persecution and discrimination against Alevis, officially recognising "Alevism" as a religion or religious sect rather than just an entity, vision, or cultural practice.

The court mandated that the state grant Alevis the same rights and benefits as other religious groups. Subsequently, the Turkish Supreme Court of Appeal affirmed this decision twice in 2015 and 2016, yet the state and its institutions have failed to adhere to the rulings.

Sweeping political transformations 

Experts on Turkey's politics and society note some fundamental changes in the choices and level of organisation and sense of identity shown by Alevis as they have faced renewed challenges.

Their involvement in political organisations has grown, mainly through their affiliation with the Republican People's Party (CHP).

They now consider it their party, standing parallel and equal to the other major political organisations: the Justice and Development Party (AKP) representing Sunni Muslims, the National Movement Party (MHP) representing Turkish nationalism, and the  Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), seen as a Kurdish party.

This kind of politics has not always been a priority for Alevis. Traditionally, they have been involved in various left-wing parties in the country, with a preference for the secularist Ataturkist current, which they viewed as capable of transcending sectarian divisions.

That changed during the period of AKP rule, particularly after 2010, which brought about a significant change in the dynamics of the Alevi community in Turkey.

The AKP held a referendum to amend specific articles of the constitution, and its political and media circles made statements indicating that the changes were aimed at "freeing the judiciary from Alevis." These constitutional measures granted the President broader powers in appointing top judges. 

It was during this time that Kiliçdaroğlu rose to prominence as the first Alevi leader of the CHP. Unofficial indicators also suggest that the party's second-tier leaders and decision-makers also predominantly became Alevis.

That helped the CHP broaden its appeal from its traditional heartlands of the wealthy coastal, educated, urban social classes.

Alevis' political tendancies have also shifted during the period of AKP rule, becoming more conservative as the influence on the group of the democratic left has declined.

Historically, many Alevis have considered themselves pioneers and advocates of secularism in Turkey. Many of them aligned with left-wing and democratic currents to call for fundamental change, including a challenge its Islamic foundations.

They called for abolishing state support, regulation, and oversight of the Directorate of Reliegious affairs, known as the Diyanet, often seen as a "Ministry of Endowments", which exclusively covers Sunni Muslims. 

Alevis also tended to be secularist.

Typical policies included support abolishing compulsory religious lessons in schools, repealing laws that contradict the principle of equality, fully implementing secularism, refraining from building Islamic/Sunni institutions in Alevi villages, and eliminating discrimination against Alevis in the state's administrative structure by removing any religious or sectarian bias in state behaviour, institutions, and charters.

This trend has also declined over the last two decades, as a preference for a form of political Islam has emerged among Alevis in its place, albeit one flavoured with their own identity.

The change has led to calls for inclusion and recognition within the existing governmental Diyanet institution, the addition of private religious lessons for Alevi sect members in public schools, increased representation of Alevis in the government apparatus, and equal treatment of Alevis in all religious and sectarian aspects of state institutions and public life promoting transparency.

It comes as the group makes a collective realisation that uprooting Turkey's current format of government and replacing it with a fully secular alternative is virtually impossible.

Instead of calling for the abolition of religious presence, Alevis now advocate for equality within religious contexts instead of abolishing them altogether.

The prevailing political trend among Alevis has come to believe that the AKP's rise to power and its ability to maintain it for decades results from Islamist insistence and strategy of working within the existing system/state rather than opposing and formally seeking to change it. Consequently, Alevis feel compelled to adopt a similar approach.

At the same time, Alevis have put aside differences among themselves. Groups with the group include the Baktashis, Ali Ilahi, Nusayris, Kurdish Alevis, Qizilbash, and Osman Babalilar, each exhibiting distinct religious beliefs, perceptions and rituals as well as historical backgrounds.

These differences had traditionally influenced their political orientations, ranging from leftist, Kurdish, Arab, and Turkish nationalist movements to liberal, environmental, and regional affiliations.

Alevis now firmly believe in their collective identity as a cohesive political group within the Turkish entity and society. They define themselves in contrast to conservative Sunni political Islam and align themselves with political discourses, projects, and orientations that move in the opposite direction.

Two cautious steps

The AKP has pursued two distinct approaches to address the Alevi community's growing unity and organisation over the last two decades.

They established a group of Alevi clubs, associations, and organisational frameworks loyal to the AKP. President Erdoğan believed this "qualitative antidote" originating within the Alevi community would deter opposition from Alevi voices.

These religious and social organisations received substantial financial support and exceptional administrative and political facilities. Their primary focus was responding to and questioning the actions and choices of other Alevi organisations, particularly those associated with Turkish opposition parties.

The second step, which came relatively late, was taken after various opinion polls cast doubt on President Erdoğan's ability to win the election.

Last year, a republican decree was issued to establish the Cultural Presidency of the Alevis as a directorate within the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Comprising 11 Alevi individuals, this directorate is tasked with managing and evaluating the work of government initiatives that support and oversee activities related to the Alevi community.

The motivation was to win Alevi votes. It may not have worked, since it faced criticism from the sect, which objected to Alevis being categorised as a mere "cultural practice" within the Ministry of Culture and Tourism rather than becoming part of the Diyanet institution.

Concerns were also raised over the limited financial resources and the small number of employees allocated to the directorate—merely 1,200 public employees responsible for managing the affairs of nearly 20 million people—particularly compared to the 50,000 employees within the Diyanet.