Why China is mediating in the Middle East

A breakthrough in the Middle East reveals both Beijing’s capabilities and its influence as many more challenges lie ahead in a changing world, not least over Ukraine

Saudi state minister Musaed bin Muhammad Al-Aiban, Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Wang Yi and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani.
DPA
Saudi state minister Musaed bin Muhammad Al-Aiban, Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Wang Yi and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani.

Why China is mediating in the Middle East

Over the past year, China has been gradually unrolling a new phase of its foreign policy as it shifts from being an observer to becoming an assertive player.

This can be seen in the country’s reaction to the Ukraine crisis but also in the Middle East where China chose to focus its re-drawn policy in light of the wider geopolitical implications of the conflict in Europe.

First came President Xi Jinping’s announcement last year of a Chinese “vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security”, made at the Bo’ao Forum for Asia of the Global Strategic Initiative. Then came the president’s signal of a more assertive foreign policy last October at the Communist Party Congress.

EPA
China's President Xi Jinping (C) and other Chinese leaders attend the closing meeting of the first session of the 14th National People's Congress (NPC).

A more detailed articulation followed at the Munich Security Conference last February, when State Councillor Wang Yi took a defiant attitude towards the West in general and the United States in particular.

He signalled that China was losing patience with the Ukraine crisis. He declared that Beijing would put forward ideas for a settlement but also did not refute the American claim that Beijing would be providing lethal weapons to Russia.

Two birds, one stone

In a single stroke, Beijing was indicating to the West that it will not accept a Russian defeat and, at the same time, notifying Moscow that it will not accept an open-ended conflict in Ukraine.

A few days later, China issued both a concept paper on its “Global Security Initiative” and a position paper on the Ukraine crisis. The latter contained nothing new and was mostly a reiteration of positions held by Beijing since the beginning of the crisis. Some argued it could be more about Taiwan than Ukraine.

Nonetheless, it was also a signal to the world that China, when it finds itself ready, is prepared to mediate the conflict. Given that the crisis has severely impacted developing countries, China may well prefer to lead a group of developing countries or the Bric nations — Brazil, Russia, India and China —to put forward an initiative for settlement.

But that will need extensive preparation and time. There is plenty of that available, as it is highly unlikely that either Ukraine, backed by the US, or Russia is prepared for a settlement at this stage of the conflict.

Reuters
Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Another round of major hostilities may be required before both sides are convinced that the continuation of the war is detrimental to their interests.

Any settlement might not be a full political accord, bringing the war to a formal end. The most likely outcome could very much mirror the Korean situation, of an end to hostilities along lines of control without a formal peace agreement, leaving issues of territory for future discussions.

China steps up Middle East involvement

In the Middle East, Beijing has largely remained aloof over the region’s politics. Instead, it has concentrated on building economic relations with all the players: the Arab countries, Turkey, Iran and Israel.

But as the region’s continued instability could have a negative impact on China’s strategic project, the Belt and Road Initiative, it looks less content to leave the management of security there to the United States and Russia.

China’s choice of which Middle Eastern conflict to mediate was careful and strategic. It picked the relationship that could alter the political landscape of the region: the one between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

China's choice of which Middle Eastern conflict to mediate was careful and strategic. It picked the relationship that could alter the political landscape of the region: the one between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The choice has elements of risk, which remain. But it was worth taking. China, as always, will proceed cautiously. It has little to lose, but much to gain. 

While Saudi-Iranian talks have been going on for some time, no breakthrough appears to be on the horizon. On the contrary, Riyadh and Tehran appeared to be far apart on Lebanon, Syria and more importantly on Yemen. 

Enter the Chinese. It appears it was Beijing that was able to help both parties over the remaining hurdles. The normalisation of relations, after a seven-year period of disruption, was announced in Beijing on 10 March. 

Getty Images
Chinese President, Xi Jinping (C) meets by Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (R) following an official welcoming ceremony at the Palace of Yamamah in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on December 8, 2022.

While it is too early to assess the full impact of this important development, it would not be an exaggeration to say that it will not only greatly influence the process of realignment that has been taking place in the Middle East, but also in the relations between the region and the outside world, including the West in general and the United States in particular.

The processes already in motion that are shaping the regional realignment will probably accelerate. But it is now also likely that the widening and deepening of the Abraham Accords and the associated Negev Forum will slow down.

The primary objective they served — Israel and the US's desire to create a regional security arrangement directed against Iran — no longer looks achievable. 

That outcome would not have been conceivable without Saudi participation. Now that Riyadh has opted to normalise relations with Tehran rather than confronting it, such a possibility is even more remote.

Furthermore, US-sponsored moves to bring about normalisation between Tel Aviv and Riyadh are now thrown into doubt. They will certainly be influenced by how the Saudi relationship with Iran develops. 

AP
In this photo released by Xinhua News Agency, Visiting Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, left, shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping before their meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Feb. 14, 2023.

Beijing's mediation between Riyadh and Tehran is a signal that China is not satisfied with the prevailing status quo, at least to the extent that the US and, to some extent, Russia appear to be. Meanwhile, the other major outside player – the EU – appears to be resigned to play a marginal role in putting an end to the many conflicts in the region. 

Now, there is a big question: will Beijing follow up on its role in mediating between Riyadh and Tehran with further initiatives on Yemen, Syria and Lebanon? These are the three areas where the interests of Saudi Arabia and Iran collide.

Riyadh has long indicated that Iranian intervention in Yemen, Syria and Lebanon is of great concern, with Yemen being the most important. 

It is unlikely that Riyadh would have agreed to normalising relations with Tehran without at least an understanding on a road map where its security concerns are addressed, particularly in Yemen and Syria. The election of a president in Lebanon may provide an early indication of the understanding reached Riyadh and Tehran. 

On Yemen, while the US has clearly indicated that it is uncomfortable with the Saudi policy, it has provided assistance to Riyadh in defending itself against the Houthis. It has also supported UN mediation efforts. 

This policy, however, was not satisfactory to Riyadh. The problem for Riyadh was always Iran's intervention, and the United States appeared unable to help.  

China appears to have moved in to fill the void. The coming weeks will prove whether Beijing has been able to wrest the kind of concessions from Iran and the Houthis that Riyadh has been seeking for years. 

The problem for Riyadh was always Iran's intervention, and the United States appeared unable to help. China appears to have moved in to fill the void. The coming weeks will prove whether Beijing has been able to wrest the kind of concessions from Iran and the Houthis that Riyadh has been seeking for years.

On Syria, the situation is more complicated. Here the US is indifferent to reaching a settlement. The UN mediation efforts appear to be at a standstill with the Constitutional Committee dormant for almost a year and no prospects for its reconvening in the near future.

The proposal for a step-by-step approach, advocated by Special Envoy Pedersen, will not get traction without Arab input, primarily from Riyadh.

The most significant developments that could influence the chances of a settlement in Syria are the rapprochement between Damascus and Ankara and the normalisation between Arab countries and Syria. 

On the Ankara–Damascus axis, Moscow is active. Beijing needs only to play a supportive role in the process. And now Tehran has become involved, having convinced Russia to include it in an upcoming meeting in Moscow that will be held at the deputy ministers' level.

It is too early to tell whether this will yield results, given that Damascus is reluctant to hand a victory to Turkish President Erdogan ahead of the elections in May without wresting significant tangible gains on the ground in the areas where Turkiye exercises effective control in northern Syria. 

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President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan (R) and Chinese President Xi Jinping (L)

Meanwhile, the prospects of Saudi Arabia normalising relations with Syria is largely contingent on Riyadh's relations with Iran. Reducing Iranian influence in Syria has been a longstanding Arab objective and particularly a Saudi one.

Can Beijing achieve a feat that has long escaped the Arabs? Will it be able to help negotiate a roadmap between Damascus and Riyadh whereby Iranian influence will be reduced overtime? Will Beijing be in a position to assuage Iranian fears that it might lose all influence in Syria and that it can retain important economic interests without commensurate political influence?

A play for more time?

Tehran is known to be a master of tactics. Are the concessions it made to Riyadh merely tactical to buy time until it is able to regroup from its domestic disturbances and the uncertainty surrounding the fate of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on its nuclear programme?

It is not likely that China would have joined the fray in the highly complex politics of the Middle East if there was not a reasonable measure of success in influencing realignment in the region. Otherwise, the impression will be confirmed that China's policy is more talk than action. 

The fact that the announcement of normalisation between Riyadh and Tehran came a few days after news was leaked about what is reported to be Saudi conditions for normalisation with Israel is – to say the least – interesting. 

AFP
China's President Xi Jinping (bottom) is applauded as he arrives for the opening ceremony of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 4, 2023.

The conditions and timing of the leak may indicate that it could have been a ploy by the Saudis to distract both the US and Israel from a more important priority which both oppose: normalisation with Iran. 

Washington can live with the prevailing situation in Syria. Moscow, although distracted by Ukraine, has always strived to transform its military gains in Syria into a political settlement. That is the only way it can declare success for its military intervention. 

On Yemen, while neither Washington nor Moscow are comfortable with the situation, both appear ready to live with it as long as the security and stability of Saudi Arabia is not seriously threatened. 

China now has a direct interest in the stability of the Middle East, through its strategic project of the Belt and Road initiative. The region represents a critical node, with its land networks and maritime routes, connecting Asia with both Africa and Europe. 

China's mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran is quite possibly a signal that it is prepared to back its project with an active political role in the settlement of the conflicts in the region. 

Were Beijing to pursue this course and be successful, primarily in Yemen and Syria, the political landscape in the region may be completely altered. In the process, China will have enhanced its prestige and influence, not only in the region, but in the world at large. 

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