Saudi Arabia’s evolving foreign policies explained

However, it does seem that this period of harmony between the KSA and US policies has come to an end.

Diverging interests

In the last 15 years, we can observe clear differences and even contradictions between Saudi and American policies. The 'cautious' policies of the KSA that intended to avoid upsetting the US outside of closed doors are changing and emerging differences between the two countries have been exposed. 

This change in the KSA's foreign policies began with the US invasion of Iraq and gradually deepened during US President Barack Obama's first term. We have noticed, for example, disagreements between the US and the KSA emerge over the Iran nuclear deal. 

Furthermore, the KSA intervened in Yemen against the will of the US, which the Obama administration used as a justification to cease providing Saudi Arabia with high-precision weapons. 

Differences between the two countries have also deepened after the Russian war on Ukraine. The KSA refused to impose economic sanctions on Russia and coordinated with it within the framework of OPEC + last November to reduce oil production by two million barrels daily. 

This decision enraged the US to the extent that US President Joseph Biden threatened publicly that 'Riyadh would bear the consequences of its deacon'.

Meanwhile, other American officials called for freezing the US-KSA cooperation including those that are related to arms sales, while other legislators called for ratifying the so-called "NOPEC" legislation, which enables the US Department of Justice to sue OPEC + countries under the antitrust law.

In the past, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, US-KSA relations have witnessed tension that has been highlighted in several books, academic articles, and policy papers that attacked the KSA.

However, American media and think tanks did not accuse the KSA of allying with US opponents or of seeking to interfere in its internal affairs as was the case recently after the OPEC + decision to reduce the oil production. 

These facts reveal changes in the direction of the KSA's foreign policies, the reasons for which are mainly structural and related to the changes in the two countries that took place over the last two decades. 

Structural changes and eastern outreach
In the last two decades, the fact that the US has become an oil and gas exporter impacted its policies in the Gulf region. In this regard, Riyadh noticed that the US had been prioritising its interests at the expense of its partners in the Gulf region. 

For example, while the priority of the US was to reach a nuclear agreement with Iran, the KSA's main concern was to stop Iran's intervention in its neighbouring countries and curb the advancement of its missile capabilities that pose a grave threat to the Arab Gulf region's infrastructure, especially after the September 2019's strike on its oil facilities in Abqaiq. 

Furthermore, the US withdrew some of its defence systems from the KSA at a time Iran was escalating its attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf region, and the Houthis were escalating their missile attacks and suicide drones targeting the KSA's airports, oil fields, and infrastructure. 

These examples reinforced the conviction in the KSA and other Arab Gulf countries that the US is planning to withdraw from the Middle East as many political analysts have argued in the last decade.

In fact, Riyadh has noticed the US desire to distance itself from the Middle East and to direct its resources away from the region during President Obama's first term.

Obama who considered China a strategic threat to American hegemony maintained his policies of shifting American military and political resources away from the Arab region, directing them instead toward East Asia in his second term.

The structural changes in the US, i.e., becoming an oil exporter country and considering China as its main competitor in the world, were not the only reason that forced the KSA to change its foreign policies. The KSA itself has undergone fundamental changes.

Fundamental changes

Today, the well-being of the Saudi people depends on their trade relations with East Asian countries, especially China. Over the past decade, the KSA's main source of revenue was from its trade relations with Asian countries. 

The KSA's oil exports alone to China, Japan, India, and South Korea have been steadily rising since 2015, reaching more than 66 per cent in 2020 of its total oil exports. In 2021, the KSA's imports from China reached 20 per cent of its total annual imports, while its imports from the US during the same year amounted only to 10 per cent.

More importantly, the KSA's window of opportunity to move away from a hydrocarbon-based economy to a knowledge-based economy is rapidly narrowing. 

Years before the war in Ukraine, all industrialised nations began green energy projects to reduce their dependence on oil. The war in Ukraine only accelerated this trend in Western countries in order to have alternatives to Russian oil and gas. For example, the EU has agreed that "all new cars and trucks registered in Europe will be carbon-neutral by 2035." 

For the KSA, whose population stands at over 35 million, 60 per cent are under 30 years old, the developed countries decision to shift away from oil is worrisome. This underscores the importance of completing the process of social and economic transformation before the world turns its back on hydrocarbon resources.

Shrinking window of opportunity

The KSA knows it has limited time to diversify its economy away from oil. It started to restructure its economy in 2016 according to Vision 2030 which seeks to turn the country into a tourist, financial and commercial hub, and an exporter of clean energy. But restructuring the KSA's economy is costly as it requires investing in massive projects that cost hundreds of billions of dollars. 

Furthermore, a knowledge-based economy depends on localising technology or at least having access to it. This dictates fixing two issues. The first is keeping the oil prices relatively high in order to use the revenue to fund Vision 2030's projects.

And the second is maintaining balanced relations with countries that can contribute to the implementation of the KSA's social and economic Vision such as China, Russia, India, and Japan.

Premises of change

The structural changes that are associated with the US desire to reduce its presence in the Middle East, coupled with the global push for moving away from hydrocarbon, and the KSA's dependence on its trade relations with the East Asian countries for its well-being are all factors that are contributing to the KSA's evolving foreign policies. 

The premises of these changes are:
First, Riyadh has come to believe that it can no longer rely on the US alone for its security needs.

This means the KSA will look for other means to enhance its security including importing advanced weapons from other countries than the US, localising its military defence industry and having more allies. In other words, Riyadh will diversify its security partners, and this requires good relations with all major powers such as Russia, China, France, and Britain.

This does not mean the KSA is planning on replacing its security alliance with the US; rather, it aims to take advantage of existing opportunities to diversify its security. The KSA is well aware that China or any other major power cannot compensate for the US security role in the Gulf region. 

This is partly due to the fact that other great powers have no military infrastructure in the Gulf region, and also partly because no great power is willing — at least for the time being — to allocate sufficient resources to maintain the security of the Gulf region. 

Second, it is not in the KSA's interest to take sides in the competition between great powers as this would impact negatively its economy. Accordingly, the KSA will adopt policies that aim to preserve its economic and security interests with all major powers without siding with one of them at the expense of others.

Third, over the next decade, internal domestic policies, such as Vision 2030, will be the primary driver of KSA's foreign policy. As a result, the KSA will seek economic and security cooperation with all countries that respect its sovereignty, security, and vital interests.

Fourth, stability, security, and prosperity are the main components of the KSA's foreign policy in the Gulf and the wider MENA region, including Yemen and Iran.

Despite criticisms of the KSA's role in Yemen, Riyadh seeks a solution to Yemen's crisis that is acceptable to the international community, and it supports the efforts of the UN Special Envoy to Yemen to achieve peace. 

Balanced policies

The KSA's new foreign policies will undoubtedly expose it to American pressures. On the one hand, the KSA has vital security interests with the US but has equally important economic interests with China. 

Finding the right balance in the relationship between both countries is not an easy task. There is no known formula to be used in this regard. As such, in seeking to balance the relations with the US and China, losses are expected. But this is a learning process, and the KSA will learn from its mistakes and will avoid repeating them.

However, there are a number of factors that the KSA will take into account while striving to balance its relations with the US and China.

First, China cannot assume the security role of the US in the Gulf region in the foreseeable future. China has no military bases in the region. Although it has a significant interest in the Gulf's security to maintain the flow of oil and gas to its economy, its security priority is in its geographical proximity. 

China feels threatened by the American military presence in the Indo-Pacific Oceans, and has troubles with India, Japan, and even Australia and South Korea. Presently, China does not feel that it needs to allocate resources to ensure security in the Gulf region because the US is currently doing so, freeing Beijing from the burden of fielding this cost. Hence, China is not seeking conflict with the US in the Gulf region.

Second, Iran's relationship with China is not stronger than China's relationship with the KSA. Media reports about the existence of a strategic partnership between China and Iran are mere propaganda because this partnership is conditioned by lifting the economic sanctions on Iran. China fears that if it develops its partnership with Iran, the US will impose sanctions on its companies. 

Meanwhile, China is enhancing cooperation with the KSA in the fields of technology, air space, drones, and weapon defence production, and even at the level of universities of the two countries.

Third, while it is expected that the US will exert pressure on the KSA to scale back its relations with China, there are limits to the amount of pressure it can apply. The global economy relies on the KSA's oil supply, especially amid the current conflict with Russia. 

This allows the KSA the time and the space to maintain balanced policies with major powers without fearing the repercussion of its relations with the US. In short, the KSA will not choose China over the US or vice versa; the KSA's interest is to have a good and strong relations with both countries.

Regional and international implications
The KSA's new foreign policies have regional and international implications. By making domestic politics, namely, the social and economic transformations, the basis of its foreign policies, the KSA is sending a message to its rivals in the region that it does not seek hostilities with them. It is only when there is peace, security, and stability in the region that the KSA and other neighbouring countries can achieve prosperity. 

However, the KSA won't sit idle and watch its rivals undermining its security; it will look to acquire the means to defend its territories and interests.

The KSA will no longer side with any great global power at its own expense. These days are well behind. Instead, Riyadh is seeking to maintain good relations with all major powers based on mutual respect and common interests. 

Saudi leaders understand that taking sides with any major power can negatively impact its social and economic transformation programme. The KSA will resist any pressure to favour the US over China or vice versa; both countries are important to the KSA's security and economy.