Is Britain a spent force in the Middle East?

These proved relevant when the UK enjoyed something of a renaissance in the region from the 1980s. This began with the famed 1985 al-Yamamah arms deal with Saudi Arabia, Britain's largest ever export agreement, and was followed by further arms deals with neighbouring states and the expansion of British firms working in the Gulf.

As the Cold War ended, the US expanded its presence in the Middle East and Britain proved a key ally to add both military assistance and diplomatic support. It played a prominent role in the campaign to eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991, the no-fly-zone to protect Iraq's Kurds arranged soon afterwards and the 1998 bombing raids on Baghdad. 

In 2003 it was Washington's main partner in the 'coalition of the willing' that invaded and occupied Iraq, giving London its first governing role in the region since the end of empire when it administered Basra. 

Though its presence in Iraq ended in 2009, it returned to the region after the 2011 Arab uprisings, firstly to help topple Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and then as part of the coalition to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. 

However, for all its military engagement, the UK has had very limited success in the post-imperial era. Its campaigns in Iraq eventually toppled Saddam Hussein, but the government that replaced him is no particular friend of Britain, being close to Iran. 

Similarly, it helped defeat Gaddafi, but Libya has been unstable ever since, and the rivals for power there look to Turkey, France, the Gulf and Russia for support, not the UK. The one recent success has been the anti-ISIS campaign — tellingly one that London opted against deploying significant ground troops for, relying more on airpower and local allies to do the fighting.  

A weaker west

The relative failures of several decades of activism has certainly played a role in Britain's pull back from the Middle East, but there are also deeper structural reasons at play. Firstly, western actors in general are less powerful than they were in the 1990s and 2000s. The US is less active globally than the peak of its power in the 'unipolar' era immediately after the Cold War. 

The failures of the 'war on terror' in Iraq and Afghanistan has prompted restraint from the American public about committing 'boots on the ground' abroad, limiting appetite for similar operations in the future. Economically, the 2008 financial crisis has taken years to recover from and the US enjoys less global economic domination than it once did. 

Politically, the US has become more and more insular, with society still deeply divided over Donald Trump and related 'culture wars' issues, making it far harder for the US to unite to be the global leader it once was. Related to this, as the US' internal problems have been broadcast around the world in recent years, its soft power and attractiveness to other parts of the world has diminished. 

Parallel to the relative decline of western actors has been the strengthening of non-western states both globally and in the Middle East. China's rise is well known, benefitting from the financial crisis to take on large amounts of western debt, invest heavily in western economies and emerge as the world's second largest economy. 

Beijing has become more militarily and economically active in the past decade, expanding its presence in the South China Sea, and building a network of global trade partners via the Belt and Road Initiative. 

These include several Middle Eastern states notably Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Russia, though suffering due to its invasion of Ukraine, is no longer the enfeebled player it was in the 1990s, having successfully intervened in Syria and enhanced its ties to several Middle Eastern states via diplomatic links and arms deals. 

Importantly, the Middle Eastern states themselves are far more assertive than they once were. While Iran was always rebellious to western designs, now Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Israel have all started to pursue their own regional policies, often in defiance of their western allies. 

Western actors still have a stake in Middle Eastern affairs, but unlike the 1990s and 2000s, they must now compete with several other regional and global players, and often struggle to get their way.

A weaker Britain

Secondly, while the west is weaker globally and in the Middle East, Britain is weaker within the western coalition. This is primarily due to Brexit and its fall out. Materially, Britain is no longer a part of the EU, so it no longer has a say in the world's largest economic bloc. 

In the past London was able to amplify its influence through the EU, helping to direct some of Brussels' foreign policy priorities. For example, the UK took the lead in pushing for all EU states to sanction Syria's Bashar al-Assad in 2011. This ability has now been lost. 

While Brexiteers like former Prime Minister Boris Johnson have insisted there will be alternative avenues for 'Global Britain' to influence the world, there has been little evidence of this so far. 

London joined Australia and the US in a new 'AUKUS' military alliance, focusing on the pacific, but this is just an expansion of a pre-existing relationship and does not compensate for the decline in ties with former European allies that came about with the bitte divorce from the EU. 

Similarly, London has played a leading role in arming Ukraine against Russia, but it could have done this within the EU. Arguably Johnson felt compelled to make more of his support for Ukraine to try to persuade Britons that the UK remained relevant internationally after Brexit rather than because he had any new freedom to do so. 

Evidence of Britain's weakness has been by Joe Biden's decisions to visit France and Germany far more frequently during his presidency than the UK, a rarity for American presidents and a sign that 'the special relationship' with London has diminished in value since Brexit.

Brexit has also impacted London's global reputation. While once it had considerable soft power, years of wrangling with Brussels over the departure, including threats to break international law, and internal chaos within successive governments about Brexit have shattered the global image of London as a responsible global actor. 

Similarly, like the United States, Brexit and its fallout have made successive British governments turn inwards, focusing on internal politics rather than the outside world. 

While Tony Blair and David Cameron enjoyed relative domestic stability, allowing them to indulge in adventures in the Middle East, their successors have had no such luxury. With the Brexit crisis now giving way to economic worries, it seems unlikely Britain's next leaders will have much more capacity for external affairs.

Shifting priorities

A final change is the shifting importance of the Middle East to global players, including western actors like the UK. During the war on terror, the region was the hub of western global interest, especially Britain and the US. 

This continued into the 2010s as the Arab uprisings prompted western governments to respond – initially to support democratic movements and then to contain instability from spilling over. Once ISIS emerged attention shifted to counter-terrorism and defeating the jihadist threat. 

However, with the revolutions of 2011 having now mostly petered out and the related violence diminishing, the west has fewer reasons to engage in the Middle East. Economic changes like the US' shifting away from relying on Gulf oil have similarly decreased western interest. 

At the same time, the west's diminished foreign policy resources have been directed elsewhere. The clash with China has ramped up under successive US presidents, supported by western allies like the UK.

More recently the war in Ukraine has prompted a massive shift in western military and diplomatic resources towards a focus on Russia and Eastern Europe. 

Britain's foreign policy priorities have reflected this shift. In Britain's 2021 Integrated review — seen at the time as a blueprint for London's post-Brexit foreign policy — maintaining good ties with Middle Eastern governments was mentioned, but the region was relegated in importance behind a tilt to south-east Asia. 

The Ukraine war, which broke out after the review was published, will likely have pushed it even further down the priority list.  
 
Areas of interest

That said, the UK does retain some interest in the Middle East and has far from abandoned the region. It retains close ties to old allies in Oman and Jordan, as well as several Gulf states who continue to enjoy close relationships with the UK military. 

London also retains important economic links. The Gulf states remain by far the most important of London's trade relationships. Once this largely went in one direction, with London selling arms and providing services for the newly wealthy petro-states.

But it is now more reciprocal, with Gulf governments making key investments in the British economy, from real estate to football clubs. 

Moreover, the Ukraine crisis has made London more dependent on LNG from the region, especially from Qatar. Beyond the Gulf, the UK retains important trade links with Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Egypt.   

Security is another key area of importance for London. While the ISIS threat has diminished, should it revive or an equivalent emerge, the UK would likely work with regional, American and European allies once more to contain and destroy the threat. 

Likewise, were any of the larger states to face internal collapse, possibly precipitating another migrant crisis that would impact Europe and the UK, London would likely offer assistance and involvement.

However, such reactive moves are a far cry from the leadership, whether positive or negative, London offered in the past. Even as recently as the 2010s, the UK would have been regarded as a significant foreign player. 

Such days seem in the past now with comparable powers like France and Germany seemingly taking more of a lead in the region than Britain. 

The fall out of Brexit at home, a lessening of western power and the diminishing importance of the Middle East to London and its western allies has seen the UK step back from the region. It may not be a spent force in the Middle East yet, but it is headed that way.