The legacy of Rafik Hariri and the collapse of the Lebanese state

Rafik Hariri endured what only a man of silence and patience could endure. His faith in his ability and the ability of Lebanon and the Lebanese people to overcome adversity helped him, especially in the year 2000 and the years after. 

In that year, Hafez al-Assad died, southern Lebanon was liberated from Israeli occupation, and a statement was issued by the Maronite bishops calling for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. 

There is no escape from acknowledging that we, Hariri and I, were part of the Syrian tutelage system over Lebanon, which was no longer bearable after Bashar al-Assad inherited the presidency in Syria from his father. 

His intervention in Lebanese affairs became more direct and robust, and all Hariri's attempts to lessen it were in vain.

Simon Karam

Hariri's destiny lies in the fact that he started his public life with several Lebanese thinking highly of him. At the end of his life, the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese admired him.

However, the problem with his story and legacy lies in the long period between the beginning of his public and political life and its tragic end.

Three factors had a significant role in shaping his legacy at the beginning of his public life.
     
The first factor was that Hariri positioned himself as a self-made man. The Lebanese appreciate self-reliance because they can relate to it, and therefore appreciate and admire figures who possess these traits.

The second factor that shaped his legacy was his generosity. Lebanese value generosity a lot.

The third factor was his emphasis on science and education which epitomised for many Lebanese modernity and social advancement. Hariri made sure to open the doors for many Lebanese to overcome difficulties and achieve great things.

These factors which shaped his legacy from the start only multiplied after he was assassinated. His death united the Lebanese and helped them achieve a second national independence, which unfortunately dissipated in vain.

But between the legacy of his beginning until his sad end, there is the story of the political, social, and moral erosion that Lebanon was subjected to and Hariri's calculation to put himself, Lebanon, and the Lebanese in a confrontational situation.

I do not know what led him to believe that he could build a Lebanese state under the authority of Syrian power, with its humiliation and self-destruction that began to unfold after the knots on their tongues were loosened after his death. 

In his last days, he seemed to have sensed the rock bottom that he and his country had fallen into.

The proof is in that sentence, which he insisted on concluding his last resignation with, "I confine this beloved country to God and the Lebanese."

He said this sentimental statement because he felt that the country was breathing its last breath and it was when his assassination was being planned.

Hariri may have finally understood that Lebanon was living in a maze, politically, economically, and socially. What stood out in the tragedy was his determination to get out of that maze is what led to his murder. 

Is it possible to say that Hariri's legacy is the story of a man who was assassinated when he began reconciling with himself and his country?

What the Lebanese did from the moment of his shocking assassination wouldn't have been achieved had it not been for that talisman called Rafik Hariri.

Zuhair Hatab

When he first entered into public service in Lebanon, people were suspicious of Hariri's donations, aid, projects, companies, and political activities.

They wondered about his mysterious goals, which they linked to his interests or the interests of external parties. 

Lebanese have never known figures or political leaders — especially in Beirut's Sunni community — like Hariri.

They were accustomed to politicians and leaders who provided services to their supporters from state institutions, not from their institutions and businesses, based on loyalty, nepotism, and subjugation. 

Hariri may have broken this pattern of people's relationship with their leaders and transcended it by expanding and diversifying the circles of that relationship before he reached the premiership and ran for parliamentary elections. 

His mega construction and banking companies, his work in the premiership, and his presence in the field of international relations reshaped the concept of traditional and local political leadership in Beirut and later on in Lebanon. 

This prompted Manah al-Solh (1927-2014), a descendant of the ancient, traditional Beiruti political family, to say that "Rafik Hariri aged us," that is to say, he made those political families obsolete or outdated.

All of this led to the question of what could be the "profile" that fits Hariri's general personality in our societies.

I have not met anyone who was not invited to the Ramadan Iftar banquets at hishouse: either due to their profession, their family relations, being social figures or electoral keys, being members of a civil, sports, or charitable associations, or being employees in any of the various sectors. 

I have not even known any prominent member of the Beiruti community who did not have a connection to Hariri's work.

Hariri worked on the development of people both inside and outside his sect. Many people who were against his policies benefited from his educational grants. I know others who worked in his institutions without him restricting their freedoms and political choices.

It was when the traditional Sunni leaders, notable families and  popular neighbourhoods were disappearing, and family and residential ties were disintegrating in the Sunni Beiruti sphere during and after the civil wars, that Hariri entered the scene and began to address the aspirations of the new professional elites and their political choices. 

Perhaps this was why his presence in the popular Sunni conscience was weak before his assassination — because he surrounded his activities with a high wall of technocrats and professional elites.

It is because Sunni urban families of all ranks were accustomed to seeking, obtaining, and working within frameworks dominated by family ties, a practice that was uprooted by Hariri.

However, his assassination and the popular, inclusive political movement it launched cleansed Hariri's legacy from the suspicion and confusion that defined it throughout his public and political life. 

As for the Lebanese Sunni community, it took his  assassination to understand, recognise and appreciate Hariri's importance and his role as their leader.

After his loss, Sunnis felt like orphans. They looked around and realised that they had lost an extraordinary figure and movement that he implemented with remarkable tact and intelligence.

His assassination made the Sunni community feel like it had been hit at its core, especially in the face of the Shiite community which is organically cohesive in its assembly and leadership.

Perhaps the assassination of Hariri liberated the Sunnis from two things.

It liberated their dependence of their Arabism to "Assad's Syria" and also their sense of incomplete Lebanonism compared to the Lebanese Christians.

That was because they felt that they offered a great martyr on the altar of Arabism and the liberation of Lebanon from the Syrian tutelage.

Daoud Al-Sayegh

After his assassination, people discovered Hariri's silent suffering. And for months after his assassination, I was always asked the same questions: Why did he remain silent? Why didn't he say anything? Why didn't he defend himself? 

Hariri was distinguished by his inability to cause harm and his reluctance to respond to slanderous accusations.

Several Lebanese politicians turned politics into a field of aggression and grudges. But not Hariri. People discovered this characteristic of him after his assassination, not during his political life.

Since the Syrian authority replaced the Taif Agreement and the constitution in Lebanon, Hariri's relationship with Hafez al-Assad facilitated the conduct of affairs within that framework.

The role of the Syrian authority increased when Emile Lahoud reached the presidency in 1998. The campaigns to defame Hariri's image and reputation began to intensify, so he preferred to face them with patience and silence.

He was keen to stop by Damascus after his travels and foreign visits, which were his way of establishing a Lebanese foreign policy.

His vast regional, Arab, and international relations kept him from drowning in internal feuds and quarrels in Lebanon.

Those relations were the product of his initiatives and efforts, which he used to direct to the benefit of Lebanon, which he genuinely loved, rising above fanaticism.

This characteristic was unmatched by Lebanese politicians during and after the civil wars and perhaps the veterans who preceded them.

The strength of his international relations stems from the fact that he adopted a businessman style, which he mastered, to political and diplomatic ties.

As a businessman, he was distinguished by his efficiency, speed of implementation, and realism.

And that businessman evolved into a real statesman when he moved from the small theatre of domestic grudges in Lebanon to the theatre of international relations. 

However, he was keen to establish direct links with Lebanese society through donations, social, educational, health assistance, and post-war reconstruction.

And when Hariri was about to reveal his true identity as a Lebanese statesman, he was killed in a vengeful and horrific assassination, which was also a blow to the international relations that Hariri silently and patiently championed for the benefit of Lebanon.

He was destined to be killed, so his vision of being an independent statesman in an independent country was not realised. His fate was tragic for Lebanon and the Lebanese.

The Lebanese saw Hariri, who had come from the business world into political life, as a new hope. He had extensive connections with engineers, lawyers, bank managers, professionals, workers, and immigrants. 

Even European officials benefited from his expertise in finding out what was happening in the Middle East. He possessed lively and practical oral skills.

He had a unique ability to listen to senior politicians, heads of state, and even small newspaper informants.

He understood his importance as an individual and in his active personal role; and realised that large segments of the Lebanese were betting on his presence in Lebanon and international relations.

This disturbed many people in the theatre of local political grudges.

Two months after he became prime minister in 1992, he realised the disadvantages of Lebanese political life and its rampant corruption.

But he had no choice but to deal with the militia princes who entered the government and state institutions using force that was hard to combat. 

In the absence of Christian politicians, he longed for a Christian leader such as Raymond Rimond Eddé to ally and cooperate with, so he compensated for that by constantly communicating with the Maronite Patriarchate and the Vatican. 

Conscientious and educated Christians saw him as a liberal and a friend of both the West and the Arabs, who believed in free order and individual initiative.

As for the others, who were influenced by rumours and incitement in a country where the intelligence services manufacture public opinion, they began to accuse him of the Islamisation of Lebanon. 

Hariri used to go out to the garden of his house so that he could make a phone call. 

Franck Mermier

Many countries had witnessed similar incidents to the Lebanese people's immense gathering in Martyrs' Square in Beirut after the assassination of Rafik Hariri on 14 February 2005.

A good example is the Ukrainians' rally in 2004 in key cities, including Kyiv, to demonstrate patriotism and opposition to Russian expansionist ambitions. 

The Chinese had also gathered in the squares of Beijing.

In their rally in Beirut on 14 March 2005, the Lebanese wanted to emphasise their Lebaneseness in the face of the Syrian regime.

It was an expression of their will to get out of their sectarian areas and identities. Yet, what happened after demonstrated that they could not translate that wish into a unified political will.

While the Lebanese uprising succeeded in forcing the Syrians to withdraw from the country, the popular movement did not produce much else after.

Lebanese groups returned to demarcating their internal borders, divisions, and hostilities.

They failed to transcend civil polarities and loyalty to their leaders. These polarisations manifested themselves in the parliamentary elections that took place shortly after Hariri's assassination. 

Lebanese pluralism needed to find another political representative to champion its cause.

Remarkably, the independent Lebanese middle class had a strong and wide-ranging presence in the protests between 14 February and 14 March 2005. But it lacked the leadership that could carry forward its aspirations.

However, this middle class soon fell victim to the polarisation of parties and their sectarian leaders — and this was not the first time. The educated middle class had been a silent victim throughout the Lebanese civil wars (1975-1990).

For more than three decades, the Lebanese middle class was present with such force and intensity as a protest against its absence and destruction.

On the first anniversary of 14 February, the Lebanese gathered in a familiar scene, despite their differences. Their swarming indicated that they were still stuck in the same place.

They were in a political paralysis so overwhelming that it was impossible to turn the page. It's as if they had been chained and could not express their free political will.

They echoed the same scene as Hezbollah supporters had done on 8 March in support of the Syrian regime.

They separated themselves from these supporters, as well as supporters of Aoun.

It can be said that Martyrs' Square became a fortress to 14 March supporters. 

Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea told the masses in the same square on 14 February 2006: "The sea is in front of you and the enemy is behind you."

The square became a fortress which people were afraid to leave, fearing the unknown. So, they stayed there, in a kind of spatial fetishism of politics.

The mosque of Muhammad al-Amin in Martyrs' Square — which had sparked sectarian strife before Hariri's assassination — was transformed into a mosque of sectarian harmony for a whole month after Hariri was buried in it. 

Conversely, Hassan Nasrallah and Michel Aoun turned the Mar Mikhael Church, on the old war line in the southern suburbs of Beirut, into a place for their "understanding" against the 14 March crowd.

The Aounists, we shouldn't forget, first emerged from Martyrs' Square. This spatial, symbolic, and political delineation of the Lebanese groups painted a picture of what would happen later in Lebanon.

The spatial fetishism of politics in the Lebanese discourse and press extends to where their leaders reside Koraytem and Sayyid Koraytem (Koraytem's Master) refer to Rafik Hariri.

Ain Al-Tineh refers to Speaker Nabih Berri. Rabieh and the Rabieh General means General Michel Aoun. The cedar and cedar's doctor is Samir Geagea, whose residence is in Bsharri, the homeland of cedar trees. Haret Hreik Sayyid Haret Hreik means Hassan Nasrallah. Last but not least, the palace of Al-Mokhtara and the leader of Al-Mokhtara is no one else but Walid Jumblatt.

The logic of the spatial fetishism of politics and leadership is akin to accepting inherited leadership from one generation to another within the same family. It is also linked to introducing murder, assassination, death, abolition, fear, and war in political action. 

Hariri was subjected to this, and it was only the first of a series of subsequent political assassinations against figures from the 14 March movement.

Ironically, it is what broad and large segments of the Lebanese people rose against after the assassination of Hariri, when they left their regions, rejecting killing and assassination and the logic of the spatial-leadership designation of politics and political life.

However, not only did the logic of fortresses, castles, and idolatrous leadership institutions return, but it came with greater potency. 

This is what lies at the heart of Lebanon's tragedy today.