Catherine Ashton (L), High Representative of the Union of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the European Union, and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif give a press statement on the second day of the second round of P5+1 talks with Iran at the UN headquarters in Vienna, Austria, on March 19, 2014. (DIETER NAGL/AFP/Getty Images)[/caption]
Writing about the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1, the five permanent UN Security Council powers and Germany, in 2014 is to enter a world of diplomatic déjà vu. Depending on your viewpoint, we are either on a honeymoon with the Iranians or even further down the road to being suckered by them. Either way, since the deal struck at the end of last year, in which the two sides committed to solving the nuclear impasse by this July, there have been more constructive talks than at almost any other point in this decade-long saga. The Americans and Iranians are even speaking to each other directly.
The negotiations are obviously imperfect. The same cast of characters meets, talks and agrees on pretty much nothing except to meet again. Words and more words: this is the form the nuclear crisis now takes. Nonetheless, there is comfort in the banal: this series of talks remains the only hope (barring unpleasant alternatives like military action) of resolving the nuclear standoff, and they must be followed carefully.
It is clear that both sides want the talks to succeed, or at least not to collapse. Diplomats on both sides are under pressure from elements back home who are convinced (or hopeful) that the talks will lead nowhere. In Iran, hardliners oppose talking to the West on principle, while even Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei remains unconvinced they are worthwhile. Meanwhile, US President Barack Obama faces attacks from figures on the Right of American politics—as well as some in his own party—who believe Iran is not negotiating in good faith, but is instead stalling for time while it moves closer towards a bomb.
It is instructive therefore that diplomatic rhetoric from both sides has been almost universally positive since the deal. The latest round of talks from March 18–20, held once again in Vienna, ended with a joint statement from EU Foreign Policy chief Catherine Ashton and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif declaring they had “substantive and useful discussions covering a set of issues,” while Zarif later declared he was hopeful about meeting the July 20 deadline for a long-term solution to the crisis.
There have been bumps in the road. Ashton caused considerable displeasure by meeting with dissident Iranian women in Tehran on International Women’s Day on March 8 in what was the first trip to the country by the top European Union foreign policy official in more than five years. Zarif cancelled a dinner with her just before the Vienna talks over what was described as her undiplomatic behavior. But, the point having been made, both sides were eager to gloss over it and move forward.
Zarif told reporters at the post-talks briefing: “We will meet again on April 7–9, 2014, in Vienna and continue our work on the substantial areas which we intend to cover in a comprehensive agreement. In the meantime, technical experts will meet to further elaborate on the details of the relevant issues.” Everyone, it seems, is on track.
All this positivity is even more instructive given how far apart the two sides still are. The P5+1 want to ensure that Iran is incapable of building a nuclear weapon. At the heart of their concerns is its uranium enrichment program, which ideally they would like to see scrapped altogether. The Iranians won’t do this and have said so repeatedly, to the degree that it is unlikely they could back down now and retain credibility among their own people even if they wanted to. This is critical. The regime has boxed itself into a fairly tight corner by so consistently insisting on its “inalienable rights” to nuclear technology. It cannot be seen to cave into pressure without receiving anything substantial in return. As positive as Zarif was, he made clear to Iranian media that any deal would be one that “respects the rights of the Iranian nation.”
Problems also exist beyond merely scrapping the enrichment program. The degree of monitoring of the Natanz and Fordo enrichment facilities wanted by the P5+1 is likely to prove controversial. And then there is the controversy surrounding the heavy-water reactor under construction at Arak, which, once operational, could produce plutonium from which a nuclear bomb could be made. Washington has suggested solving the problem by converting it into a light-water reactor, which would present less of a proliferation threat, but the Iranians are not keen. “Arak,” said Zarif, is “part of Iran’s nuclear program and will not be closed down.” Little wonder that, behind the scenes, diplomats from the US and the EU are skeptical that the July deadline will be met.
On such a global matter, geopolitics also remains an issue. The perennial Israeli factor is, if anything, intensifying. As the talks began, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon urged Washington to “lead the campaign against Iran” instead of negotiating. Israeli pressure on the US will continue to factor in US diplomatic calculations, and the threat of military action, while perhaps not as serious as several years ago, remains ostentatiously on the table.
More interesting is the emergence of Ukraine as a new and potentially complicating factor. As the talks opened, several analysts mooted the possibility that Russia might seek to make life difficult for other P5+1 members on the Iran file in response to US and European opposition to its actions in Ukraine. However, Michael Mann, a spokesman for Ashton, told reporters that he had not seen “any negative effect” on the talks attributable to the Ukraine crisis. It is likely that, thus far, he is right. The Russians are on board because they share an interest with the US and the EU in ensuring Iran doesn’t get a bomb.
It is, however, a question of priorities. While preventing Iran from going nuclear is the Obama administration’s number-one foreign policy objective, it comes some way down the list of Russian concerns, certainly below organizing affairs in what they see as their back yard. If relations continue to worsen over Ukraine, it is conceivable that Moscow may start to use the nuclear crisis as leverage for its actions in Crimea. If this happens, the considerable progress made over recent months may end up counting for nothing.
All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.
