[/caption]Referencing a quote from Gorky in his seminal work on the Russian Revolution, Orlando Figes notes that the twentieth century provided no example of a betrayed people. Instead, the elite of a given country arose organically from its people and the elite’s characteristics were at most exaggerated reflections of society’s values and beliefs. While this is, according to Figes, a practically universal phenomenon, one can particularly see such a dynamic at play in the recent history of Kuwaiti politics.
The Kuwaiti Parliament and the policies it pursues are, overall, a direct reflection of the whims and desires of the majority of Kuwaitis. While their quasi-direct democracy may be applauded, unfortunately neither the Parliamentarians nor the Cabinet seem able or willing to play the necessary dispassionate role with an eye to longer-term sustainability. Instead, since the elections in February 2012 Kuwait’s Parliament again resembles more of a jamboree of handouts, pay increases, and easy, popular decisions, than a judicious debating body addressing the immediate needs of the state while looking after longer-term interests.
Social Policies
The basic dynamic that has emerged in Kuwait is a conflict between those who traditionally have been the richest and the most politically connected sectors in society versus the more recently emancipated tribal and Islamist elements. These relative newcomers to the political scene see it as their primary mission to extract as much coin from the Kuwaiti Government as possible, while blocking any actions that might enable the traditional ‘ruling classes’ to gain further, whether financially or politically. Where possible, they also seek to pursue a narrow, conservative social agenda.
While the tribal and Islamist groups are far from homogenous and indeed key differences remain, they do presently form a broad church, and as a block present the Government and its supporters with a stringent opposition.
[inset_left]While Kuwait is a very rich country, the current budget trajectory is nevertheless unsustainable. [/inset_left]
A bill that calls for the death penalty for any unrepentant Muslims who insult the Quran, the Prophet Mohammed, his wives, or his relatives, has been voted through Parliament following controversial comments made by a prominent Shi’a cleric, Yasser Al-Habib, who lives in exile in London. Habib’s comments were considered to have deliberately stoked sectarian tensions, hence the introduction of the severe bill, which its critics claim flatly contradicts Kuwait’s long-standing constitutional protection of freedom of speech that has been in place since the 1960s. Defenders of the bill suggest that the measures are necessary to protect the unity of Kuwait. The bill still awaits the Emir’s signature for it to become law, yet this bill is not an isolated incident.
A Member of Parliament recently called for the removal of churches from Kuwait, but later clarified that he only sought a ban on their construction. Additionally, there have been suggestions that Sharia should be made the sole source of legitimacy for the Kuwaiti constitution and after discussion and deliberation it has been decided that military personnel may grow their beard to any length they choose.
Such policies typically play well to the traditional constituencies of the tribal and Islamist MPs and highlight their potent power, even though such policies are seen elsewhere in Kuwait as being retrograde or not of even remote importance.
Finances
As ever, the populist MPs seek to make the biggest impact when it comes to Kuwait’s finances. Disagreements and discrepancies over pay rises in Kuwait’s public sector led Kuwait Airways and customs employees to reject the 25 percent pay rise and hold out for 30 percent. Musallam Al-Barrak, one of the leading populist MPs, suggested state-sector employees should get 40 percent.
Barrak also tabled a motion that would see the termination of all sixty-six thousand expatriate workers in the Kuwaiti public sector within one year, and their replacement with Kuwaitis. Clearly, by any reasoned standards such a policy would be a catastrophe—not least because it would go against Kuwait’s vision of encouraging more Kuwaitis to work in the private sector, entrench the public sector mindset, enlarge the public sector wage bill (already one third of the entire Kuwaiti budget), and rob the sector of decades of institutional knowledge and hard graft.
The fact that Kuwait is predicted to boast one of the largest budget surpluses in the world in 2012—around 46 percent—is likely driving some of this ‘share the wealth’ mentality. Indeed, this is understandable if not fair; a people should benefit from the success—fiscal or otherwise—of their country. Yet the concern in Kuwait is twofold.
Firstly, such enormously generous policies have been implemented for decades. Huge annual pay rises, debt relief, food stamps, and a deep range of subsidies have become expected in Kuwait. This pernicious culture is becoming ingrained and will be difficult to change, which is highly problematic when taken in conjunction with the second concern.
Namely that while Kuwait is a very rich country, the current budget trajectory is nevertheless unsustainable. Currently, Kuwait’s break-even price for a barrel of oil is projected to rise to $109.50 for 2012-13; if the current rate of spending is unchanged, it will reach an unmanageable £213.50 by 2029-30. This consistent rise in expenditure is thought to be the key reason behind the resignation of Kuwait’s Central Bank’s governor of twenty-five years in February 2012.
Yet while Kuwait’s government is willing to spend huge sums of money on wages and subsidies, when it comes to genuine investment it is unable to gather the necessary consensus because the issue of privatization is deeply divisive. In 2010 a law on privatization was passed after 18 years of wrangling in the Parliament, but it has yet to be significantly acted upon. In discussing amendments to this bill, an MP voiced concerns that this bill would create a master-servant relationship. This sentiment perfectly encapsulates the deep reservations that many of the newly-enfranchised MPs have regarding such bills and large investment plans: that they will enable the established, rich, and politically connected to graft away more money. These concerns are not wholly unwarranted, and a toxic atmosphere of mistrust has arisen. Presently issues of investment and privatization are seen as a zero-sum game, hence the obstruction of the latest $30 billion development plan.
Looking Forward
There is little reason to expect this populist vogue in Kuwaiti politics to change soon. The various cleavages in Kuwait must form one single national vision and a new national compact. This would need to be led by the Emir—he is the only person in Kuwait with sufficient respect—and it would need to focus on two areas in particular.
First, the government could seek to augment its fund for future generations as a means of saving more revenue. Focusing explicitly on saving money for Kuwait’s future by, for example, forging a link between government expenditure on wages or subsidies and state revenue might be the only feasible way that people would accept any curbs on such expenditures today.
Second, such a strategy would rely on strenuous and visible government action against corruption. Transgressors would need to be tarred and feathered, while transactions and procurement would need to be open to scrutiny. Transparency—also in particular in the sovereign wealth funds themselves—would be a prerequisite for Parliamentarians’ acquiescence to the necessary large investment plans that all Kuwaitis want to see spent on Kuwait’s ageing infrastructure.
Pursuing such a plan would take vision and a selfless submission to the ultimate goal of benefitting Kuwait as a whole. Also, any such plan would be open at all times to meddlers using latent anger towards Iraq (a popular political football) or an elite scandal to distract voters, but the logic of a sacrifice for the good of the next generation is potentially powerful. The alternatives of half-measures and bluster will only entrench each side further and relegate another generation to bitter, recriminatory in-fighting. The consequent lack of action from which Kuwait has suffered for decades, after being a dynamic leader of the Gulf region in the 1960s and 1970s, will consign Kuwait evermore to an expensive and endless role playing catch-up to its regional rivals who have long since been diversifying and innovating their way to coping with the post oil and gas challenges that lie ahead.
