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Tunisia has voted. As anticipated, it seems that the Islamist Ennahdha (Renaissance)—which has struggled for decades as an officially unrecognized and illegal political party—has won by far the largest share of the vote intended to determine the makeup of a new Constituent Assembly. The results, trickling out at the time of writing, indicate that only months after Rached Ghannouchi’s return from exile in the UK his party will hold at least a 40 percent stake in the new assembly tasked with drafting a new Tunisian constitution.
The outcome, which sees predominantly secular opposition groups from the Ben Ali era take a back seat to Ennahdha, was broadly expected for two reasons. Firstly, for the past twenty years Ennahdha have been a genuine voice of opposition to Ben Ali, despite (or perhaps because of) the group’s illegal status and the government’s campaign of persecution against them, Ghannouchi and his party were able to maintain a vocal stance against the iniquities of the former regime. Therefore, Ennahdha looms large in the political consciousness of every Tunisian, whether a supporter or not. The party is now one of the largest landmarks on a political landscape that has, until recently, remained fairly barren—with over a hundred political parties coming into being in the past six months. So in one sense this win is an endorsement of the political maturity of Tunisians, who apparently have memories long enough to remember who has been doing the donkey-work for the past two decades and are willing to give long-standing opposition a chance to hold the reins.
[inset_left]The major note of positivity struck by the election is the speed and success of the transitional process since January[/inset_left]
The second and perhaps more significant reason is that an anti-corruption ticket defined the election campaign. As a self-consciously Islamic party in an overwhelmingly Muslim country, Ennahdha were well-placed to adopt a position of moral authority and stand in contrast to the rampantly corrupt, practically institutionalized dishonesty, of the previous government. Cynics might be quick to point out that Islamist parties are well known practitioners of this policy in the Middle East. The last major election victory won by political Islam in the region went to Hamas, in the Palestinian Legislative Elections of 2006. That year, Hamas also played the corruption card against their opponents and took advantage of massive popular frustration at the interminable stalling of the peace process. However, the astonishing ramifications of that result—which included attempts by interested foreign (western) parties to delegitimize the whole election process—will not happen in the Tunisian case. Indeed there are several reasons to be optimistic for Tunisia’s immediate future and the hopes might be said to outweigh the fears, which will inevitably be peddled by those observers predisposed to be suspicious of political Islam.
The major note of positivity struck by the election is the speed and success of the transitional process since January, when the former president fled his country. Soon after Ben Ali’s ouster the interim Prime Minister, Beji Caid Essebsi, announced that elections would be held at the end of July. Some minor controversy surrounded the decision to postpone until 23 October, but that decision—intended to allow more time for voters to be registered—has been vindicated by the relatively smooth handling of the logistical side of things. Ashraf Al-Shuabi, an election operations consultant for the United Nations Development Programme, is optimistic, “internal and international reports show logistically there were no major problems, only occasional minor issues such as might be found anywhere in the world.” This certainly sounds like a triumph, especially given the extraordinary figures released by the Independent High Authority for Elections in Tunis, which provisionally estimated that more than 90 percent of the 4.1 million registered voters in Tunisia made it to the polls.
What is more, the election has played out in a discernibly democratic spirit, with only very few reports of antagonism from any quarters and particularly measured responses to the results. "We accept the democratic result and we'll be in opposition,” said Kais Nigrou, of the Pôle Démocratique Moderniste in response to reports of Ennahdha’s success. Al-Shuabi also had encouraging words: “Democratically speaking the elections were transparent and successful, there were no complaints, for instance, that names could not be found on the voters list. And there is no chance of fraud.”
All of which good news leaves Tunisia in a fairly healthy position. Ennahdha have achieved a notable victory and with it the chance to play a significant role in shaping the future country, but Islamists will by no means be the only section of society represented in the Constituent Assembly. Several opposition groups have been quick to point out that if Ennahdha have won 40 percent of the vote, then the other 60 percent has been won by comparatively liberal representatives of the diverse and broadly secular Tunisian society. Notwithstanding the fact that since the election campaign began in earnest, Ennahdha—and Ghannouchi in particular—have been extremely careful to allay any fears of extremism. The party is well aware of the large Francophile and progressive makeup of Tunisia and has always stressed a commitment to the democratic process. Importantly, the Ennahdha is signatory to a September agreement that entails a moral obligation the ideals of a transitional roadmap.
So optimism is certainly running high, but it would be naïve to assume that the smooth progress will continue unabated, after all, democracy by its nature thrives on conflict. The immediate task at hand of the newly elected assembly will be to agree upon and nominate a new president. Given the fact that this will largely be a ceremonial role, it is unlikely to provoke much controversy. The sticking point, and something that will become clear in the coming weeks, is that given the size of Ennahdha’s success the party may seek to occupy a number of significant positions in the new interim government, not least that of prime minister. Hamadi Jbeli, Ennahdha’s secretary general, was quick to put himself forward as the party’s nomination for prime minister. A perfectly reasonable suggestion, given that he will represent the majority party in the assembly, but the wider concern will be that should Ennahdha press home their advantage in the short term, and seek to dominate an interim government and legislature that is intended simply to lay the groundwork for a future Tunisia, they may derail the chances for stability.
It would be a calculated risk on Ennadha’s part to dominate the assembly, since any perceived failure in the short term will be laid at their door. Negotiations have already begun to ensure a healthy coalition that can effect reasonable government over the next year—which is the proposed timescale in which to draft a new constitution and hold parliamentary elections. Let us not forget that the economic problems that exacerbated the downfall of Ben Ali have not gone away and a newly empowered populace will be happy to give their opinion at the next election, penciled in for next autumn in the roadmap, as to the relative success or failure of the interim government.
The most significant advantage in the hands of Tunisia’s new assembly will be a practically clean slate. Some of the major problems facing neighboring countries, in the throes of their own revolutions, are the lingering and malignant influences from a supposedly deposed regime. In Tunisia, not only has Ben Ali gone, but with him fled the invidious networks of cronyism that characterized his regime—we know this because it was his family, and extended family, that operated these networks, and those people have departed. They have left behind a remarkably enthusiastic populace, genuinely intoxicated by the thrill of free and fair elections, who know very well that it is they who control the government and not vice versa.
