The Lebanese civil war that started in 1975 was concluded with the ratification of the Taif Accord in 1989, engineered by construction tycoon and billionaire Rafik Hariri, who became Lebanon’s prime minister for the greater part of the 1990s until his resignation in 2004. During this time, Lebanon enjoyed civil peace, thanks to the convergence of interests of regional and international powers, namely Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, France and the United States. But also during this time, Syria maintained a military presence inside its smaller neighbor, and thus tightly controlled Lebanon’s political and economic affairs, among other state elements.
The Iraq war of 2003, however, shook up regional political alignments. Hariri, the leader of Lebanon’s sizeable Sunni community, commanding a coalition that included heavyweight Christian and Druze leaders, came close to ejecting Syria from Lebanon in 2004. His move was coupled with the approval of Security Council Resolution 1559, which stipulated a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and the disarmament of militias, such as Hezbollah.
Hariri was killed in February 2005. His assassination provoked domestic anger and international pressure on Syria, which was forced to withdraw its troops in April, for the first time since they first invaded Lebanon in 1976.
Hariri’s assassination also prompted the formation of a UN investigation commission. In 2007, the Security Council created the STL to try the crime of Hariri and 11 other political murders that followed.
Since its inception, the tribunal has been a paradoxical problem for Lebanon, the region and the international community. On the one hand, it represents over due justice for the brutal murder of Lebanon’s most prominent national leader in the post-Taif era, and an opportunity for closure, healing and reconciliation. On the other hand, this justice may come at the expense of the future stability of Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, has accused the STL of being an Israeli-American tool designed to undermine his party, and has suggested that—for the tribunal to be credible—it should not discount the possibility of Israeli involvement in Hariri’s murder. Nasrallah has demanded that Prime Minister Saad Hariri, the son of slain Rafik, preemptively denounce the tribunal, claiming that it has become known that Hezbollah members will be among the indicted.
With tensions rising, Lebanon’s regional interlopers have stepped up to manage the growing crisis within the state. None of these players are interested in seeing a broken Lebanon that could destabilize the Levant at large.
Of Lebanon’s partners, Syria could potentially play a constructive role in bringing the country back from the brink of potential conflict. As the benefactor of Hezbollah, and given its improved ties with Saudi Arabia, Hariri’s patron, Syria is in a good position to help diffuse the crisis.
Syria stands to benefit the most from rescuing Lebanon. Immediately, a destabilized Lebanon on its border runs contrary to its long-standing security policy of preventing instability from spilling into Syria. Damascus would also have the opportunity to further leverage its influence in Lebanon, and, as a result, make Hariri’s government more amenable to its interests. Finally, Syria’s relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia would further deepen as a result of this rescue.
Syria’s Foreign Minister, Walid Muallem said at a news conference that, “Lebanon's stability is part of the security and stability of Syria.” He added: “President Bashar Assad gives Lebanon's stability great importance… anyone who tries to sabotage this effort will not succeed.”
Assad’s highly unusual joint visit with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to Beirut in July of 2010, illustrates how far Syria has come in its relationship with Lebanon since 2005. The visit came in the wake of warming relations between Beirut and Damascus. Hariri had visited Assad for the first time in December 2009. In March that same year, Syria announced the appointment of its first ambassador to Beirut, Ali Abdul Karim Ali.
Despite the improving relations, Damascus is still in no position to call the shots in Beirut. Since its withdrawal in 2005, Syria was left with little leverage inside its smaller neighbor. Lebanon’s parliamentary elections of 2009 showed that only three out of Syria’s few dozen candidates won outside of districts that are not controlled by Hezbollah. This illustrates that, since 2005, Syria’s influence in Lebanon has been extremely dependent on Hezbollah, a party that—despite its strong ties with Damascus—is an Iranian proxy after all.
Like with Hezbollah, the STL’s impending indictments have caused deep unease in Syria. The tribunal could potentially prosecute Syrian officials. Such accusation would harm the image of Syria’s regime. Damascus is keenly aware that its ally, Hezbollah, might take up arms in the event of an indictment of its members.
Since the tribunal’s inception, Syria has attempted to hamper, weaken and destabilize it. So far, Damascus has been unsuccessful in halting it, but it has worked to discredit the tribunal’s legitimacy. In October, Damascus issued arrest warrants for Hariri’s aides on charges that they stood behind what Syria and Hezbollah claim to be witnesses who gave false testimonies to the UN investigation team.
As the release of STL indictments reaches its zero hour, Syria hopes it can discredit the STL to the point that even Hariri would reject its legitimacy. Such an act would ensure that even if the indictments were unveiled, Lebanon would never act on them.
Since July, negotiations between Syria and Saudi Arabia have been intensely underway to find a compromise where, in exchange for Saudi Arabia no longer supporting the tribunal’s legitimacy and convincing Hariri to follow suit, Syria would come out fully in support of Hariri’s government and would oppose any attempts by Hezbollah to destabilize the country. Whether Syria can reign in Hezbollah, or even intends to do so, remains questionable.
Lebanon today stands at a crossroads. The absence of justice might encourage revenge, and eventually civil war. If the perpetrators of the Hariri crime remain at large, the lack of punishment might promote further political assassinations in the future. However, for all of its worth, justice on the Hariri case might not come free of charge. Those who fear indictment, namely Syria and Hezbollah, might decide to turn the table by starting domestic violence.
It looks certain that, during the time of this writing, both Syria and Hezbollah are calculating to see whether their interests are served more in starting civil war in Lebanon, or in preventing it. Meanwhile, the international community also looks determined to support justice for Lebanon at all costs. At least the United States and its allies see an interest in keeping the pressure high on Hezbollah and Damascus to encourage them to change their behavior. In the case of Hezbollah, it is expected to disarm and renounce violence. In the case of Syria, it should realign itself away from Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas.
In Lebanon and the Middle East at large, a wait game goes hand in hand with a dance of power. Who gets the last word is far from being determined, with or without an STL indictment in Lebanon.
Andrew Bowen – A PhD candidate at the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics. He works and writes on Middle East politics, international relations and American foreign policy.
