A controversial Egyptian television series, Al-Gama’a, was broadcast daily at prime viewing time during Ramadan this year. It depicted the foundation and early development of the Muslim Brotherhood through the life of its founder Hassan Al-Banna. Muslim Brotherhood members labeled the series “blatant propaganda” in the run up to November’s parliamentary elections, and attempted to secure an injunction to prevent the show from broadcasting. The government, in contrast, remained silent—happy to let the Muslim Brotherhood show itself to be the enemy of freedom of speech.
The drama serial portrayed Al-Banna as a fanatic, and tied the Muslim Brotherhood to a series of assassinations and attacks on Cairo’s Jewish quarter in the 1940s—accusations the group denies. The writer of the series, Wahed Hamid, is known as a critic of political Islam but also of the government. However, it seems that Hamid’s Al-Gama’a gained government approval by portraying the government agents, despite their faults, as basically good when compared to Brotherhood members.
While this is the obvious interpretation, the effect of the program was not so straightforward. The government sought to portray religious extremists from all religions as the enemies of Egypt, their people and the values of moderate Islam. In this case, the strategy seems to have backfired as the show depicted an “Islam versus secularism” worldview with the Muslim Brotherhood, and not the state, as the strongest defender of Islam and Egyptian society against Western influences.
In portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as aggressively anti-British, anti-Jewish and anti-secular, the characters actually spoke to some of the discourses that have widespread popularity in Egyptian society. The state should know this. The Egyptian government avoids using the term secular, preferring to describe Egypt as a civil not a secular state. This is to avoid the connotations that come with the term secularism. For many Egyptians, including Al-Banna, secularism means atheism or kofr, and this is considered by some to be almost an existential threat to Islam.
Another perhaps unintended outcome is a sense of admiration for Al-Banna’s character in standing up for a cause. In a climate of political apathy, social stagnation and a lack of real choices, this can be appealing, regardless of whether you agree with the cause or methods. The show did highlight the Muslim Brotherhood’s lack of a coherent political program. Yet this matters little to a population whose experience shows that a party’s political program makes scant difference in daily life. Expressions of popular piety and providing access to basic services—two areas where the Muslim Brotherhood works to gain grassroots support—are more influential than a party manifesto.
The significance of Al-Gama’a is found not only in its content, which would inevitably cast the Muslim Brotherhood and its founder in a negative light, but also in its very existence. The state took a risk in allowing the series to go ahead, even investing a reported 22 million Egyptian pounds in its production. Normally, government strategy has been to marginalize the Muslim Brotherhood from the media in an effort to make the group invisible in the public conscience. In official state media, the Muslim Brotherhood is usually referred to only as “Al-Mahthoora,” meaning the forbidden group.
Yet the effect of this series was to create a space to discuss the Muslim Brotherhood openly. Raouf Ashm, the manager of the Cairo bookstore, Madbouly, noted a significant increase in demand for books on the Muslim Brotherhood, and particularly on Hassan Al-Banna. He claims that after the series started, sales increased by 45 percent. But while the series clearly made an impact at the time it was broadcast, if it was the government’s intention to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood and their campaign for the parliamentary elections, then the long-term impact should be considered. With electoral campaigns well underway, Al-Gama’a and the discussions it has provoked appear to have been forgotten.
Although interest in understanding the Muslim Brotherhood may have increased, it is unlikely that the series either gained or cost them any significant support. There is a sense that the government made a wrong move in the war of media and propaganda. Nevertheless, the media will remain a key battleground. Both the NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood recognize the power of the media. The state has made dramatic moves to restrict the independent media prior to elections, while the Muslim Brotherhood has increased efforts to improve its image through the use of new media—even establishing an alternative to Facebook, called Ikhawanbook.com.
A new installment in this drama is expected to unfold next year. Wahed Hamid intends to write a sequel to Al-Gama’a to air during Ramadan 2011. Part II will cover the Muslim Brotherhood’s history under the regime of Gamal Abdul Nasser, surely provoking controversy once more.
Elizabeth Iskander - Dinam Research fellow in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Dr Iskander holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Cambridge, and writes regularly on Middle East politics.
