An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy?
Reidar Visser and Gareth Stansfield
C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd 2007
Stansfield and Visser’s edited volume, An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy?, tackles the difficulties of building a viable state structure in Iraq. The authors suggest that regional and territorial sentiments have historically been more crucial in determining the political landscape. Meanwhile, the ethnification of Iraqi politics is a recent phenomenon, spurred by party elites who promote “artificial” sectarian categories. The writers put forth a strong case that regional identities could be the basis for building a federal Iraq, and highlight the capacity of Iraq’s constitution to accommodate different regional preferences. But whilst An Iraq of Its Regions challenges our assumptions about Iraq, we are left feeling despondent. In spite of their excellent case for regionalism, our fears that sectarianism will prevail are never fully dispelled.
This book had been knocking around my living room for two weeks waiting to be reviewed. But every time I looked at it, I quickly found that I had a hundred better things to be doing. The problem is the title. It really is a terrible title. I was also confused by the question mark. Did the authors really have such little faith in their notion of regionalism as an alternative to sectarianism? Apparently so. Once I found the resolve to extract the book from the coffee table sprawl of newspapers, I was pleasantly surprised if rather downhearted by the end. An Iraq of Its Regions serves as a welcome relief from the tired analysis of Iraqi politics through a sectarian lens. It provides the reader with a more nuanced and complex picture of Iraq, and offers the reader a different paradigm for viewing Iraq’s past and future. The book is also at times rather interesting. Interesting that is in a “local histories” sort of way. This is perhaps unusual for a volume tackling a post-war society; local histories are usually undertaken during more certain times. However, it is the multitude of local traditions and parochial concerns that constitute the true heart of a country. As Iraq tries to navigate these uncertain times, Visser and Stansfield remind us of this fact.
Visser’s introduction is an excellent summary and critique of the historiography of Iraq. It also lays the foundations for the rest of the book by deconstructing our simplistic understanding of Iraqi history. Visser’s main contention is with viewing Iraq’s historical fault lines in sectarian terms. Although he agrees that most studies of Ottoman Iraq divide the regions surrounding Mosul, Baghdad and Basra into Kurdish, Sunni and Shi’ite areas, respectively, Visser says that such an analysis is frankly wrong. He blames lazy scholarship and the limited knowledge of Arabic amongst historians for such an oversimplification. But more than laying blame, Visser emphasizes the risks in viewing Iraqi history through an ethno-sectarian lens. This view is not only dangerous in that it may, and to an extent has, become a self-fulfilling prophecy, but it is also unnecessary. As Visser highlights, the focus on sect as a basis for identity is a recent phenomenon in Iraq. Historically, villages, towns and regions constituted the main foci of identity.
In the following chapter Visser discusses in finer detail the popular claims that the Shi’a of the south are lobbying for a Shi’ite federal state. According to Visser, movements emanating from the south have traditionally focused on regionalism as a source of unity. Prior to 2005 there were only a couple of attempts at the creation of an entity based along ethnic lines, the most noteworthy being the Shi’ite separatist movement of 1927. Visser compares the 2003 “project” for a Shi’a region in the South with a stalled Shi’ite separatist movement in 1927. In both cases he says that the proposal for a separate Shi’ite entity failed to mobilize popular support, yet attracted international attention. In 1927, the bid failed because they failed to attract the support of leading Shi’ite figures. In 2005, the movement for Shi’ite federalism is failing to win the support of leading Shi’ite cleric Ali Sistani. Visser suggests, however, that this time the ethnic politics encouraged by various strands within Iraqi society may lead to the creation of a Shi’ite region. He indicates that: “after 2003 the bedrock of regionalist and nationalist sentiment—widespread as it may have been at the popular level—became irrelevant in politics as party elites introduced “artificial” sectarian categories and succeeded in convincing Iraqi militants that these were somehow fundamental building blocks.” Although Visser suggests that a Shi’ite federation has little historical basis, he laments the extent to which sectarianism may prevail. He blames the exceptional conditions of post-war Iraq for this possibility.
The picture is further complicated when Fanar Haddad, and Sajjad Rizvi bring Baghdad into the equation. They demonstrate that although federalism may have been a foregone conclusion for allies and exiled Iraqis just prior to the invasion, for the Iraqi population the notion of federalism was entirely novel. Based on a series of telephone interviews conducted with Iraqis, Haddad and Rizvi suggest that it is unlikely that there will be a popular push for federalism from Baghdad. In the capital, Shi’a and Sunni alike oppose calls for a federal Iraq fearing that with power devolved to the peripheries, they may end up out of pocket. Their lack of support for a federal Iraq is only exceeded by their sense of alienation from the process. The interviews reveal a widespread mistrust of political actors, some are dismissed as outsiders having spent years in exile, and others are deemed stooges to the foreign occupiers.
The overall sense is that most Iraqis do not wish for a federal Iraq divided according to ethnic loyalties. Even during these exceptional times, where ethno-sectarian violence has crystallized Iraqis’ sense of ethnic loyalty, there is only limited will to transpose these ethnic divisions onto Iraq’s political make-up. The most recent elections, in which the non-sectarian candidate Ayad Allawi’s slate won a majority, demonstrate the extent to which the population is jaded by sectarianism and eager to move beyond it.
In the penultimate chapter, Liam Anderson makes the most compelling argument against an ethnic-based federalism. He highlights the “abysmal track record” of federations built of ethnic identities, but more importantly, in Iraq’s case Anderson suggests that an ethnic model of federalism should be based on a permanence of ethnic identity, which cannot be simply engineered. In Iraq’s case the authors argue that ethnic politics are a new and artificial phenomenon; this is then a poor basis for ethnic federalism. Anderson suggests that for a stable Iraqi federation to emerge, it is necessary to account for both regional and sectarian preferences when creating sub-federations. It is also the case that some regions will want more autonomy than others. Thankfully, Iraq’s constitution is able to accommodate these realities since it allows Iraqis themselves to define their own federal system. Yet Anderson concludes that establishing regional boundaries, though constitutionally viable, could prove an overwhelming task.
US aspirations for a full withdrawal depend largely on achieving a reasonable level of stability in Iraq. Yet, military gains since the surge have not seen parallel political inroads. As it stands, Iraq has been unable to form a government since elections were held in March. It is easy to incline towards exasperation here, but as Stansfield and Visser’s volume shows, the obstacles to overcoming ethno-sectarian tension are desperately complex and poorly understood. Thankfully, their book helps us to move the debate beyond sectarianism. Although, many of the authors feel that an Iraq of its ethnicities may be a foregone conclusion. One can only hope that they are wrong.
