Russian officials are eager to reinvigorate their Middle East peace credentials. In particular, Russian diplomats are vigorously lobbying to host a Middle East peace conference in Moscow as a follow-up to the November 2007 Annapolis meeting. Although Russia’s previous peace efforts have not had much impact, Moscow might soon have an opportunity to make an important contribution.
For the past two decades, the Russian government has played a supportive but distinctly secondary role in the Arab-Israel peace process. The Russian Federation—along with the European Union, the United Nations, and the United States—is a core member of the Middle East Quartet of international peace intermediaries. Russian diplomats have staunchly supported the Quartet’s position that a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement requires establishing an independent, sovereign, and viable Palestinian state whose leaders, along with other Arab governments, accept Israel’s right to exist in peace within internationally recognized boundaries.
Although the parties in the Middle East have generally welcomed Russia’s peace initiatives, they have typically turned to the other Quartet members when seeking concrete progress. In the future, however, circumstances may fortuitously change to give Russia its long-sought leading role in the Middle East drama.
In his June 14 speech outlining his conditions for peace, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insisted his government would only accept a two-state solution if a Palestinian government can ensure Israel’s security. Moscow is well placed to help meet this stipulation.
First, Russia can continue to help reign in Hamas and enhance the security capacity of the Palestinian Authority, actions which most other governments are reluctant to undertake. Second, and most importantly, the Kremlin can assume a lead role in a multinational peacekeeping force that could help police a two-state solution.
Moscow alone among the Quartet members has formal ties with Hamas. The Russian government has refused to designate Hamas a terrorist organization, and instead have sought to work with its leaders to induce Hamas to follow the original Palestine Liberation Organization and renounce violence, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and adhere to all the obligations the Palestinian Authority had undertaken.
Until now, Russia’s influence has proven insufficient to secure Hamas’ adherence to these three Quartet conditions. Hamas’ use of force in 2007 to exclude Fatah and the Palestinian Authority from the Gaza Strip further strained relations between Russia and Hamas. Russian officials subsequently engaged only with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and his West Bank government. They even supplied the Palestine Authority its security forces with light weapons and security training with the permission of Israeli authorities. Late last year, the Russian government also joined with Abbas and others in a futile effort to induce Hamas to resume its six-month ceasefire with Israel.
Hamas’ clear military defeat in the subsequent war for Gaza has led some members of the group to reconsider their policy toward Israel, at least in practice if it not in public. If Israel and the Palestinian Authority agree to create an independent Palestinian state, many in Hamas might not contest the agreement. Hamas would not welcome a continued Israeli military presence in the occupied territories, but they might accept the deployment of an international peacekeeping contingent, including in their power base in the Gaza Strip.
Although complex, relations between Russian and Israeli leaders have been generally good since the new Russian state abandoned the distinctly pro-Arab policies of the Soviet Union. Since 1991, Russian policy makers have staunchly defended Israel’s right to exist even while frequently chastising Tel Aviv for various polices seen by Moscow as excessively inflexible or confrontational. In recent years, the two countries have managed to avert major tensions resulting from Israel’s support of Georgia as well as Russia’s possible sale of advanced S-300 air defense missiles to Iran.
One asset the Russian government might use more effectively is influence it enjoys with the hundreds of thousands of Israelis of Russian or Soviet origin. Members of this group, which constitutes the largest Russian-speaking Diaspora outside the former Soviet Union, typically vote to support political parties, such as that led by current Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, that resist negotiating concessions with Palestinians. They might moderate their positions if military units of their former co-nationals were defending them.
Israeli leaders would not trust a UN-led peacekeeping mission to defend their security interests in Palestinian territories. At best, they might accept a force answering to the Quartet, in which the UN plays only a modest role. American and European troops might be willing to deploy in West Bank. Only the Russian government, however, would be prepared to base peacekeepers in Hamas-controlled areas.
Russia has already played such important peacekeeping roles twice before. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, the presence of Russian troops helped reassure Serb minorities sufficiently to contribute to modestly successful peace agreements under the overall guidance of NATO and other international institutions.
The Russian government’s long-sought desire to host an international conference on the Middle East is admirable. Even so, Moscow could more effectively contribute to international peace and security by sending its best peacekeepers to the region.
Richard Weitz, Ph.D. - Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, Washington DC.
