On July 5 violence broke out in the Western Xinjiang Autonomous Region, a province in the West of China. Over the next few days over 180 people were killed in clashes between Chinese of Han and Uyghur origin and between the latter and the police. Irrespective of the causes of this particular outbreak of violence there are two elements that underscore the heavy-handed response of Chinese authorities to this outburst. The first element is Uyghur Islamic terrorism and Chinese fears of its potential for destabilization in western China. Related to this is Chinese general apprehension over pro-independence movements elsewhere, especially in Taiwan but also in Tibet.
Uyghur terrorism dates back to the late 1940s, when Xinjiang rejoined China after a brief period of independence. However, terrorism only became a greater problem as a result of the 1979-1989 Soviet war in Afghanistan. Uyghurs from southern Xinjiang joined the anti-communist movement fighting against Soviet forces in 1986. Three years later arms were smuggled into western Xinjiang, a region bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan. Then Uyghur separatist aspirations increased following the collapse of the Soviet Union, since this had allowed some Muslim communities in Central Asia to gain independence. As a result of these events what had mostly been a pacific movement demanding greater autonomy for the Uyghurs became more radical. Nonetheless, it should be noted that support for terrorism among the Uyghur population is not widespread.
The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is the main group among several terrorist organizations operating in the region. The goal of ETIM and other regional terrorist groups is the creation of an Islamic state in Central Asia that would include the territory of Western Xinjiang Autonomous Region. According to the Chinese government ETIM has been active since the early 1990s and is behind dozens of attacks around China’s territory, including three major violent incidents during the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
China has therefore been fearful of Islamic separatism for a long time. However, Chinese qualms increased following the 9/11 attacks on American soil. The Chinese government says that ETIM members have been trained by Al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives. This is corroborated by the US Department of State. In August 2002 it listed ETIM as a terrorist organization, citing evidence of this movement having received financial assistance and training from Al-Qaeda. One month later ETIM was also included by the UN in its list of terrorist organizations linked to the network led by Osama bin Laden.
As a result of this outbreak of violence in Xinjiang, Al-Qaeda’s wing in North Africa has vowed to target Chinese workers in Africa in response to the killing of Muslims in Xinjiang. In fact, Al-Qaeda militants had already been targeting Chinese economic interests in the continent. This reinforces Beijing’s worries regarding collaboration between Uyghur separatists and Islamic terrorists.
The financial and personal links between Al-Qaeda and Uyghur terrorists is not the only concern for China. More worrisome for the Hu Jintao government is the possibility of WMD or nuclear technology falling in the hands of Uyghur terrorists. Unnoticed to many, over the past few years China has increased its participation in the WMD and nuclear non-proliferation regimes. To this end the Hu Jintao government has quietly strengthened domestic legislation and control mechanisms to ensure that its own nuclear technology and WMD do not fall in the hands of Islamic terrorist networks. Amendment of the Regulations of the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Exports and the Regulations of the PRC on the Control of Dual-Use Nuclear Items and Relations Technologies, in 2006 and 2007 respectively, are examples of this. Beijing has also become a more active participant in multilateral non-proliferation organizations. These developments would not have taken place were not for the presence of Islamic radicals in Xinjiang.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is another mechanism used by China to deal with the threat of Islamic terrorism in the region. Ever since the organisation’s predecessor, the Shanghai Five, was founded in 1996 fighting against “terrorism, separatism and extremism” has been one of the key goals of member countries. Cooperation against these threats increased rapidly following 9/11. Hence, in January 2004 SCO members created a permanent Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure to coordinate activities in this field, most notably prevention of the smuggling of weapons and the spread of fundamentalism. In fact, some analysts go as far as to suggest that the main reason why Kyrgyzstan was invited to join first the Shanghai Five and then the SCO was China’s desire to improve ties with its neighbour, home to a large Uyghur population. Beijing also sought to involve the Kyrgyz government in counter-terrorism activities.
On the domestic front the Chinese government has concentrated on developing Xinjiang’s economy to weaken support for Uyghur separatism in general and terrorism in particular. However, the fact that many Uyghurs do not speak Mandarin hinders their access to good-paying jobs in both the private and public sectors. In addition, the changing ethnic composition of the population increases tensions - as of 2009, the proportion of Chinese of Uyghur and Han origin in the region is almost the same. Uyghurs also complain that the Chinese government favours Han Chinese when hiring and when handing out contracts to private companies. This fuels support for separatism and, in some cases, violence against the Han community and the state.
No analysis of Chinese response to the problems in Xinjiang would be complete without framing it within the government’s aversion towards other pro-independence movements. Beijing cannot afford to show weakness on the face of any challenge to its territorial integrity.
Problems with separatism in the Western Xinjiang Autonomous Region have sometimes been compared to those in the Tibet Autonomous Region. Both regions are similar in that they are, respectively, the largest and second largest Chinese provinces. In theory both enjoy more legislative rights than other provinces. In practice this only means that they have the right to appoint a governor, who usually comes from the regional minority. Since all provincial governments enjoy a significant degree of economic policy freedom and little political autonomy from the central government, Xinjiang and Tibet are not very different from other Chinese provinces in terms of self-government.
The main and most obvious difference between the situation in Xinjiang and Tibet is that the latter is not home to any terrorist or violent separatist movement. Muslim ethnic groups such as the Hui and some Muslim Tibetans live in the region. Nonetheless, there are no indications that they may radicalize and follow in the steps of ETIM. As for the Tibetan pro-independence movement, it is mostly pacific. Ethnic strife between Chinese of Tibetan and Han origin has taken place, most recently in the weeks before the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Still, for the most part Tibet has been much more restive than Xinjiang.
However, contrary to popular belief Beijing’s qualms over separatism come mostly from Taiwan rather than Tibet. Eventual reunification with Taiwan, which the Chinese government and population consider a province of their country, has been the foremost foreign policy goal of the Chinese Communist Party since the partition of China in 1949. Beijing has proposed the formula “one country, two systems” to solve the conflict with Taiwan since it was first advanced by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. Any perceived challenge to this proposed solution, including domestic separatist movements in mainland China, is strongly dealt with by the Chinese government and population.
The damage of violence in Xinjiang to the image of China in the Muslim world also compounds Chinese apprehension towards Uyghur separatism. On July 10 Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan labelled the death of Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group, as genocide. Furthermore, there have been pro-Uyghur demonstrations in the Middle East, Indonesia and Central Asia, most notably in Kyrgyzstan. A strongly-worded opinion column in China Daily, an official English-language newspaper, urged Mr. Erdogan to retract from his words. This shows that Beijing will not hesitate to defend its sovereignty, even if this has the potential to damage its relations with third countries.
In any case, the response of other Middle Eastern governments to the events in Xinjiang has been for the most part muted. Economic and political links with China are strengthening and there is little desire to weaken them for an issue that is not a top priority in international affairs. Furthermore, most Middle Eastern governments also face the double threat of terrorism and separatism. Hence, they are unlikely to raise the voice against the Chinese government, a staunch supporter of the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs.
Ultimately, Uyghur grievances and Beijing’s worries about separatism and terrorism create an uneasy environment in which violent clashes are unlikely to recede in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, blaming the reaction of Chinese authorities to these clashes on favouritism towards the Han is too simplistic and overlooks the myriad of factors underpinning Beijing’s response.
Ramon Pacheco Pardo – Researcher in counter-proliferation and East-Asian politics. Editor of the Millenium Journal of International Studies.
