Inside Syria's 'Republic of Fear'

Inside Syria's 'Republic of Fear'

They would turn up the television when they wanted to lower their voices. In Syrian homes, criticism had its own ritual. First, the sound of a newsreader or television drama would rise. Then the speaker would lean in, his lips almost touching his guest's ear. Even those who wielded power were wary of what the walls might conceal. Some knew how listening devices were planted. Others had planted them themselves. Still others feared that their colleagues might have got there first.

Nearly two years after the fall of the Syrian regime, the stories keep coming. The television spoke so that people could speak. It might be blaring praise for 'Mr President' while those seated before it tried to slip in a remark or a weary sigh. The telephone, however, offered no such protection. It had plans of its own. There are millions of stories. One of them, according to those who tell it, concerns Jamil Hassan and Ali Mamlouk. Hassan had already lost his position as head of Air Force Intelligence, while Mamlouk remained director of the National Security Bureau.

Then it was Mamlouk's turn. On the very day Bashar al-Assad dismissed him, Hassan called to ask about the decision. Perhaps he imagined that, once stripped of their positions, the two officers could at last speak with a candour previously denied them. Mamlouk, himself a master at setting traps, was quick to reply: "Speak up. I cannot hear you... The line is crackling." Then he hung up. He was trying to keep his name out of a report being compiled by an operative whose job was to record telephone conversations.

Both men have since lost their positions and now languish in Moscow, awaiting a reckoning. Yet the habits of power have stayed with them, along with an acute awareness of the consequences of every word and gesture. Hassan was asking about the dismissal of a colleague who was also a rival. Mamlouk, for his part, feared that the same colleague and rival might implicate him simply by speaking to him, leaving him on record as having listened without objecting, or having said nothing at all. Losing power had not restored their freedom to speak. Mamlouk, who had spent years finding out what others were saying, now seemed desperate to escape what someone was saying to him.

There is more to this story than the telephone call itself. When Hassan fled on the night the regime collapsed in late 2024, he left behind in his office a 'golden register' overflowing with verses of extravagant praise for Bashar and Maher al-Assad. Such displays of servility merit a story of their own. The language went beyond even the excesses of flattery. Here was an officer of immense power, responsible for atrocities committed in the regime's service, pouring his energies into rituals of submission. The same hand that had inflicted suffering on Syrians was now writing words of abject submission.

He knew where his authority came from, and who could take it away. His position gave him sweeping power over ordinary Syrians and prisoners confined to their cells, yet left him dependent on the favour of those above him. Every extravagant tribute was another pledge of loyalty, another attempt to postpone the final telephone call and the day he would be sent home.

Another story involved the two officers, according to one account. On an anniversary of the founding of the Baath Party, Hassan sent Mamlouk a bouquet arranged in the colours of the party flag. Mamlouk was perplexed. He despised the ruling Baath Party, despite being one of the regime's pillars. A small bouquet revealed an immense gulf between the regime's public façade and its inner workings.

One could hate the Baath and still serve al-Assad. The party filled the streets with slogans, while the standing of officials was measured by their proximity to the president

A man at the summit of the security establishment loathed the party supposedly entrusted with "leading the state and society". His contempt for the party did nothing to threaten his place at the heart of the regime, so long as his loyalty rested with the man who ruled it.

Could one imagine a security chief of such standing in North Korea, the Soviet Union or another totalitarian state rejecting a symbol of the ruling party and openly declaring his hatred of it? The comparison raises a question about the party's function in Syria. How much of it remained an ideological movement, and how much had become a façade for power exercised through other relationships?

Inherent dichotomy

One could hate the Baath and still serve al-Assad. The party filled the streets with slogans, while the standing of officials was measured by their proximity to 'Mr President', who also bore the title of 'Regional Secretary'. Ideology was for public consumption; personal trust was reserved for those admitted behind closed doors. There, the comrades understood that a party membership card could never open the doors unlocked by a signal or a 'directive' from above. And Ali Duba knew precisely how much such a signal was worth.

Another account recalls that, under Hafez al-Assad, the National Security Bureau held regular meetings chaired by Abdul Raouf al-Kasm, bringing together senior officials from the intelligence services, the Baath Party and the government. At that time, Ali Duba served as head of Military Intelligence. He was not the highest-ranking official in the room, but he wielded the greatest power, thanks to the backing he enjoyed from above and his sectarian affiliation. No meeting would begin until he arrived. If he was late, everyone waited. The chairman and the other members had their allotted seats; Duba held their time hostage. He had no need to sit at the head of the table for everyone to know where the real power lay.

One day, Duba arrived late to find the meeting already underway. He knew something had changed. Nobody in that room would have dared, on his own authority, to end Duba's privilege of keeping everyone waiting. What had happened before he entered was a message intended for him. For the others, the decision to proceed in his absence was permission to recognise the new limits of his power. His title remained unchanged. What had changed was his standing with 'the Master'. He could now measure that distance in the minutes during which others had spoken without him. He took his seat, and the meeting continued with Duba in his new role.

The timing of meetings, the order in which officials enter a room, the tone of a greeting, the wait that is prolonged or abruptly dispensed with: these are details that men in high office learn to read, for what goes unwritten may matter more than anything contained in official decisions or statements. Yet for all his power, Duba himself remained under surveillance. He was expected to report on his rivals, while his fellow intelligence chiefs were instructed to send Assad reports on his movements, travels and gambling, both at home and abroad.

To expose the executioner's anxieties is no absolution of his crimes. It reveals how his brutality and submission helped sustain the regime's methods

'The Master'

The reports flowed from different agencies and converged at the palace. Each man knew something about his colleagues, without knowing what they knew about him. When suspicion arose, 'the Master' was the man they turned to, both for answers and for protection. The deeper the divisions among his men, the greater their dependence on him.

In such a world, the boundaries of fear and the limits of loyalty were difficult to draw. Fear began in the prison cell, passed through the office, crept into the homes of the powerful, coursed through telephone lines and settled like rust upon the walls. Positions differed, as did the price each man might pay. Yet a sense of security eluded even those who deprived others of it and planted fear in their hearts.

In a care home for the elderly in Damascus lived a retired officer, a solitary man who had devoted his life to the regime. He lavished praise upon it, fearful that his professions of loyalty might not be believed. His years had passed, and his rank had faded, yet the ordeal of proving his allegiance never ended. There was always another declaration to make, greater fervour to display, some fresh proof that he remained the man he was expected to be.

Into old age he carried an inner censor, forever listening for a lapse in his voice. He had planted that censor in the hearts of others, only to find it firmly lodged in his own. Nobody needed to demand more of him. He demanded it of himself, fearful that everything he had given might still fall short of what was required. He had come to fear himself. "I am afraid they will not believe me," he told a visitor.

In George Orwell's Animal Farm, the commandments are rewritten to accommodate the privileges of the rulers. In Syria, many of the words remained on display while life beneath them changed. A republic passed down by inheritance. A ruling party despised by some of the most powerful guardians of its own regime. Institutions whose officials waited upon a man who did not even chair their meetings. A state whose resources and institutions could scarcely be disentangled from the affairs of the ruling family.

Al-Assad did not invent fear. He planted it deep in the country's soil and cultivated an immense network of it in the hearts of its people. He bestowed power upon his men while keeping the keys in his own hands. An officer could order thousands of Syrians thrown into prison, or have them put to death, yet could never be certain that the door to his own office would remain open to him.

An officer's fear of losing his position bears no comparison with a prisoner's fear for his life. Hanging up a telephone cannot be equated with extinguishing a life, nor can the fear of listening devices hidden behind colleagues' walls be compared with the terror of an innocent person cast into a cell. To expose the executioner's anxieties is no absolution of his crimes. It reveals how his brutality and submission helped sustain the regime's methods, piling up heaps of skulls and carving rivers of torment.

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