Israeli voters have largely moved on from October 7

Four key questions

Given this deeply uncertain picture, it is worth highlighting four fundamental questions that Israeli society will inevitably have to confront after the elections.

The first is the Palestinian question. Israeli society will have to overcome its profound scepticism regarding both the management and the eventual resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Regional and international realities will compel Israel to address this issue, one way or another.

A government replacing the current coalition would likely be more receptive to international perspectives on the matter. Whereas the incumbent government has approached the conflict primarily through an ideological lens, an alternative government would likely adopt a more pragmatic outlook, recognising the need for a diplomatic track alongside, rather than exclusively relying on, military means. The political dialogue with the international community will be more pragmatic, rational and open. An alternative government will definitely deal robustly with the attacks of Jewish settlers against the Palestinians in the West Bank. 

Indeed, Israel's approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will have far-reaching implications for its foreign relations as a whole. This does not necessarily imply an immediate resolution of the conflict, but rather a fundamental shift in policy and approach compared with those of recent years. It is fair to conclude that substantial segments of Israeli society understand that without some progress on the Palestinian conflict, no further normalisation with the Arab world will be achieved. In many ways, Israeli society is much cleverer and more mature than its leadership.

A second, and extremely key, factor that will substantially influence any Israeli government is that President Trump is approaching the last two years of his second term. He enjoys, maybe more than previous American presidents, enormous influence over Netanyahu, if he remains PM, and over any other candidate who replaces the current government.  

This is relevant on all fronts—Iran, Lebanon, Syria and Gaza. An alternative government will most likely be more attentive to the implications of the ongoing war over the last three years for the "way ahead". While focusing obviously on Israel's security interests, it will be much more open to approaching and internalising political solutions that each front should have.

The third concerns the political status and participation of Israel's Arab-Palestinian citizens. Recent developments offer encouraging signs, such as the need to take the community's vital interests more seriously and to take a more direct part in Israeli politics. The unique and unprecedented decision by MKs Segalovitz and Abbas to join forces is shaking Israel's political map, even if its implications may be seen only in the longer run. It poses a serious challenge for opposition leaders to demonstrate sufficient political courage. In practical terms, this would entail some form of cooperation between a future governing coalition and Israel's Arab-Palestinian political parties, even if such cooperation would be limited to only some of them.

The fourth, and perhaps most fundamental, concern is the future character of Israeli society. Will Israel choose to strengthen its liberal-democratic foundations, or will it compromise on those principles and move toward a more conservative, nationalist orientation? This is not an absolute dichotomy. Nevertheless, the developments of recent years have sharpened the need for a meaningful choice between these competing visions.

Whether voters will make that choice in the upcoming elections remains an open question. Israeli society may need more time to recover from its collective trauma before it can fully confront the political and societal decisions that lie ahead.