Opinion

The feast, the harvest, and the trap

Two US-China summits later, it has become clear that two mutually reinforcing traps are at work. The first is geopolitical; the second is technological

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Ibrahim Hamidi
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The feast, the harvest, and the trap

Ibrahim Hamidi
last update on

Four months ago, Xi Jinping received Donald Trump in Beijing with a meticulously choreographed itinerary, taking him on a tour of China’s imperial history. He wanted to send Trump a message: China rests on the foundations of an ancient civilisation, but it is a power fully awake. The past is its ally and the future its friend.

Days ago, Xi was the guest. His host, Trump, stood at the foot of the aircraft steps to welcome him, took him on a tour aboard the presidential helicopter, and presented him with a statue of a bald eagle—a symbol of America’s free and soaring spirit. The battle of symbols did not end there.

Trump took him to the National Archives, where the Chinese president stood before America’s founding documents: the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Trump responded with symbols of his own. Two histories faced each other: one 250 years old, the other 6,000.

But when the ceremonies ended, and only politics remained on the table, the harvest was far smaller than the feast. The trade truce was extended and limited understandings were reached, but there was no major trade agreement, no breakthrough on Taiwan, no agreement on rules for artificial intelligence, and no public Chinese declaration that Beijing would meet Trump’s demand to halt any support for Iran, despite US statements about Chinese assurances. The host and guest had changed places, but something fundamental had not changed. The two great powers are managing their differences, not resolving them.

But Trump and Xi talking is still an achievement. The US-China summit eclipsed the UN summit in New York. Two summits in four months, open channels, an extended trade truce and an effort to keep disagreements within bounds. The two men will meet twice more before the end of the year, in China in November and then in the United States in December. Four summits in a single year between the presidents of the world’s two largest economies are no minor matter.

Xi's visit to Washington showed that the two great powers are managing their differences, not resolving them

A relic of a bygone world

Here, a relic of a bygone world returns. During the Cold War, US-Soviet summits mattered for more than the agreements the two leaders signed. Behind closed doors sat two men with enough weapons to destroy humanity, and sometimes simply bringing them together was part of managing the danger and keeping miscalculation away from the nuclear button. The aim was not to end the dispute between Washington and Moscow, but to prevent that dispute from ending the world.

US-China summits have come to serve a similar purpose. The defining fear of the 20th century was nuclear arms—a fear that remains to today. In the 21st century, a new fear has emerged: artificial intelligence. Some of those developing the technology warn about how rapidly it is advancing and how difficult it may be to control. Others go further, warning that it could threaten humanity's survival.

Half a century ago, the leaders of the two greatest powers negotiated over nuclear warheads and missiles, surrounded by decorated military commanders. Today, Trump and Xi sit alongside corporate executives and billionaires, with chips, algorithms, data, computing power and minerals at the heart of their competition.

The difference is not just in the tools. During the Cold War, the two powers negotiated limits on weapons whose range and destructive power they understood. Today, they are competing over a technology whose limits they have yet to discover. A missile can be counted, tracked, and negotiated away. But how do you manage algorithms? Missiles can be monitored, but how do you monitor something that is constantly evolving, with capabilities that are hard to predict or control?

This is where the second "trap" begins. Four months ago, I wrote here about the "Thucydides Trap": a rising power, a dominant power, and the fear that the former's ascent instils in the latter. Xi invoked this trap in Beijing and revisited it in Washington. 

Both the US and China fear the risks posed by the technology, but fear even more that the other will get there first

Reinforcing traps

Yet between the two summits, it became clear that two mutually reinforcing traps were at work. The first is geopolitical: China's rise heightens American fears, while Washington's response fuels Beijing's anxieties. The second is technological: every advance either side makes in artificial intelligence compels the other to accelerate its efforts for fear of falling behind.

Trump and Xi both recognise the danger, but differ on how to address it. Xi insists that artificial intelligence must remain "under human control," while Trump opposes restrictions that could hamper US companies in their race with China to achieve "superintelligence." It was no coincidence that Washington excluded its most advanced chips from trade negotiations with Beijing. These chips are not merely another commodity on the trade balance; rather, they are one of the key instruments for gaining an edge in the artificial intelligence race.

Each side fears the risks posed by the technology, but fears even more that the other will get there first. Here lies the most dangerous paradox: fear of AI should make both sides cautious, yet fear of the other gaining the upper hand drives them toward recklessness. America will not slow down as long as China presses ahead, and Beijing will not stop while Washington races forward. Thus, the technological trap fuels the geopolitical one, and the geopolitical trap, in turn, fuels the technological one.

Decades ago, the fear centred on a man-made weapon whose power was known—a weapon for which rules were subsequently devised to prevent its use. Today, America and China are racing to develop a technology whose capabilities they are still discovering even as they advance it. In the 20th century, the challenge was to keep a finger from pressing the red button. In the 21st, the fear is that smart buttons may slip beyond human control, and that technology may move faster than politics.

The powers have changed, and so has the tool, but the fear remains—and so does the "trap".

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Related topics China Donald Trump Xi Jinping
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