Damascus and Kabul: how great powers are defeated

Unlike the Taliban approach with the US in Afghanistan, Sharaa distinguished between victory and vengeance— between hostility towards Assad and relations with Russia

Damascus and Kabul: how great powers are defeated

What connects Damascus’s announcement of an agreement with Moscow to regulate Russia’s military presence in Syria with Kabul’s commemoration of the anniversary of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan?

Weeks after the 9/11 attacks, the United States went to war in Afghanistan, toppled Taliban rule and pursued al-Qaeda. It then spent two decades trying to build a state, a political order and an army capable of preventing the movement from returning to power. On 15 August 2021, US forces suddenly withdrew; the Taliban immediately stepped in to fill the security vacuum, and the US-backed government led by President Ashraf Ghani collapsed, and he fled the country. This chaotic scene became an enduring symbol of American defeat.

Yet Afghanistan’s story as the “graveyard of empires” goes much further back: to the British campaigns of the 18th and 19th centuries, and to the Soviet experience at the end of the 1970s. In 1979, the Red Army entered Afghanistan, while the US and its allies backed the Afghan mujahideen. Nearly a decade later, the Soviets withdrew. That resounding defeat became one of the forces that helped pry Russia loose from the red mantle of the Soviet order.

The great powers changed. Afghanistan remained.

When the Taliban came back to power in Kabul five years ago, celebrations of their victory were not confined to Afghanistan. In Syria’s Idlib, then groaning under Russian air strikes and attacks by Assad’s forces, sweets were handed out. Fighters there saw in the Afghan experience proof that time itself could become a weapon, and that a superpower, however many aircraft, bases and allies it possessed, did not remain forever.

Around three years later, in December 2024, Ahmed al-Sharaa’s forces entered Damascus. The regime fell, and Assad fled to Moscow. Russia, which had intervened militarily in Syria in 2015 to save him, suddenly found itself confronted by memories of its Afghan wounds. After nine years of political and military support, the ally Russia had come to protect had fallen.

Al-Sharaa devised more than a military plan to reach Damascus; he devised a political plan to reach Moscow by neutralising it.

Nuanced approach

Damascus could have become for Vladimir Putin what Kabul became for Washington, or for Soviet Moscow: the symbol of a major defeat for a major power. Events, however, took a different course, and the difference began to emerge before Damascus itself fell.

When al-Sharaa's forces entered Aleppo and began advancing from central Syria towards the capital, they faced a Russian complication. At Hmeimim, Moscow still retained an air force contingent which, although reduced because of the war in Ukraine, remained capable of altering the course of the offensive if Russia chose to commit its full weight.

Al-Sharaa, therefore, devised more than a military plan to reach Damascus; he devised a political plan to reach Moscow by neutralising it. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani told Al Majalla in an earlier interview that, acting on al-Sharaa's instructions, he opened a channel with a senior Russian official, which was effectively a line to Putin himself.

Read more: Asaad Shaibani on how Syria untangled its Russian knot

A leadership advancing militarily towards the capital could have addressed the Russians in the language of victor and vanquished. Russia, after all, was the country that had rescued al-Assad in 2015, bombed opposition areas and al-Sharaa's forces, and helped the regime retake Aleppo at the end of 2016.

Instead, they resorted to a Damascene vocabulary. The message was that Russia had made a mistake by binding its interests to al-Assad, and that it could preserve those interests by tying them instead to the "new Syria".

Instead of humiliating Russia, al-Sharaa portrayed its support for al-Assad as a "mistake" that he could look past if it cooperated with the "new Syria".

Cooperation, not agitation

Then came the pivotal sentence, as al-Shaibani recalled it: "The fall of the Assad regime does not mean Russia's departure from Syria." Before al-Sharaa even entered Damascus, he distinguished between defeating al-Assad and defeating Putin; between the former fleeing Syria and the latter leaving it; between victory and the humiliation of an adversary; between knocking al-Assad out and getting on Russia's bad side. 

He understood that he was dealing with more than a state whose forces had bombed the opposition. Russia was a great power, armed with a nuclear arsenal, a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and influence across many parts of the world. The aim, therefore, was to slowly chip away at Russia's influence in Syria, rather than expelling it altogether. 

The understandings were reasonable enough: Russian bombing of Syrian cities would stop. Moscow would refrain from using its political and media weight against the change under way. Channels would be opened for a future relationship, and the movement of Russian forces would be facilitated should Moscow wish to withdraw from certain positions. In return, Russian bases would not be targeted, and al-Assad's overthrow would not be turned into a campaign to humiliate Russia.

Al-Sharaa entered Damascus without severing the Russian thread that had accompanied his advance, and after becoming president, he visited Putin twice. Talks continued until August 2026, eventually producing a new understanding to reconfigure Russia's military presence.

Russia in the "new Syria" is no longer what it was during Assad's rule. Its presence has shrunk, and its influence has weakened. Yet the negotiations produced an arrangement that allowed the Kremlin to save face.

Russia in the "new Syria" is no longer what it was during Assad's rule, yet talks produced an arrangement that allowed the Kremlin to save face.

Saving face

Herein lies the difference between what unfolded in Syria and what happened in Afghanistan: the Taliban negotiated with the US so that it would leave Afghanistan humiliated, whereas al-Sharaa's goal was not to embarrass Russia. In Afghanistan, the superpower's departure from Bagram Air Base was the ultimate image of victory. In Syria, al-Sharaa's objective was to bring down the Assad regime, not to add Russia to the list of enemies.

There is another irony. Five years ago, Idlib was looking towards Kabul. Today, Kabul has begun looking towards Damascus. In 2021, fighters in Idlib wanted to learn from the Taliban how an Islamist movement could endure long enough to prevail. In 2026, some Taliban leaders are looking to al-Sharaa to understand how an Islamist movement that has won militarily can transform itself into a state, emerge from isolation and engage with the wider world.

Five years on, the Taliban remain burdened by isolation, while Damascus has taken a different path. Al-Sharaa moved from Idlib to the capital, from leading a faction to presiding over a state, from the cave to the palace. He distinguished between hostility towards al-Assad and relations with Russia—between victory and vengeance.

The two stories also contain a lesson for the great powers. The Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan and decades later, so did the United States. Russia, although it lost its position at the centre of power, was able to preserve some of its presence and influence through the latest deal and, most importantly, preserve Syria itself.

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