Syria’s parliament can only be as strong as its leadership allows

The new bylaws are a good step forward, but can be exploited if parliamentary leadership uses its extensive powers to limit scrutiny of the executive branch

Syria’s parliament can only be as strong as its leadership allows

Syria’s new People’s Assembly has taken another important step towards becoming a functioning legislature. After five days of internal debate, parliament finalised its 231-article rulebook on 30 July. The bylaws contain much that could help transform the assembly from the largely ceremonial institution it was under Bashar al-Assad into a stronger legislature. They give Members of Parliament (MPs) clearer procedures and potentially stronger tools that, if used effectively, could help parliament establish an institutional identity of its own.

But the new rules also contain a flaw that could weaken that progress from the outset: too much authority over parliament’s internal workings is concentrated in the hands of the speaker. This structure risks weakening the legislature’s independence by giving its leadership substantial control over how MPs and committees exercise their powers.

There is much to welcome in the bylaws. Parliamentary sessions are public by default, voting results and minutes are to be published, and disclosure is established as the general principle governing parliamentary documents. MPs also enjoy immunity for statements, votes and other acts undertaken in the course of their duties.

Parliamentary committees can request documents and information from ministries and public bodies, summon officials to provide explanations and conduct field visits. Temporary committees can investigate allegations of criminal, financial or administrative wrongdoing and refer their findings to judicial or oversight bodies. MPs can also record dissenting opinions, while major disciplinary sanctions require a parliamentary vote. These provisions equip parliament with important tools to scrutinise the government and assert its institutional role. But their effectiveness is constrained by the degree of control parliamentary leadership exercises over their use.

The new bylaws contain a flaw that could weaken progress from the outset: they give the parliament speaker too much authority.

Extensive powers

The speaker's powers are extensive. He represents parliament, manages its relations with the executive and judiciary, supervises its finances and administration, determines when sessions are held, shapes agendas, manages debate and appoints parliamentary staff. Many of these functions are standard for a parliamentary speaker. Taken together, however, they give the office considerable influence over how the institution operates.

That influence extends to committees. The speaker can ask them to convene and chairs meetings he attends. Official correspondence between committees and executive institutions passes through him, while committees seeking outside expertise require his approval.

The parliamentary bureau, which he chairs, further strengthens that control. It appoints the chair, deputy chair and rapporteur of every permanent committee, distributes MPs among committees and can, under certain conditions, reorganise or merge them. This is where administrative efficiency begins to collide with parliamentary independence.

Committees should be among the main centres of scrutiny within any legislature. They develop specialised expertise, investigate government policy and allow MPs to pursue issues that may never dominate plenary debate. Their effectiveness therefore depends partly on their ability to operate independently of those who control parliament's wider agenda.

Yet under the new bylaws, committee leaders are appointed by the bureau rather than elected by committee members themselves. A committee examining a politically sensitive issue could therefore be led by figures chosen by the same body that decides much of how parliamentary business is organised.

A legislature with limited constitutional leverage should maximise the independence it retains internally, not narrow it further through its own procedures.

Limited leverage

The result is a system in which parliamentary leadership has substantial influence over how far sensitive inquiries can go, while MPs and committees do not appear to have equivalent mechanisms to compel an investigation when the leadership would prefer not to proceed.

This matters all the more because Syria's Constitutional Declaration already limits parliament's leverage over the executive. The absence of confidence and no-confidence mechanisms stems from that constitutional framework, not from the bylaws, which cannot create powers the declaration does not grant. A legislature with limited constitutional leverage should therefore maximise the independence it retains internally, not narrow it further through its own procedures.

The danger is not simply that a speaker might deliberately obstruct scrutiny. Institutional dependence can shape behaviour even without direct intervention. If MPs know that committee assignments, leadership positions, access to officials, parliamentary resources and the progress of issues through the institution depend heavily on the speaker and bureau, they have incentives to avoid confrontation.

A parliament does not need formal censorship to become cautious. Rules that make independence institutionally costly can encourage self-restraint on their own. None of this means that the speaker or bureau will necessarily abuse their authority. But sound institutional design should not depend on the restraint of whoever happens to occupy powerful positions.

Syria's parliament now has a more serious procedural framework than before. Detailed rules, however, do not by themselves create an independent legislature. The real test will be whether parliamentary leadership uses its extensive powers to strengthen the autonomy of MPs and committees or turns them into another mechanism for concentrating authority and weakening scrutiny of the executive.

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