Israel is heading into what may be the most pivotal election in its history, but at stake this time isn’t so much its conflict with neighbouring countries or its relations with the Palestinians. The core issue in this vote, slated for 27 October, is whether Israel will remain the liberal democracy its founders envisioned when it was established in 1948, or move even more vigorously toward a kind of illiberal regime infused by Orthodox Judaism.
After presiding over a series of centre-right governments for 12 years, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took an abrupt rightward shift when he returned to power in 2022 in a coalition with far-right and ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) parties. It soon emerged that his government had two primary goals. The first was to undercut the powers of an independent judiciary and vastly increase those of elected politicians, a plan quietly built on the assumption that, as in the case in other illiberal democracies, those in power would remain so because elections would cease to be entirely free and fair.
The second was to give a greater role to the Jewish religion in the public space and provide massive financial, legal, and moral support for West Bank settlers. It was accompanied by ever-bigger government handouts and increased privileges for the Haredi community, most prominently a (so far failed) effort to enshrine in law the ultra-Orthodox’s traditional exemption from military service.
In the meantime, the government has allowed or even facilitated spiralling settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has tried with much success to turn the national police into a political tool, cracking down on anti-government protesters and giving free rein to settler attacks. Defence Minister Israel Katz has sought to do the same with the army.
Along the way, Netanyahu adopted an approach to politics designed to delegitimise the opposition and government institutions—similar to that of US President Donald Trump. Although Netanyahu is less mocking and his public remarks more coherent, that is not so for his cabinet ministers, lawmakers, and social media network—which do his dirty work. He has not only cowed the opposition but also rivals inside his Likud party and government institutions ranging from the courts to the army.
The Netanyahu government’s marquee project vis-à-vis the judiciary was the plan unveiled by Justice Minister Yariv Levin just days after taking office to limit the Supreme Court’s judicial review powers, give politicians control over judicial appointments, and limit the authority of its legal advisors.
The plan was never fully realised because it was met with massive street protests, court rulings striking down parts that the Knesset had approved, and the war that followed Hamas’s attack on October 7 2023. But the government never abandoned it and capped its last months in office with a legislative blitz that won Knesset approval for facets of the judicial overhaul proposal and favors to the Haredi minority.
Millions of Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza have none of the rights extended to Israeli citizens. But democratic norms remain the rule inside Israel itself, despite the pressure they have come under in the past four years. If the Netanyahu government remains in power after the upcoming election, then it’s safe to assume that it will feel entirely unconstrained—much the way Trump has blown through governmental norms and conventions in his second term. After all, what could serve as better proof that Netanyahu’s plans to remake Israel have the public’s support?
Israel’s parliamentary opposition, including leftist, centrist, and right-wing parties, as well as two factions representing the Palestinian minority, has been largely ineffective throughout this period. It never offered a coherent alternative, nor was it able to block the government’s agenda in the Knesset. Yet as bloodless and fractious as it is, the opposition supports judicial independence, opposes the politicisation of the army and police, is appalled by settler violence in the West Bank, and has no truck with Haredi privilege, like the draft exemption. An election-day victory for the opposition is the only way to stop Israel’s march to illiberal democracy.
But can it prevail in the election? The opposition’s leadership challenge seems to have been solved. Gadi Eisenkot, a former army chief of staff, has been rising steadily in the polls to the point where his Yashar party is now the biggest vote-getter among opposition parties by far. Indeed, it is running neck-and-neck with Netanyahu’s Likud.
In many respects, Eisenkot is a strong candidate. He has the military credentials that many voters regard as a sine qua non for high office. He comes from a working-class, Moroccan immigrant background, which should appeal to voters with similar Middle Eastern or North African roots who traditionally vote Likud. He lost his son and two nephews in the war in Gaza. Eisenkot has kept his political stance close to his chest, but his record as chief of staff, public remarks, and party platform suggest that he is a little left of centre.
That said, the opposition has two problems. The first is that Eisenkot’s meteoric rise in the polls may not reflect deep support among his voters, many of whom appear to come from the moderate right and may yet drift back to the Likud. Netanyahu is working to upgrade the Likud’s image by peppering the party’s slate with more respectable candidates than the vulgarians and yes-men that currently fill the party’s Knesset ranks. Recently, he has promised to enforce conscription of Haredim, an issue that has hurt him even among his most loyal supporters.
The second problem is that Eisenkot has pledged to include only Zionist parties in his governing coalition—rejecting Palestinian-led parties as potential partners. Without at least one of them, such as the more moderate Ra’am party, Eisenkot would likely fail to amass a clear-cut Knesset majority, according to polls.
