Politics

Trump returns focus to Nile dam dispute, but is it too late?

The US wants to revive talks on Ethiopia’s Nile dam, but another strategic contest between Addis Ababa and Cairo has emerged in the Red Sea, which could complicate reconciliation efforts

AFP

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and US President Donald Trump during a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the G7 summit in the city of Évian, eastern France, on 17 June 2026.

Trump returns focus to Nile dam dispute, but is it too late?

Amr Emam

last update on 07 Jul 2026

US President Donald Trump has re-entered the Nile dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia at a time when the conflict has fundamentally changed. The battle between the two countries is no longer merely about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile and Egypt’s sole reliable source of freshwater. It is increasingly about strategic influence over the Red Sea, where control of ports, shipping lanes, and military access is reshaping the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.

During a 17 June meeting with his Egyptian counterpart, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, on the sidelines of the G7 summit in France, the US president stood up for Egypt regarding the GERD. “The Nile is getting a little emptier than it should be, and that’s what we are here to talk about,” he said.

At the heart of the longstanding dispute is Egypt’s fear that Ethiopia’s operation of the GERD, without a binding agreement on water releases, could jeopardise the flow of the Blue Nile, the source of most of the Nile’s water. Sisi has repeatedly described any threat to Egypt’s water security as ‘existential’. The dam became fully operational in August 2025.

Trump has claimed he almost reached a resolution during his first term, promising to give it another try in his second and to resolve the standoff. He has also blamed previous US administrations for financing the dam. During his talks with al-Sisi, Trump pledged to give the dispute the "highest priority" and to support efforts to reach a fair solution. The move reflects his administration's desire to remain relevant to a dispute that is reshaping power dynamics in the Horn of Africa.

Since construction began over a decade ago, Egypt has worked tirelessly to persuade Ethiopia to accept a legally binding agreement on the dam's filling and operation. As such, Cairo would welcome any US pressure that helps secure an agreement.

Luis TATO / AFP — Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed delivers his remarks during the official inauguration ceremony of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in Guba, on 9 September 2025.

Restricting force

During the multi-year reservoir-filling phase, Ethiopia withheld significant volumes of Nile water that would otherwise have reached Egypt. Even now, as the dam generates power, it continues to restrict or control large portions of Egypt's annual share. Addis Ababa's failure to coordinate such releases with Cairo and Khartoum has caused problems in both Egypt and Sudan.

Egypt also needs Ethiopia to coordinate water releases from the dam during droughts to protect its people from water shortages and its farmland from devastation. Yet Trump's pledge to re-enter the GERD dispute raises a broader question: would a settlement over the dam alone be enough to defuse tensions between the two countries?

With Egypt depending on the Nile for almost 97% of its water needs, any dam that restricts the river's flow poses a serious—potentially devastating—threat to the country's water security. Over the past decade, Egypt has invested heavily to adapt to the consequences of the dam's construction and operation, modernising its irrigation systems, expanding seawater desalination, and increasing the amount of wastewater it recycles each year.

Egypt welcomes any US pressure to get Ethiopia to agree on a legally binding agreement on the dam's filling and operation.

Broader rivalry

However, as power politics in the Horn of Africa shift and rivalry over the Red Sea intensifies, the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia is rapidly transforming. The dam has become only the tip of the iceberg, masking a broader and more serious rivalry between the two countries. This broader strategic rivalry is reshaping power dynamics in the Horn of Africa, forging alliances that extend far beyond the region and tying the dispute directly to Red Sea security, control of the Gulf of Aden, and the future of the Suez Canal.

Ethiopia has long presented the GERD as the answer to its electricity shortages and a driver of economic development. Yet the magnitude of the project and its vast reservoir also point to Addis Ababa's ambition to use the dam as a tool to pursue broader geostrategic goals. The dam helps Ethiopia reign supreme over the Nile Basin, particularly over downstream states Egypt and Sudan, by placing it in control of the Blue Nile, which supplies 60% of the Nile's total flow.

On to the next

With the GERD now operational, Addis Ababa is turning to its next strategic objective: securing direct access to the Red Sea. Its success in this regard would give it leverage over Egypt's two critical lifelines: the Nile and the Suez Canal.

Reuters — Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed casts his vote during the parliamentary elections at a polling station in Jimma, Oromia Region, Ethiopia, on 1 June 2026.

The latest election victory by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's Prosperity Party is likely to reinvigorate Addis Ababa's push for access to the Red Sea. The ruling party secured an overwhelming majority in the early June poll, which was overshadowed by conflict, accusations of repression, and limited participation by opposition groups.

Why Egypt, located over 2,400km from the Horn of Africa, grits its teeth as Ethiopia pursues its ambitions on the Nile and the Red Sea may be difficult to understand for those unfamiliar with the nature of the dispute between the two countries. By making it harder for Egypt to secure its annual share of Nile water, Ethiopia is undermining not only the country's water security but also its broader stability.

This is why Egyptian officials have long framed the country's struggle to secure its annual share of the Nile as an existential issue. Whatever the historical rivalries between Egypt and Ethiopia, the GERD experience has left Egyptians deeply suspicious of Addis Ababa's drive to secure a foothold on the Red Sea, home to the Suez Canal, a vital pillar of Egypt's economy.

On the surface, Egypt's opposition to Ethiopia establishing a presence on the Red Sea appears to be a bilateral issue. In reality, however, it is part of a wider international contest for control of this maritime chokepoint—one whose outcome could make or break Egypt. The two countries' shift in focus to the Red Sea does not mean they are leaving the Horn of Africa behind as a battlefield. Rather, the Red Sea is emerging as a new front in a connected struggle, where gains on one front shape the contest on the next.

AFP — Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty delivering a speech at a press conference with his Eritrean counterpart, Osman Saleh Mohammed, and his Somali counterpart, Ahmed Moallim Fiqi, in Cairo on 11 January 2025.

Egypt's counteroffensive

Egypt has made significant gains in the Horn of Africa by forging strong alliances with Eritrea and Somalia, both now at odds with Ethiopia. Besides giving Egypt a military foothold in the Horn, these partnerships have also enabled it to establish a presence in its Red Sea ports. Cairo is doing this through a series of port upgrade and logistical cooperation agreements with the two countries. This growing presence narrows Ethiopia's options for securing access to the Red Sea, leaving it with few alternatives, including the Somali breakaway region of Somaliland.

Israel has also entered the fray by recognising Somaliland and, according to Somali officials, deploying troops of Ethiopian descent to the breakaway region. This further complicates Egypt's strategic calculations, encouraging Ethiopia to pursue similar moves and underscoring the increasingly multilateral scramble for control of the Red Sea. It also shows that what began as an Egyptian-Ethiopian rivalry for influence in the Horn of Africa and a presence on the Red Sea is evolving into a high-stakes, multilateral showdown for Red Sea supremacy and control.

The Egypt-Ethiopia strategic rivalry is forging alliances that extend far beyond the region and tying the dispute directly to the security of the Red Sea and Suez Canal.

Meanwhile, Iran's growing presence in Sudan, including through its involvement in the country's civil war, adds another layer of complexity. Taken together, these developments raise doubts about whether Trump's offer to resolve the GERD dispute can deliver lasting peace between the two countries.

The US president's offer might have worked before the GERD became the opening move in a much larger geostrategic context involving an expanding cast of regional and international players. Unless the US also addresses this broader geostrategic contest, any deal on the dam will amount to little more than a temporary truce in a struggle that is increasingly shaping the future of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.

+ / -