The growing prominence of figures from Idlib in positions of authority in the “new Syria” has stirred debate over the nature of the political order that has emerged since the regime’s fall. Some observers argue that what is unfolding amounts to a replication of the Qardaha model under the Assads, albeit under different names and with a different sectarian complexion. Yet such a reading, while not entirely without foundation, fails to capture the complexity of the new landscape.
President Ahmed al-Sharaa himself is not from Idlib. He comes from a well-known family in southern Syria, was born in Riyadh and grew up in Damascus. He spent more than a decade leading from Idlib before returning to the capital. Moreover, natives of Idlib do not have a monopoly on the most influential positions in the state, which are distributed among individuals from a range of regions, social backgrounds and class milieus.
Case in point: the ministers of interior, finance, social affairs, communications, and information hail from Damascus and its countryside. The minister of economy and the governor of the Central Bank are from Aleppo. The minister of defence is from Hama. The minister of justice and the head of the intelligence service are from Deir ez-Zor, while the foreign minister is from Hasakah. The government also includes ministers and officials from the coastal region who previously served under Bashar al-Assad.
None of this negates the fact that ministers, senior officials and members of the bureaucracy, security apparatus and armed forces arrived in Damascus from Idlib after 8 December 2024. It does, however, raise a different question: is Idlib truly the "new Qardaha”? And when people speak of the “Idlibisation” of the state, are they referring to geographical origin, or to political affiliation and a shared experience?
A key distinction
An important distinction separates the experiences of Qardaha and Idlib. From the former came the ruling family that entered Damascus with the rise of Hafez al-Assad and his relatives to positions of power. Assad the father engineered a class- and clan-based upheaval within his sect, drawing its sons, relatives and networks into the capital, the centres of decision-making, and the institutions of the regime, the army and the security services. The movement was from Qardaha towards Damascus and its surrounding belt, or else towards remaining on the coast while extending shadow networks and smuggling routes between the coast and the interior, and between Syria and Lebanon.
