Most politicians in Lebanon, it seems, have yet to grasp the scale of the major shifts that have swept the region since October 7. They are still using the same language in their proposals for any settlement affecting Lebanon, drawing from the very box that produced their pre-October 7 solutions. Those solutions were little more than painkillers. They helped to worsen Lebanon’s crises instead of resolving them.
A few days ago, Lebanon marked the anniversary of the liberation of its south on 25 May 2000, the day Israel withdrew from Lebanese territory it had occupied and declared its implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 425. This year’s anniversary came at a time when Israel is once again occupying several areas that were liberated in 2000.
Over 26 years, Hezbollah’s influence and military arsenal grew under the pretext of resisting an occupation that no longer existed. The Lebanese learned to live with this arsenal. Some relied on it to gain leverage over their political rivals, while others opposed it, though that opposition failed to produce any practical solutions.
The declared shift in the purpose of this arsenal began immediately after Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The Shebaa Farms pretext then came to the fore through coordination between the Assad regime in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The weapons were recast as “legitimate and necessary” until Israel withdrew from the Shebaa Farms, even though neither the Syrian nor the Lebanese side provided proof that the area was Lebanese.
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated, and the international investigation commission and the international tribunal established that Hezbollah members were responsible for his killing. Barely a year later, the party carried out an operation to capture two Israeli soldiers, triggering the July War. Hezbollah’s secretary general at the time, Hassan Nasrallah, later said: “Had I known.”
