From Khamenei to Maduro: no more red lines for Trump’s America

For decades, the United States adhered to international norms governing arrests and assassinations of political leaders beyond its borders. That script has now been ripped up.

Donald Trump seems to be ignoring the state’s accumulated historical, political, legal, and customary traditions, including when it comes to assassinations.
Mark Smith
Donald Trump seems to be ignoring the state’s accumulated historical, political, legal, and customary traditions, including when it comes to assassinations.

From Khamenei to Maduro: no more red lines for Trump’s America

Less than two years into his second presidency, US President Donald Trump continues to undermine entrenched political norms, challenge established institutional rules and redefine America’s external relations with boldness and speed. Moreover, he has redefined the country’s relationship with the outside world according to his own personal understanding of both America and the rest, ignoring the state’s accumulated historical, political, legal, and customary traditions.

The list of the president’s shocks is long and growing, from demanding the annexation of Canada as America’s 51st state and the incorporation of Danish Greenland into the United States, to the suggested mass displacement of two million Palestinians from Gaza to turn it into a coastal “riviera” for foreign tourists. Along the way, he has berated Europe, America’s historic and loyal ally, on the grounds that it relies on the US.

Fortunately, most have not become political or institutional realities, but Trump has nevertheless succeeded elsewhere, such as by disrupting longstanding American traditions governing relations with foreign heads of state and civilian officials. For decades, it adhered to the principle that heads of state enjoyed immunity from arrest and targeting, despite no explicit legal provision in US law to that effect.

Norms and customs

The United States followed established international legal custom shielding heads of state and officials from arrest or prosecution before national courts while in office. The exception involved international arrest warrants issued by specialised international courts in cases involving war crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity. Examples include the 1999 arrest warrant against former Serbian president Slobodan Milošević issued by the International Criminal Tribunal.

A broadly similar case applies to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, against whom the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant in 2024 over accusations of committing war crimes in Gaza, a move strongly opposed by the US. The warrant rested on a different legal basis linked to the Rome Statute, the international treaty concluded in 1998 and entering into force in 2002.

Evelyn Hockstein / Reuters
US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahuat the Knesset in Jerusalem on 13 October 2025.

The statute, signed by more than 60 countries—though not by Israel or the US—stipulates that the traditional immunity granted to heads of state and other officials does not shield them from prosecution before the court if accused of committing war crimes. On this basis, the court issued an arrest warrant in 2009 against former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir over atrocities committed in Darfur, and another in 2023 against Russian President Vladimir Putin over his alleged involvement in the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children into Russia during the Russia-Ukraine war.

Legal arguments

During Trump’s second term, the US administration breached this custom through its arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in a legally questionable military operation that contradicted established international practice. The administration argued that the US did not recognise Maduro as Venezuela’s president given the credible accusations of vote rigging in the 2018 Venezuelan elections, and that US prosecutors had filed federal narcotics-trafficking charges against him.

Unlike the arrest of foreign leaders, which remains legally contentious, there is far less ambiguity regarding the prohibition on assassinating foreign leaders, officials or even ordinary individuals. Laws governing successive US administrations since the 1970s are clear, with presidential executive orders prohibiting US involvement in assassinations.

In this respect, the current Trump administration appears to be overriding an important American legal and institutional tradition through the alleged assassinations carried out during its ongoing war against Iran. Half a century ago, in February 1976, US President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order 11905, titled United States Foreign Intelligence Activities. Ford was trying to repair the damage caused by the preceding Nixon administration domestically and internationally, whether through the Vietnam War or the use of state institutions against political opponents.

The order included a crucial prohibition on political assassination, stating that “no employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination”. It came in response to the findings of a Congressional inquiry, established by the Senate in 1975 and led by Democratic Senator Frank Church, to investigate the conduct of federal agencies including the CIA, FBI and NSA.

Eloisa Lopez / Reuters
An Executive Order from 1976 stated that "no employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination".

The House of Representatives established a parallel inquiry known as the Pike Committee. Across its seven published volumes, based on numerous hearings, the Church Committee documented many abuses and atrocities committed by these agencies under successive administrations up to and including Nixon’s, among them attempts to assassinate Cuba’s Fidel Castro, Dominican Republic president Rafael Trujillo, Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem, and Patrice Lumumba in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Extending the ban

In 1978, President Jimmy Carter expanded the prohibition through Executive Order 12036, which banned all forms of assassination, not just political assassination. It specified that the ban also applied to non-Americans working with US government agencies. This remained in force under Executive Order 12333, signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981.

Reagan’s order replaced Carter’s framework with a broader and more systematic structure for organising the work of US government agencies and improving intelligence coordination. It was designed in response to the long-term pressures of the Cold War at its height, rather than simply as a reaction to Congressional investigations.

Over time, Reagan’s order became central to the framework governing US intelligence work for decades, particularly in avoiding involvement in assassinations. That institutional tradition now appears to be in serious retreat under Trump following the alleged assassination of Iranian political leaders in 2025-26, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani, Khamenei’s advisor Kamal Kharrazi, and others.

Reagan's framework governing US intelligence work for decades, particularly assassinations, now appears to be in serious retreat under Trump

Some say this retreat began during Trump's first presidency when, in early 2020, he ordered a military strike in Baghdad that killed the influential commander of Iran's elite Quds Force, General Qassem Soleimani. Although some lawyers said the strike violated US laws prohibiting assassination, most Democrats focused more on the misuse of the 1973 War Powers Act.

Critics argued that the administration had committed an unjustified and provocative act by assassinating a senior official of another state in a way that could have triggered war. Without presenting evidence, the administration responded that the strike was justified as anticipatory self-defence intended to avert imminent harm, arguing that Soleimani had been planning armed operations against Americans.

Justifying killings

The White House claimed the Soleimani operation fell within the same framework as America's continuing targeting of terrorists after 11 September 2001, which it argued did not fall under the assassination ban. This justification for targeted killing rested on a legal interpretation issued by the US Department of Defence in 1989 clarifying the meaning of assassination in Reagan's 1981 executive order. According to that interpretation, the deliberate killing of hostile military leaders during armed conflict does not constitute assassination, while pre-emptive killing intended to prevent attacks against Americans falls within the scope of lawful self-defence.

What helped the Trump administration justify Soleimani's killing was that he had already been placed on US terrorism lists, both personally and through the institution to which he belonged: Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Even so, the administration failed to demonstrate that he posed a grave and imminent threat to American lives.

Majid Asgaripour/WANA via Reuters
People gather to mourn after Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameneiwas killed in Israeli and US airstrikes in Tehran, Iran, on 28 February 2026.

In the context of the current war with Iran, the administration may have some room, albeit highly contested, to justify the assassination of Khamenei on the grounds that he served as commander-in-chief of Iran's armed forces, but it is difficult to place such an operation within the framework of anticipatory self-defence.

The US had been negotiating with Iran just hours before the strike, and the administration failed to prove the existence of a serious and imminent Iranian threat to US security. The argument of anticipatory self-defence largely collapses when applied to Larijani, Kharrazi and other civilian Iranian leaders allegedly killed during this war.

Domestic American objections to the administration's war against Iran fall into two categories. The first is its failure to prepare public opinion, explain the rationale, outline the objectives, and detail how they would be achieved. Closely related is the administration's failure to adequately consult Congress and Trump's presidential overreach (according to some) regarding his scope under the War Powers Act. The second objection, which is more technical in nature, concerns the legality of the administration's actions, including its involvement in assassinations.

In reality, in an America crowded with President Trump's many bold and startling actions unfolding simultaneously across media, economics, law, politics, and even personal relations, the erosion of American norms governing arrest and assassination beyond US borders appears almost marginal. From a president who breaks accepted norms and conventions, both in America and globally, the exceptional is now the norm.

font change