Will the US and China fall into the Thucydides Trap?

Stark warning

So it wasn't incidental that Xi warned about the danger of falling into the Thucydides Trap during the summit. The term derives from the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who observed the devastating Peloponnesian War and noted,  "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable." Since then, it has become a political theory that argues that when a rising power threatens to displace an established, ruling power, violent conflict is a probable outcome. 

Xi urged wisdom to ensure neither side falls into said trap. He also called to build a new model of relations between China and the US, the former a rising power and the latter an anxious incumbent power. As things currently stand, the conduct of both capitals suggests a preference for managing the collision, rather than avoiding it altogether.

In public, Trump and Xi spoke of stability, economic cooperation and keeping channels of dialogue open: trade, investment, tariff reductions, AI and the management of disagreements across a range of issues. Behind these calm words, however, the current was moving in the opposite direction.

Growing confidence

China continues to accelerate the development of its military, technological and scientific capabilities, while repeating its rejection of any American pressure over Taiwan. It now appears calmer and more confident. It behaves as if it sees the global balance gradually shifting in its favour, and believes time is on its side.

Washington, meanwhile, had been levying sanctions on Chinese companies before and even during the summit, accusing Beijing of stealing AI technologies and warning of its growing influence in cybersecurity. While Trump sought to present himself during the summit as the dealmaker capable of building a personal relationship with President Xi, whom he showered with praise, America's national security institutions were treating China as the greatest geopolitical threat.

What was achieved at the Trump-Xi summit fell far short of expectations: fewer trade deals, modest political understandings, and a "trade war" held hostage to a truce. Trump wants Xi to help him prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, prevent it from receiving military support, and keep the Strait of Hormuz open. Xi wants an end to military support for Taiwan, leaving it to fall into the Chinese "trap", while keeping US-China relations framed as a "partnership", not a "rivalry".

And while Beijing moves forward with confidence and patience, steadily building its economic, technological and military influence, Washington—which won the Cold War against the Soviet Union and led the emerging international order for decades—now appears less confident, less anchored in alliances, more divided and more isolated.