Continuity trumps reform in Syria's cabinet reshuffle

While observers acknowledged that the removal of Druze Agriculture Minister Amjad Badr appeared linked to dissatisfaction with his performance, his replacement, despite his technocratic credentials, remains closely associated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

Countering nepotism claims

The governorate appointments likewise appeared driven more by local political calculations than by any broader administrative reform agenda. Al-Aama's appointment as secretary-general of the presidency, in particular, was widely interpreted as an attempt to counter accusations of nepotism after the role had previously been held by al-Sharaa's brother. In that sense, the reshuffle may address the more visible sources of criticism, but it doesn't fundamentally alter the architecture of power.

The past year has exposed deep flaws in Syria's new governing model, yet the changes offer little indication that those problems are being seriously addressed. One of the clearest weaknesses has been the lack of coordination across state institutions—a problem rooted in the transitional government's shift away from a prime ministerial system toward a fully presidential model. The removal of the PM post dismantled what had traditionally served as the main mechanism for aligning ministries, without creating an equally effective alternative in its place.

Supporters of the new system argued that the secretary-general of the presidency could fill that role and provide centralised oversight across government. In practice, however, the office has neither evolved institutionally nor acquired the capacity, knowledge or mechanisms necessary to coordinate policymaking across multiple ministries and institutions.

The result has been a government in which ministries often operate in parallel rather than as part of a coherent national strategy. Policies frequently appear fragmented, poorly sequenced, and only loosely connected to one another. The consequences extend beyond bureaucratic inefficiency. They have reinforced the perception of an administration that reacts to events as they unfold rather than one capable of pursuing a clear political and economic agenda.

Overlapping mandates

This problem is further compounded by the growing tendency to transfer key state functions from ministries to newly established bodies. This approach deepens the same coordination problem the reshuffle fails to address. Multiple centres of decision-making create overlapping mandates, making coordination more difficult.

The reshuffle also leaves untouched a highly centralised management style that continues to slow decision-making across government. Across the transitional authorities, ministries, and state institutions, authority remains concentrated in narrow channels. Key decisions tend to move upward rather than being handled by empowered institutions, creating bottlenecks that delay policy design, weaken implementation, and leave officials waiting for approval rather than taking the initiative.

The problem is compounded by the practice of assigning senior officials multiple roles at the same time. Rather than building dedicated teams with clear lines of responsibility, the government appears to rely on a small pool of trusted figures who are expected to manage several demanding portfolios at once.

Bassel Sweidan's appointment as agriculture minister illustrates the risks of that approach. Before his promotion, Sweidan appears to have held several positions simultaneously, including deputy agriculture minister, chair of the anti-illicit enrichment committee, member of the import and export committee, and director of the agriculture and livestock sector in the sovereign fund. At the same time, he has reportedly been pursuing a master's degree in rural engineering at Idlib University. It remains unclear which, if any, of those roles he has relinquished since becoming minister.

The issue is not whether Sweidan is qualified. It is what such overlapping responsibilities reveal about the governing model. Concentrating so many roles in the hands of a limited number of officials may help preserve loyalty and control, but it also risks overwhelming senior figures, blurring accountability, narrowing the talent pool, and weakening the state's ability to govern effectively.

Inherited problems

Many of the structural problems weighing on Syria's transitional government are rooted in forces it did not create: the legacy of a hollowed-out state, the institutional damage left by the Assad regime, the strain of economic crisis, political uncertainty, and fractured public trust. But those constraints cannot be overcome through a reshuffle alone, however broad or carefully calibrated, unless it is accompanied by a deeper change in how the state is run.

That change will require more than replacing ministers or moving officials between posts. It will require broader inclusion, a clearer division of responsibilities, stronger institutions, greater transparency, and more meaningful public participation. Without such reforms, each reshuffle risks becoming another exercise in crisis management, offering temporary relief, or the illusion of it, while leaving the deeper machinery of government unchanged.

Syria's transition is being asked to deliver state-building through a governing model that often works against that goal. A system designed to consolidate control may help manage immediate political risks, but it is poorly suited to rebuilding institutions, producing durable outcomes, restoring public confidence, or generating legitimacy. The more authority is concentrated in narrow channels, the harder it becomes to build the very institutions the transition needs to survive.

Syria's next phase will not be defined by how many officials are replaced, but by whether power is moved from narrow channels into functioning institutions. Without that shift, the reshuffle will be remembered less as a turning point than as another missed opportunity to rebuild a Syrian state that is strong, inclusive, and capable.