“Some meetings leave an impression; ours apparently left a fragrance.” With that line, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa thanked US President Donald Trump for sending him a refill of cologne. On its surface, the exchange was light, even playful. At a deeper level, it captured the astonishing speed and intensely personal nature of the new US-Syria opening, something close to a diplomatic miracle. The relationship between Trump and al-Sharaa has helped produce an opening few could have imagined just two years ago.
It shows what personal diplomacy can do when formal channels are frozen, distrusted, or too cautious to move first. A direct relationship between leaders can create momentum, soften hostility, and give governments room to attempt what their bureaucracies might otherwise resist. Yet the personal diplomacy that opened this door also leaves it exposed. So far, the relationship depends too heavily on the rapport between the two presidents.
Diplomatic talks, security coordination, and economic discussions have begun, but they remain limited in scope and reliant on a small number of individuals. That may be a useful starting point, but it is not a durable foundation. Personal rapport can alter the tone of a relationship, but only institutions can give it staying power.
To preserve the opening, both governments need broader channels of communication, regular mechanisms for handling disputes, and bureaucratic routines capable of sustaining cooperation beyond the current political moment. If Damascus wants this opening to survive beyond Trump’s term ending in 2028, it must move quickly to build that foundation. Otherwise, the relationship could dissipate as quickly as the fragrance that has come to symbolise it.
Personal diplomacy
The fragility is rooted in the highly personal way the opening came together. The Trump administration, like its predecessor, initially approached post-Assad Syria cautiously, setting conditions for deeper sanctions relief, including progress on counterterrorism, the destruction of chemical weapons, and the handling of foreign fighters. Then Trump abruptly accelerated the process.
Encouraged by key regional leaders, especially in Saudi Arabia, he moved faster than the US bureaucracy, announcing sanctions relief in May 2025 after meeting al-Sharaa in Riyadh. The decision left many senior US officials as surprised as the audience watching it unfold. Trump said al-Sharaa was a “young, attractive guy” and a “tough guy”. This paved the way for his historic visit to the White House, the first by a Syrian president (where Trump gave him the original bottle of cologne).
The opening was not driven purely by regional pressure or Trump’s instincts; Syria also helped create the moment through a disciplined foreign policy campaign, al-Sharaa’s diplomatic charm, and his deliberate break with the past, both his own and that of the Assad regime. Still, while al-Sharaa and other Syrian officials have met members of Congress and senior US officials, the relationship remains concentrated in a narrow circle of individuals.
That reflects how both governments currently operate. Trump’s reliance on personal diplomacy is not unique to Syria. Across several files, he leans heavily on trusted special envoys drawn from his circle of loyalists, often allowing them to bypass traditional bureaucratic channels. On Syria, the most important of these figures is special envoy Tom Barrack.
Damascus’s own bottlenecked management style has reinforced this dependence. Many Syrian officials and institutions lack the authority and autonomy needed to build sustained cooperation with their US counterparts. As a result, much of the relationship still runs through a small number of individuals managing multiple urgent files at once. That concentration slows progress and makes the entire opening more vulnerable to disruption.
The institutional gap
Even in areas that have advanced faster than others, institutional progress remains limited. Damascus’s decision to join the international coalition against Islamic State (IS) has allowed counterterrorism coordination to move forward and created an opening to work together. But Syria’s role remains narrow. So far, its participation has been limited to coordination with the US on select operations. Beyond this, institutional cooperation in defence and intelligence remains minimal.
Financial coordination has progressed but not yet produced a strong foundation for cooperation. Discussions on monetary and financial reform have taken place but they have advanced slowly, partly because the reforms needed to build confidence have not yet materialised. Some of the obstacles are structural and will take time to overcome. Syria is still burdened by outdated laws, an inactive legislative body, and years of sanctions and opaque financial practices.
