This is a direct translation from the original article that appeared in Arabic.
With the 2026 midterm elections now only eight months away, the United States is entering an exceptional and unusually fraught political moment, one in which geopolitical turmoil collides with the deep internal polarisation that has come to define American politics. These elections are no longer merely a routine referendum on the performance of an administration halfway through its term, as midterms have often been in the American political tradition. They are becoming a decisive test of an American political, security and social identity that is still taking shape, especially in the wake of the launch of Operation ‘Epic Wrath’ against Iran.
This military operation, which began in late February, does more than alter the balance of power and deterrence in the Middle East. Its effects reach well beyond the battlefield and into American domestic politics, casting an immediate shadow over the ballot box. It creates new and consequential pressures on the economy, especially energy prices and inflation, alongside questions of national security and partisan identity that are increasingly shaped by major decisions of the state. Contrary to the familiar tendency of American voters to close ranks behind the leadership in moments of national crisis, this war has exposed how fragile that instinct has become in the face of hardened partisan division. Growing anxiety over the war’s long-term economic and military costs has begun to outweigh any brief enthusiasm for military action.
Against that backdrop, the war’s impact on the American domestic scene and on voter sentiment can be traced through five interlocking strategic and sociological dynamics, each pointing towards a new phase of political realignment.
The narrative of strength and deterrence in Republican discourse
The electoral use of war lies at the heart of the strategy now being pursued by the Republican Party and President Donald Trump’s administration. The military operation is being presented to American voters as a necessary and overdue restoration of American deterrence, one that, in this telling, had been eroded by years of hesitation and failed containment under previous administrations. The president’s rhetoric seeks to reinforce the image of a strong, decisive leader in moments of danger, in the hope of reviving that familiar public instinct to close ranks when the nation faces an external threat.
At the same time, the administration is plainly seeking to put the Democratic Party on the defensive, portraying it as weak or incapable of defending vital American interests against foreign threats. The aim is to force the opposition into a politically costly dilemma: support the war effort and risk alienating its progressive base, or oppose escalation and open itself to charges of weakness on national security.
This narrative does not stop at the projection of force in the Middle East or the protection of allies. With notable political dexterity, it is tied to the domestic concerns that most energise the populist and nationalist base. The administration draws a direct line between military firmness abroad and strict border enforcement at home, offering a broad and deeply rooted reading of America First. In this framework, the defence of the country’s vital interests extends alike to armed groups and hostile regimes abroad, and to irregular migration and perceived security laxity at home.
That linkage helps keep the conservative base fully mobilised, as it sees the use of hard power as an authentic expression of national sovereignty and as a means of restoring state prestige once thought diminished. Politically, this mobilisation turns military action abroad into a means of reinforcing internal cohesion on the right, where cultural and security anxieties fuse into a single political frame that secures loyalty to the current presidential course.
Voter sentiment and the economic effects on the midterms
In times of war, public psychology is often shaped by the impulse to rally around the leadership, as voters historically tend to set aside political quarrels in the early stages of conflict. Yet the present moment has broken with that familiar pattern. The administration has failed to secure approval ratings commensurate with the scale of Republican control over Washington’s sovereign institutions. From the opening strikes of Operation ‘Epic Wrath’, opinion polls pointed to a noticeable decline in public satisfaction, as concern over the consequences of the war and the prospect of a prolonged conflict eclipsed any temporary martial enthusiasm.
This failure of mass mobilisation reflects the depth of the polarisation now gripping American society. It deprives Republicans of the chance to translate war quickly into gains in swing districts in the House and Senate, while keeping alive the strong possibility that the president’s party will be punished in the midterms.
This public mood carries the risk of a damaging backlash against the governing party. American voters have become acutely sensitive to the economic cost of foreign interventions, especially in the middle and working classes that remain the most important voting blocs. As the war continues, rising oil prices, potentially above $120 a barrel, begin to hit household budgets directly, deepening inflationary pressures and raising the daily cost of living, including the price of essential goods. At that point, the war ceases to be a political asset and becomes an electoral burden.
Voters’ attention is forced away from the course of military operations abroad towards more immediate anxieties about economic security at home. In the absence of quick victories and if the operation slides into a war of attrition, public sentiment may turn sharply against the leadership. Democrats are counting heavily on exactly this development, focusing their attack on the war’s economic and political costs while demanding tighter legislative oversight, in an effort to channel public frustration towards the ballot box.
