Ansar al-Sunna has the markings of Iranian foul play

Enter Ansar al-Sunna 

Since the fall of the Assad regime, a new group has emerged in Syria under the name "Saraya Ansar al-Sunna". It has claimed responsibility for a number of killings targeting Alawites in the coastal region and in the countryside of Hama. Although its founding statement asserted that its mission was to strike remnants of the regime among "Nusayris and Rafidah", and that its formation was a response to the new administration's leniency and reconciliation measures, the group later claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing that struck the Church of Mar Elias in the Damascus district of Dweila in June 2025. That attack, which targeted Christian worshippers and left dozens dead, contradicted the very rationale the group had proclaimed for its existence.

The group then disappeared for a time, only to resurface in late December with another attack—this time targeting worshippers at the Ali ibn Abi Talib Mosque in Homs, specifically in the predominantly Alawite neighbourhood of Wadi Al-Dahab.

Anyone reading the statements issued by "Saraya Ansar al-Sunna" will immediately notice their clumsy language. Yet the real question remains: who stands behind this group? Is it merely a cluster of Syrian extremists forged by 14 years of war? Does IS have a new disguise? Or are those who have been harmed by the fall of the Assad regime and Iran's departure from Syria trying to cloak themselves while they seek to destabilise the country?

Although the group has demonstrated the ability to commit significant security breaches, it remains in its infancy. Combating it—and the ideology that fuels it—is an urgent priority before Syria slips into the kind of vicious cycle of violence that gripped Iraq following the ouster of Saddam Hussein's regime.