President Ahmed al-Sharaa's decision to issue a decree guaranteeing the rights of the Kurdish community in Syria—a community that had suffered decades of discrimination and persecution under Baathist rule—was an important step forward. By doing this, he shows that his stance against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whom his army is currently battling, has nothing to do with his stance towards Syrian Kurdish citizens.
The decree was widely celebrated, though some Kurdish and even non-Kurdish figures rejected it. These figures are not interested, and were never interested, in a political solution; they are just looking to incite—one day along ethnic lines and another day on sectarian lines.
How can any state be expected to tolerate the continued presence of an armed militia that controls parts of its territory and imposes its will through coercion? And if this is unacceptable in Syria, why should it be acceptable in Lebanon with Hezbollah? The SDF hides behind Kurdish identity to justify its actions, just as Hezbollah cloaks itself in its Shiite identity.
Supporters of the SDF argue that the Syrian state is either unwilling or unable to grant Kurds their rights. Hezbollah supporters claim the Lebanese state is too weak to protect its Shiite citizens, but the rejection or acceptance of armed factions within a state has nothing to do with ideology. It concerns the very foundations upon which a state is built.
Following the Taif Agreement, Hezbollah retained its weapons under the pretext of resisting Israeli occupation in the south. After Israel withdrew in 2000, the justification shifted to the Shebaa Farms. Later still, the party adopted a doctrine of self-preservation: weapons to protect the weapons. Arms became both the means and the end.
