Demonstrations by Alawite communities swept through Latakia, Tartus, Homs, and Hama again last week, just a month after a similar wave of protests. This time, however, they unfolded in a far more volatile environment, particularly in Latakia, where unrest turned deadly. Four people were killed, including a member of the security forces, and more than 100 were injured. The violence underscored a growing reality: Syria’s transitional authorities are struggling not only to manage dissent, but also to protect those who express it.
The transitional authorities attributed the violence to remnants of the former Assad regime, accusing them of exploiting the demonstrations to attack both civilians and security forces. While the involvement of such actors is highly plausible, this explanation alone does not account for the scale of the violence, the timing of its escalation, the clear breakdown in crowd control, or the dynamics of the violence that unfolded during the protests and after they dispersed.
Reports from the ground indicate that rival demonstrations in support of the transitional government confronted Alawite protesters, creating a chaotic environment in which violence became easier to ignite and harder to contain. Security forces’ attempts to regain control by firing shots into the air further blurred lines of responsibility and complicated efforts to reconstruct events. In the aftermath, competing narratives took hold, obscuring accountability and deepening mistrust.
Understanding what drove the violence is not about managing narratives; it is the only way to prevent its repetition. As long as responsibility is narrowly assigned to shadowy spoilers while institutional failures go unexamined and underlying grievances remain unaddressed, official responses will remain reactive and ineffective. With the conditions that produced these protests still firmly in place, renewed unrest is not a question of if, but when. The real test is whether the authorities will persist with symbolic gestures aimed at containment, or begin confronting the drivers of violence so that the next crisis—when it comes—releases pressure rather than ignites it.
The protests on 28 December followed a call by Ghazal Ghazal, an Alawite cleric based outside Syria who heads the Supreme Alawite Islamic Council in Syria and the diaspora. His appeal came after a deadly attack targeting the Alawite community—highlighting how central the persistence of sectarian violence has become to community mobilisation. This time, the catalyst was a bombing at a mosque in a predominantly Alawite neighbourhood in Homs that killed eight people and wounded around 20.
Reinforcing existing fears
A Sunni extremist jihadist group, Saraya Ansar al-Sunna, claimed responsibility for the attack. Responsibility for several other recent assaults targeting Alawite communities, however, has remained unclear. Many of these incidents, which have increased since the fall of the former regime, appear indiscriminate in nature. Together, they have reinforced fears among Alawites that they are being collectively punished for crimes associated with the Assad era.
Those anxieties were clearly reflected in the protests themselves. Demonstrators carried banners demanding an end to violence against Alawites, the release of detainees, and guarantees of basic security. Notably, calls for decentralisation and federalism were far more prominent than in earlier protests. This shift aligns closely with Ghazal’s messaging and signals an evolution from reactive protest toward more explicit political demands.
The demonstrations were initially peaceful, despite occasional sectarian or inflammatory chants. Security forces were deployed to protect demonstrators rather than disperse them, but the violence that followed exposed the fragility of the authorities’ crowd-management capabilities.
