Politics

The Palmyra attack and what it means for US-Syria cooperation

An Islamic State operative infiltrated Syria’s security set-up and waited until he was with American soldiers. The assault requires an urgent reassessment of personnel and recruitment in Damascus.

Delil Souleiman/AFP

US forces patrol oil fields near Syria's north-east in the Qahtaniyah countryside of Hasakeh province on 3 September 2024.

The Palmyra attack and what it means for US-Syria cooperation

Subhi Franjieh

last update on 16 Dec 2025

In the summer of 2015, Islamic State terrorists overran the ancient central Syrian city of Palmyra, looting and bulldozing its treasures and architecture in the weeks and months that followed. Just over a decade later, on 13 December, it once again attacked the city. This time, an IS operative infiltrated Syrian security forces to target a meeting of Syrian and American forces near Branch 221 of the Syrian Desert Division to discuss coordination mechanisms for defeating IS.

According to a Pentagon, the assault resulted in the deaths of two American soldiers and one American civilian, with three other military personnel wounded. The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported that two members of the Internal Security Forces were also injured. Noureddine al-Baba, spokesperson for the Ministry of Interior, stated that the assailant espoused takfiri (extremist) ideology.

US President Donald Trump, who has been supportive of Syria’s new rulers, pledged a harsh retaliatory response against IS. He stopped short of assigning responsibility to the Syrian government, noting only that Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa was “extremely angry” over the attack, which occurred at a highly sensitive time, given that the US Congress is in the process of repealing the Caesar Act, under which onerous sanctions have been placed on Syria and those trading with it since 2019.

Spanner in the works

The Syrian government has been making concerted efforts to build confidence with the international coalition against IS, of which it is part, to demonstrate its ability to act as a credible alternative to the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in fighting the group. As such, this attack is a serious setback for Damascus. The fact that the assault was carried out by an IS infiltrator within the ranks of the new Syrian government could have far-reaching implications for the Syrian government’s coordination with the international coalition. More broadly, it will cause significant reputational damage.

The incident also indicates a shift in IS strategy, from passive planning to active engagement. It exposes holes in the Syrian government’s intelligence capabilities, a known vulnerability given the shortages of personnel and resources, and the country’s geographic instability. But the embedding of IS operatives among the forces accompanying an international coalition designed to fight it is a grave development.

SANA — IS cells were dismantled in the Damascus countryside on 9 November 2025.

It calls for an urgent and thorough reassessment of recruitment protocols for new personnel within the Ministries of Interior and Defence, alongside more rigorous scrutiny of current staff and applicants. It remains unclear whether this weakness extends to the coordination between the intelligence services—lacking an executive arm—and the two branches of the Interior Ministry, namely the internal security and counterterrorism forces.

Any such flaw could jeopardise growing cooperation between Syria and the international coalition. This is particularly pressing given that the United States has already limited its collaboration to the Interior Ministry, excluding the Ministry of Defence due to its incomplete structure. The coalition continues to regard the latter as an unreliable partner, amid ongoing concerns over potential information leaks.

Spotting weaknesses

Within Syria, some will seek to exploit the Palmyra attack to bolster their negotiating positions with the Syrian government. Among the most important ongoing dialogues that could be impacted are talks between Damascus and the autonomous Kurdish-led SDF in Syria’s north-east, and between the government and armed Druze factions in Sweida, in Syria’s south, some of whom are backed by Israel.

The Palmyra attack may be used to argue that the Syrian government is compromised and cannot be trusted in key areas like counterterrorism. This adds even more urgency to the Syrian government’s efforts to reorganise its internal structures in a manner that does not hinder its attempts to build trust and reinforce joint operations with the international coalition.

The Palmyra attack may be used to argue that the Syrian government is compromised and cannot be a credible partner in areas like counterterrorism

Some anti-IS coalition members were already sceptical of Damascus's ability to contribute meaningfully to military operations. They saw the Syrian government as distracted and hampered in both its military and intelligence institutions. Such weaknesses appear to have been proven correct, if that is what enabled IS to penetrate its security systems, potentially jeopardising future operations.

In a statement issued hours after the attack, Interior Ministry spokesperson Noureddine al-Baba revealed that there are 5,000 new recruits to Syria's internal security forces in the desert region, adding that the ministry carries out weekly personnel evaluations. This offered a degree of transparency in addressing the incident and acknowledging the ongoing assessment and restructuring process.

Reassuring allies

Despite doubts about Syria's internal security procedures, Al Majalla understands that Washington and other key coalition members still see Syrian state involvement in the fight against IS as indispensable, arguing that coalition members must help equip Syria's internal security forces with the training, military assets, and intelligence support they require. This need is particularly acute while the new Syrian government is still in its formative phase, with both military infrastructure and human resources still requiring substantial development.

From the other side, the Palmyra attack suggests that IS has entered a second phase in its strategy: using direct action to undermine confidence in Syria's new government. In recent months, the group has largely confined itself to recruitment, isolated operations to delegitimise the authorities, and relocating cells and weapons from strongholds to new areas.

The arrest of an IS cell in late November by internal security forces in Latakia, a traditionally Alawite area, shows that IS is repositioning in areas that known to be volatile, thereby giving it greater scope to sow instability. Its operation in Palmyra is being seen as a response to the unexpectedly rapid rapprochement between the Syrian government and the West, a trajectory that represents an existential threat to IS.

The Syrian desert has long been a strategic anchor for IS. Its rugged terrain makes comprehensive security sweeps difficult, while its geography connects former centres of the group's strength. These include Deir ez-Zor, Mayadin, Al-Bukamal, the Syria-Iraq border, Hamad, Palmyra, and the Safa hills overlooking Sweida.

Knowing the threat

The international coalition recognises that asserting full control over this vast area and eliminating IS activity in 12 months was always a tall order for Damascus, and recognises that the Syrian government has expanded its military presence in the region, conducting multiple operations near the Safa hills to prevent IS from exploiting the unrest in Sweida.

Damascus understands the magnitude of the IS threat and knows that IS sees the Syrian government as an adversary to exploit via security gaps to infiltrate state institutions. Al Majalla understands that Damascus now regards IS as its number one hostile actor and has allocated substantial intelligence and security resources to tracking and dismantling its cells. It also regards its participation in the coalition as a critical force multiplier, strengthening its ability to confront IS.

Delil Souleiman/AFP — Syrian Kurdish Asayish security forces at the Kurdish-run al-Hol camp, which holds relatives of suspected Islamic State (IS) group fighters in the north-eastern Hasakeh governorate.

The IS attack in Palmyra is a stark indicator of the danger IS continues to pose, not only to Syria's future but also to the joint efforts of the Syrian government and the international community to entrench stability. It underscores the need for Damascus to intensify its response through a swift and genuine review of current personnel alongside more rigorous and better-designed recruitment procedures to prevent infiltration. Support in this could come from coalition members.

In the immediate term, priority should be given to competent and demonstrably loyal cadres within the Interior Ministry's counterterrorism forces, while suspending the induction of new recruits until their backgrounds have been fully vetted and any ties or sympathies with IS conclusively ruled out.

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