Why Iran-backed militias did well in Iraq's elections
Their success in Iraq's recent elections has less to do with genuine public support and more to do with vote buying through the massive wealth they've accrued through power
Axel Rangel García
Why Iran-backed militias did well in Iraq's elections
The outcome of Iraq’s parliamentary elections last week demonstrates the shifting threat from the Iranian-backed ٍShiite militias operating in Iraq. These militias significantly bolstered their representation in parliament. The electoral success of these militias does not reflect genuine support. They are widely despised by Iraqi Shiites since they violently crushed the popular 2019 uprising in Iraq, to preserve the corrupt and unpopular ruling system, killing about 800 protesters and activists, mostly Shiites, in the process. What then explains the electoral success of these militias?
My own experience of 903 days in captivity by the largest Iranian-backed militia in Iraq, Kataeb Hezbollah, demonstrates the changing priorities of these militias, away from “resistance” and toward enriching themselves and gaining political power. My kidnapping was a criminal enterprise, not about “resisting” Israel. The kidnappers did not know my Israeli identity until a month into my captivity, when they gained access to my phone’s content. But even after discovering my second citizenship, their initial goal of securing a ransom did not change. They demanded an exorbitant ransom—initially, $600mn.
Some of the massive sums these militias have amassed through pilfering from Iraq’s public coffers and extortion of Iraqis were then spent on an unprecedented operation to buy Iraqis’ votes.
The pro-Iranian militias saw great importance in gaining as many seats as possible in the next parliament. The larger the party, the more ministries and projects the party will get awarded and hence increase its ability to siphon off state resources, and the greater influence it’ll have on the overall political direction of the country, and particularly, its alignment with Iran’s regional goals.
The prioritisation of politics and plunder over resistance marks the evolution of these militias, which were initially established by Iran to fight the US occupation. In 2014, tens of thousands of Iraqi men joined these militias to push back the Islamic State (IS) onslaught. At the end of the fight against IS, the militias organised under the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) numbered 60,000 men. Many of them returned home once IS was defeated. However, the ranks of the militias have since expanded to about 250,000, overwhelmingly made up of men who did not rush to the frontlines when a third of Iraq was occupied by IS, but joined once the threat was gone, looking for a salary.
Iran-backed militias are moving away from "resistance" and toward enriching themselves and gaining political power
The leadership of these militias has also changed in its attitude. With the days of the ideological struggle against the US occupation or IS long gone, Iraqi militia leaders and their relatives have grown accustomed to a lavish lifestyle, being surrounded by huge convoys of tinted-windowed cars and adoring lackeys. All the cars in which I was ferried between the three different locations where I was held hostage were new and had rich leather seats, the facilities all had large flat-screen TVs and the last facility even contained a jacuzzi (not for my benefit).
The "Economic Offices" of the militias have become the focus of their activity, extracting protection money from legitimate businesses, illegally collecting "taxes" at checkpoints, taking over real estate through intimidation, setting up their own companies, and guzzling up state contracts awarded to them.
The past three years under Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani's government solidified the militias' shifting priorities. The series of setbacks suffered by the pro-Iranian axis, driven by a deep intelligence penetration of the Axis from Israel and the United States, made the threat to the lives of the top leadership of these militias much more palpable. At the same time, Prime Minister al-Sudani opened the door for the militias to pilfer from state coffers at an unprecedented scale, increasing their desire to avoid conflict with the US and Israel to be able to continue to enjoy the riches they have amassed.
Iran, too, suffering under the burden of tightening global sanctions, appears to prefer that the militias deprioritise the "resistance," as the Iranian regime reportedly discouraged the militias from joining the 12-Day War on Iran, and urged them to avoid antagonising the United States and Israel. The military role of the Iraqi militias in sending foreign fighters to Syria under Iranian command ended with the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024. This historic event also significantly reduced the role of the Iraqi militias in smuggling weapons to Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah, as the land-bridge linking Iran to Lebanon, which Iran and its axis took pride in, collapsed.
Tehran now sees the importance of the militias elsewhere and prefers that they focus on cross-border smuggling of dollars into Iran and oil and other goods from Iran to prop up the ailing Iranian economy, in addition to guaranteeing that a regime friendly to Tehran maintains power in Baghdad through the manipulation of the electoral process.
Supporters of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani celebrate in Baghdad's Tahrir Square on November 12 after his list appeared to be leading in the parliamentary elections.
Months prior to the elections, the militias compelled their members to register to vote and to ensure their families did the same. Those who failed to comply were threatened with dismissal. Then, as the election season approached, these militias forced their members to bring the electoral ID cards of their relatives and friends to guarantee they would vote for the militia's political party. Those who refused were fired and even jailed. The 250,000 or so members of these militias, in addition to their relatives served as the core base of support of these political parties of these armed groups.
Finally, the militias and other ruling parties used the billions of dollars they had amassed by plundering the public till to buy votes. The amounts the ruling parties spent on buying votes in these parliamentary elections broke all records and are estimated to have reached billions of US dollars. One of the most notable expenses was for people formally assigned as "election monitors" hired by the parties. In reality, they were promised their "salaries" in exchange for their own vote and those of their family members and friends. According to different estimates, they numbered about 2 million, while the total number of votes cast was only about 12 million. Meaning, there was about one observer for every six Iraqi voters, and about 50 observers in each of the 40,819 polling stations across Iraq.
Iraqi law limits the number of observers each party can hire based on the number of polling stations in the electoral district they run, so about 500,000 such "observers" were hired. Disturbingly, to be able to buy additional votes, the ruling parties used what are officially deemed non-governmental organisations to hire "observers" on behalf of the so-called "NGOs," adding about 1.5 million additional "observers." On top of this, the parties hired thousands of "pillars" ("rakaez"), prominent individuals known in the communities, to gather the votes of their social circle.
All these billions of dollars spent paid off. The outcome of the parliamentary elections in Iraq and the significant rise in the number of seats of the militias represent a rare success for Iran in the past two years. However, this success is unlikely to translate into a military threat from these militias. These groups are increasingly disinterested in costly acts of "resistance," despite what their official rhetoric proclaims. My case is prime proof of this: For over two years, Kataeb Hezbollah demanded a ransom in exchange for my release. Yet, when threatened by Mark Savaya, now the US Special Envoy for Iraq, that if I am not released within a week, President Trump would order strikes on the militia's leadership, I was let go, with nothing given in return.
Donald Trump poses with his new special envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya
A strategy to counter these militias should adapt to their evolving roles and priorities. The main threat these militias pose is through their takeover of the Iraqi state and mass embezzlement of Iraq's riches into their pockets and those of Iran, repression of internal dissent, and subordinating Iraqi decision-making wholly to Iran. Such a strategy should take into account that the riches the commanders of these militias have amassed make them much less inclined to become "martyrs," and hence, they will respect red lines clearly set to them by the US and other forces.
Iraq may appear marginal when looking at it from Washington, DC, but it is one of the most important lifelines of the heavily sanctioned and weakened Iranian regime. Iraq is also home to over 46 million people who deserve better than one of the most corrupt political systems in the world, led by predatory parties that pilfer the country's treasury and extort its citizens.
These parties fail to deliver the most basic of services to the population, including electricity, clean water, hospitals or drainage systems. Instead of winning elections based on their record of service provision or some ideological programs, in past elections, Iraq's parasitical ruling parties heavily relied on sectarian incitement to drive Iraqis to the polls. In recent years, this rhetoric has become largely ineffective, forcing these parties to buy votes en masse, using billions they stole from Iraq's riches, while funnelling the rest into their own pockets and the treasury of the enfeebled Iranian regime.
