Why some Yemenis want US-Israeli airstrikes on Houthis
The rejection of peace initiatives, the clampdown on civil society, and the forced disappearance of humanitarian workers have contributed to growing fatigue among Yemenis under their control
AP Photo/Osamah Abdulrahman
A Houthi supporter chants slogans as he carries a rocket replica during an anti-US and anti-Israel rally in Sanaa, Yemen, on Friday, September 26, 2025.
Why some Yemenis want US-Israeli airstrikes on Houthis
During the year 2025, a noticeable—if perplexing—trend emerged among segments of the Yemeni population: vocal support for US airstrikes targeting the Houthis. Some have even called for operational coordination between American airpower and Yemeni ground forces before the US President Donald Trump suddenly paused the strikes on 6 May 2025.
On social media, users have gone so far as to publicly suggest strike locations, undeterred by the civilian toll or the implications for Yemen’s national sovereignty. Similarly, there were many social media posts, even by usually anti-Israeli Yemenis, wishing them and the Houthis to basically go into a war that they destroy each other. It was so unusual that Houthis were shocked that they issued various statements denouncing those Yemenis who would “dare” to stand with Israel against any Yemeni faction.
This shift warrants scrutiny. Yemenis have historically maintained a deeply rooted resistance to foreign interference—let alone an Israeli or an American one. In addition, while authoritarianism has long been a feature of the Yemeni political landscape, the forms of violence that accompanied it have typically lacked the institutionalised brutality seen elsewhere in the region, as in Syria or Libya.
Yemen has not experienced the scale of state-structured violence witnessed in Syria, Iraq, or Libya; its legacy of imprisonment and torture is comparatively limited. Against this backdrop, the apparent acquiescence—if not approval—of US and Israeli strikes is striking, especially when it came from individuals who opposed the Saudi-led coalition’s campaign in 2015. Over the past decade, I personally have covered air strikes in Yemen, starting from US Drone Strikes on AQAP to the coalition air strikes; this was beyond unusual. But there are reasons why many Yemenis have reached this end.
Some Yemenis have even called for operational coordination between US airpower and Yemeni ground forces before Trump suddenly paused strikes on 6 May 2025
The Houthi factor
A key explanation lies in the erosion of local tolerance toward the Houthis themselves. The group's Red Sea operations have disrupted global shipping routes and provoked widespread condemnation, but their domestic governance has arguably done greater damage to their standing. The rejection of peace initiatives—most recently the Saudi Roadmap—the clampdown on civil society, and the kidnapping and forced disappearance of humanitarian workers have contributed to growing fatigue among Yemenis under their control.
In addition, they have well established themselves in the public eyes as the "filthy wealthy" new-rich in town; while millions of Yemenis are starving, Houthis members and allies have visibly been gaining exorbitant wealth. Even in Sana'a and in the poorest areas under Houthi control, one can see Houthi leaders and fighters driving 2025 brand new cars in a striking economic gap from ordinary Yemenis living in misery around them.
Protesters from the Houthi movement demonstrate to commemorate "Quds Day" on the last Friday of Ramadan in Sana'a, Yemen, on 28 March 2025.
The Nasrallah precedent
Amidst this frustration, some have embraced the premise that US or Israeli strikes might succeed where years of coalition military action failed, especially keeping in mind Israeli air strikes that managed to kill Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah—an ally and a groomer of the Houthis. This assumption had even more ground after the Israelis managed to kill senior ministerial and military leaders of the Houthis.
Furthermore, the assassination provided a psychological boost to Iran's adversaries and prompted renewed hopes over the fate of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. That assumption held strong despite the fact that comparisons between Hezbollah and the Houthis risk oversimplifying both contexts. Unlike Hezbollah, which is deeply integrated within Lebanon's political architecture, the Houthis remain an informal, kinship-based group centred on a singular leader. The potential removal of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi would almost certainly destabilise the group—but the fragmented geography of Yemen and the group's decentralised nature would, in fact, complicate any lasting impact.
Anti-Iran sentiment
There was another reason many Yemenis wished the same fate for Abdul-Malik al-Houthi as for Hassan Nasrallah. The Houthis' increasingly overt alignment with Iran has further alienated segments of the population. Their symbolic association with Tehran—manifested in portraits of Qasem Soleimani in Sana'a and rhetoric echoing the "Axis of Resistance"—has triggered a revival of Arab nationalist and "anti-Persian" sentiment.
These sentiments are not new. Many Yemenis still recall the country's support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s—a legacy that continues to shape perceptions of regional alignment among a wide range of the Yemeni population.
For some, the idea of US strikes on "Iran's proxies" in Yemen resonates with a longstanding cultural narrative of resistance to perceived Persian encroachment. Even those critical of American foreign policy have found themselves aligned—however uncomfortably—with a campaign targeting what they perceive as another externally non-Arab imposed order. Anti-Iran sentiment across Yemen, in fact, precedes even Islamic sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shiites, as there was a strong anti-Persian history in Yemeni society long before Islam became a religion in the 6th century.
A Houthi supporter wears a jacket bearing the image of the Houthi leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, during a military parade in Sana'a, Yemen, on 7 February 2024.
The Trump factor
In addition, political shifts in Syria have also served as inspiration. The fall of Bashar Al-Assad, who was a critical member of Iran's alliance of the "Axis of Resistance" as the Houthis and the rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa—a former jihadist figure now occupying the presidential palace Damascus—has prompted speculation and false dreams within Yemeni secular and Salafist circles about the possibility of replicating that trajectory.
More importantly, former President Donald Trump's return to office in 2025 has further emboldened anti-Houthi factions. His administration's rhetorical and kinetic posture, as well as actions toward Iran, have reignited hopes for more assertive US involvement. While diplomatic backchannels remain active, Trump's combative tone has given rise to speculation—dangerous though it may be—of a further and broader US–Iran confrontation. In Yemen, some now hope not only for the resumption of American strikes on Iran and the Houthis but also for direct military assistance. Commander Tarek Saleh, also a member of Yemen's PLC, has even publicly proposed joint operational planning between the Americans and Yemenis to combat the Houthis.
History of miscalculations
While the overall general public of Yemen has strong allergies to any foreign intervention, let alone from countries like Israel, this attitude is not entirely new to the Yemeni elite. Yemen's political elite has repeatedly turned to external powers to resolve internal disputes, just as the Houthis turned to Iran in the past. In 2009, then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh invited regional air support in his campaign against the Houthis—a strategy that proved ineffective and ultimately short-lived. His former interior minister—now head of the Presidential Leadership Council—was quoted in the late 2000s in US Wikileaks diplomatic cables, urging continued American drone strikes on Yemen, pledging to falsely attribute them to Yemen's own air force in front of the Yemeni Parliament.
Former Yemeni President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, similarly, in 2013, endorsed US drone and air strikes during his tenure, even when they resulted in civilian casualties, including in his home province of Abyan. These patterns reflect a broader elite political culture in which sovereignty is often subordinated to short-term, not-so-strategic gains, and in which elites are blind and indifferent to ordinary Yemenis' feelings. This illusion also persists despite well-documented evidence that airpower alone is insufficient to dismantle embedded insurgent groups.
The potential removal of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi would almost certainly destabilise the Houthis
While the sense of urgency and desperation among Yemenis facing Houthi repression is understandable, the embrace of external military solutions carries considerable risks. Chief among them is the erosion of domestic agency. By outsourcing the anti-Houthi struggle to external actors—let alone the United States and Israeli—Yemenis risk validating the Houthis' narrative that their opponents are little more than tools of foreign agendas.
This also threatens to further fracture the already fragile anti-Houthi coalition. Those most supportive of foreign intervention vocally often reside outside the country, removed from the daily toll of conflict. Their advocacy, however amplified online, does not reflect the consensus of a population that continues to endure the consequences of war and airstrikes.
Ultimately and even pragmatically, the notion that airstrikes—however targeted—can decisively shift the balance in Yemen is misguided. In addition, sustainable peace will not be achieved through external force. Illusions of a military shortcut only delay the difficult work of building a national consensus regarding Yemen among Yemenis.
