Civil unrest in Madagascar is part of a wider African trend

A rapid chain of events led to the president fleeing for his life following deadly clashes with citizens. But what happened on the island is not uncommon for Africa. Al Majalla explains why.

Family members of a protester killed during clashes carry the casket atop a van as protesters gather around during a civil society rally demanding the resignation of President Andry Rajoelina in Antananarivo, on October 13, 2025.
Luis TATO / AFP
Family members of a protester killed during clashes carry the casket atop a van as protesters gather around during a civil society rally demanding the resignation of President Andry Rajoelina in Antananarivo, on October 13, 2025.

Civil unrest in Madagascar is part of a wider African trend

Madagascar is experiencing its most serious political crisis in recent years. What began as a series of peaceful youth-led protests in late September, driven by disruptions to the supply of electricity and water, had escalated into large-scale clashes by early October.

On 10 October, the army’s elite CAPSAT unit refused to obey the country’s authorities and joined the demonstrators, issuing a statement to security personnel to “unite their forces” and to “refuse orders to shoot at their brothers and sisters.”

In response, Madagascar's president, Andry Rajoelina, said: “At present, there is an attempt to seize power by force on the territory of the country, which is contrary to the constitution and to democratic principles.”

Two days later, the French radio station RFI, citing its sources, reported that Rajoelina had fled the country on board a French military aircraft, in coordination with French President Emmanuel Macron. At the time of writing, the president was in an undisclosed location, having left the country in fear for his life.

Following Rajoelina’s departure, CAPSAT assumed control of the military, with Major General Démosthène Pikulas appointed the new chief of the general staff. By Tuesday, the National Assembly of Madagascar voted to impeach him, and the Supreme Constitutional Court nominated a new candidate for the post of head of state: Colonel Michael Randrianirina.

Currently, virtually all government institutions, with the exception of the National Assembly, have ceased operations. Randrianirina announced that the transition period would last two years, during which the country would hold a referendum on a new constitution, followed by elections to gradually establish new government institutions.

Ironically, the mutiny of CAPSAT officers in 2009 led to the overthrow of President Marc Ravalomanana, paving the way for Rajoelina, then leader of the opposition, to take power. However, this is not ‘the irony of history’ but a structural manifestation of the post-populist cycle characteristic of many African states.

AFP
Malagasy president Philibert Tsiranana and Jean Foyer, French secretary for the Community, shake hands on June 27, 1960, in Antananarivo, after signing the Madagascar independence.

From institutionalism to neopatrimonialism

After gaining independence in 1960, Madagascar—like many African nations—inherited from France the formal institutions of democracy: a parliament, a constitution, and elections, but without genuine mechanisms of social or political accountability. Real power, particularly over the distribution of resources, remained in the hands of regional clans and networks of personal loyalty.

This laid the groundwork for the rise of Ravalomanana—a businessman and technocrat who came to power through contested elections backed by court rulings and international support.

Ravalomanana’s rule was marked by the creation of a neopatrimonial model of power. This system was defined by the concentration of economic and administrative resources in the hands of the president, his inner circle, and networks of patronage. It relied entirely on the will of the leader and the personal loyalty of the elite.

State institutions formally continued to exist, but only in a decorative capacity—as instruments of personal authority. Formal legitimacy and the presence of institutional structures did not guarantee effective governance or social stability. The distribution of resources and power operated through personal connections, family ties, and clan networks rather than through competent institutional mechanisms.

The viability of this model depended directly on external support. The West, primarily France, the US, and international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, strongly backed Ravalomanana’s regime, viewing it as a guarantor of stability and a conduit for neoliberal reforms.

The structural vulnerability of populist regimes has become the root cause of the regime's crisis

Governability and geopolitical control, expressed through unconditional adherence to external political and economic directives, implied the financing of the regime's structural reforms and a tacit tolerance for corruption and inequality.

International actors focused on promoting a 'democratic transition' effectively supported a reboot of the state governance model through the dismantling of old elites and the reconfiguration of power relations, yet without altering its essence. Clientelism and the personalisation of power merely changed form: external legitimisation replaced internal legitimacy.

From neopatrimonialism to populism

When economic growth slowed and social inequality deepened, the neopatrimonial model lost its stability. Weak institutions proved incapable of managing the situation, rendering the regime vulnerable to public unrest. Declining living standards, corruption scandals, and the dismantling of local governance mechanisms triggered a crisis of trust in the ruling elite. The mechanism of internal legitimacy—once grounded in public trust, social justice, and effective institutions—was effectively destroyed.

External influence came to be seen by society as imposed, while international support proved incapable of compensating for the domestic deficit of trust. When the resource of external backing was finally exhausted, the Ravalomanana government inevitably entered crisis, paving the way for a wave of protest.

In such a situation, protest becomes the sole instrument for reclaiming internal political sovereignty, and legitimacy begins to form not through institutions but through the streets and collective emotion. This is how populist movements emerge: exploiting societal fatigue, grievances, and resentment, thereby generating protest-based legitimacy.

Riding this wave, the young mayor of Antananarivo, Rajoelina, came to power through a military coup. A media magnate and charismatic figure, he represents a new type of non-systemic or anti-systemic politician: activists, show people, and athletes—hybrid figures shaped by the digital age and the neoliberal fragmentation of society.

RIJASOLO / AFP
A resident of Antananarivo watches Madagascar President Andry Rajoelina's address to the nation on October 13, 2025, via the official Facebook page of the Presidency of Madagascar, from her home in Antananarivo.

From populism to post-populism

Rajoelina's rise to power in 2009 was not merely a regime change, but a transition from neopatrimonialism to a new type of populism. A state in which political legitimacy is generated through emotion, protest, and the leader's charisma, rather than being underpinned by stable institutional foundations.

The structural vulnerability of populist regimes—where legitimacy based on protest and charisma creates an illusion of change but does not foster institutional development—has become the root cause of the regime's crisis. Without the implementation of structured, socially oriented programmes under professional management and functional, competent institutions, such regimes inevitably exhaust themselves.

Today's political crisis in Madagascar represents post-populism—not as a return to systemic politics, but as a political vacuum following the burnout of populism. Post-populism reflects society's fatigue with the constant simulation of change, coupled with the elites' inability to offer a new developmental model.

Over more than a decade in power, Rajoelina's regime has confronted the full consequences of post-populist cyclicality. Weak institutions have proven incapable of stabilising the economy and social sphere; corruption, inequality, and a deficit of social justice have heightened public discontent; and youth protest movements (Gen Z) have mobilised against the authorities, triggering a new cycle of legitimacy crisis.

The CAPSAT military unit, which refused to follow orders and sided with the protesters, has become a symbolic instrument for restoring order and temporarily stabilising the post-populist cycle.

 Luis TATO / AFP
Members of Madagascar's CAPSAT army unit patrol on an armoured vehicle as residents gather for a ceremony honouring protesters killed in anti-government demonstrations in Antananarivo, on October 12, 2025.

Military coup and the post-populist cycle

The Corps d'Administration des Personnels et des Services de l'Armée de Terre (CAPSAT) is a unique elite unit of the Madagascan army, responsible for personnel management, logistics, and the technical maintenance of the armed forces.

CAPSAT's special status allows it to act as a key domestic political actor, capable of influencing power transitions, participating in coups, and supporting protests.

In African countries, a national army is often seen as the only institution where discipline, hierarchy, and a sense of duty are still preserved. Consequently, military coups are frequently perceived not as a destruction of the system, but as a restoration of its 'moral core'—justice, responsibility, and dignity. They become a symbol of rationality returning to an otherwise irrational political landscape.

A military coup in Africa represents an alternative form of post-populist legitimation through the projection of action, resolve, strength, and discipline, where the demand for justice and fatigue with populism merge with trust in the military 'meritocracy' as a symbol of the capacity to restore order.

Since the early 2000s, political dynamics in most African states have followed a similar pattern

However, without a concrete reform plan, this remains a symbolic rather than institutional act. The military's rise to power is less a military event than a socio-political one, marking the collapse of the previous model of legitimacy and the inability of new actors to consolidate the system.

Post-populism under a military junta can serve as a transitional state with two potential outcomes: a neo-authoritarian renaissance, in which the elites restore order under the banner of 'stability'; or a new grassroots social policy, where institutional forms emerge from communities rather than being imposed from above.

However, a genuine transition is possible only under two conditions. First, the abandonment of personal, symbolic legitimacy in favour of institutional, procedural, and competent authority. Second, the concentration of control to restore order must be temporary and limited, with a mandatory transfer of powers to civilian authorities.

When military or security structures temporarily fill a legitimacy vacuum outside institutionalisation, the risk of a closed cycle of post-populist instability arises, in which changes of power occur not through genuine reforms but through the emotional response of society and a symbolic demonstration of the ability to act.

This is a trap for the country: the state remains in a constant dynamic of power shifts, stuck in a cycle of instability, failing to build resilient institutions, blocking long-term development, deepening social stratification, and exacerbating deficits in justice.

Luis TATO / AFP
Protesters raise their fists as a van carrying the coffin of a protester killed during clashes drives past during a civil society rally demanding the resignation of President Andry Rajoelina in Antananarivo, on October 13, 2025.

Post-populism—an African systemic syndrome

The crisis in Madagascar is part of a wider African trend where societies clash with the liberal-democratic model in its Western understanding. Post-populism is not merely the decline of democracy, but the consequence of a failed institutional transition. It marks a moment when democratic mechanisms exist formally but are incapable of reproducing competence and accountability.

In most African states since the early 2000s, political dynamics have followed a similar pattern. The institutional decay of the post-colonial system led to its replacement by neopatrimonial regimes that proclaimed order and democracy but relied on external legitimation. Vulnerable to popular protest, these regimes did not survive the subsequent economic and social crises that ensued.

They were replaced by populist leaders who legitimise power through personal charisma and protest movements rather than institutional mechanisms. When protest and charisma burn out, a vacuum of legitimacy emerges, and the state reverts to symbolic governance.

The institutional decay of the post-colonial system was replaced by neopatrimonial regimes that proclaimed order and democracy but relied on external legitimation

Post-populism is not the end of the cycle, but its internal limit. Military intervention temporarily restores order and symbolic meritocracy, yet it does not break the post-populist cycle if institutions remain formal and non-competitive.

The example of Madagascar demonstrates that genuine stability is achievable only through a combination of competent institutions, professional governance, and democratic mechanisms, which confer legitimacy through effectiveness and fairness rather than through charisma, protest, or external support.

Only such a combination can break the post-populist cycle and set the country on a sustainable path of development, transforming temporary stabilisation into structural renewal. Without this, any form of power—military, civilian, or populist—remains merely a façade of real change.

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