Unravelling the factions, sheikhs, and fighters of Suweidahttps://en.majalla.com/node/326590/politics/unravelling-factions-sheikhs-and-fighters-suweida
Unravelling the factions, sheikhs, and fighters of Suweida
This Druze-dominated city that has been the scene of fierce fighting in recent days may be a single governorate, but it is home to myriad armed groups with sometimes conflicting agendas.
Axel Rangel Garcia
Unravelling the factions, sheikhs, and fighters of Suweida
Suweida in southern Syria dominated world headlines this month for good reason. With more than 1,000 people killed in a little over a week, the violence involved a noxious mix of Syrian and foreign actors, including the local Druze population, the local Bedouin population, Sunni tribes from elsewhere in Syria, government forces, and Israel. From the Druze side, there was the Military Council plus several armed groups.
The Israeli intervention, in the form of airstrikes, was justified under the pretext of “protecting the Druze,” but it has unleashed a fresh wave of instability, exposing stark contradictions in the positions of Suweida’s religious leadership, as well as deep fissures in the alliances among armed factions and their ties to the Syrian state.
On 16 July, just hours after an Israeli airstrike struck the army’s general staff headquarters in the capital, an agreement was reached between Damascus and Suweida’s factions. Israeli aircraft had also hit military installations in Qatana, Al-Mazzah, and Madamiet al-Sham, as well as positions held by internal security and army forces in the south.
National vs local
On 17 July, Syrian President al-Sharaa delivering a scathing denunciation of Israel’s intervention. The state’s efforts had succeeded in “restoring stability and confronting outlaw factions despite Israeli schemes,” he said.
“However, the Zionist entity resorted to extensive bombardment of vital civil and governmental installations to undermine these efforts, which exacerbated the crisis and pushed the region to the brink.” He added that American, Arab, and Turkish mediation efforts “averted a catastrophe which could have determined the fate of the entire region”.
The Zionist entity resorted to extensive bombardment of vital civil and governmental installations to undermine (state) efforts, which exacerbated the crisis and pushed the region to the brink
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa on 17 July 2025
Syria faced two difficult choices, al-Sharaa explained. "Either an open military confrontation with Israel that would threaten the security of the esteemed Druze community and the stability of Syria and the region or allowing Suweida's dignitaries and Sheikhs al-Aql (Druze religious leaders) to rectify their course and elevate national interest above narrow agendas."
The local factions and Sheikhs al-Aql needed to maintain security in Suweida "out of a desire to avoid a new war that might plunge Syria back into a renewed cycle of conflict and divert it from the path of recovery from the war's aftermath and the accumulations of the previous regime," he said. So, who are these military and religious forces operating in Suweida? What are their affiliations? What domestic and external influence are they under? And how do their positions diverge?
Men of Dignity
The Men of Dignity Movement was established in 2013 by Sheikh Wahid al-Balous as a protective force for the youth of Suweida, to shield them from compulsory military service and to counter recruitment campaigns led by figures affiliated with the regime of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. A further aim of the Movement was to defend Suweida from threats beyond the governorate's borders.
An aerial view of the predominantly Druze city of Suweida in southern Syria on July 21, 2025.
Over time, its ranks swelled to more than 1,000 fighters, posing a growing challenge to Assad—especially when military personnel from Suweida began defecting to it. In 2015, Sheikh al-Balous was killed in a car bombing, plunging the Movement into turmoil. Raafat al-Balous was named leader, but he was in poor health.
In 2017, leadership passed to Yahya al-Hajjar, who reformed the Movement, rearticulating its core principles and redefining its relationship with Assad, Russia, and Iran. This prompted the departure of several members, including Wahid al-Balous's sons, Laith and Fahd, who established a new group called Sheikh of Dignity Movement in 2018.
The Men of Dignity remains one of the Syrian factions that has steadfastly refused to surrender its weapons, resisting all efforts to introduce General Security forces into Suweida, insisting that authority there must remain in the hands of its own people. At the same time, the Movement has helped mediate and de-escalate local disputes.
A Syrian family is escorted by government security out of the city of Suweida, on July 21, 2025.
Its current strength is unclear, though it is thought to number around 800 fighters. Following the Assad regime's collapse, some fighters returned to civilian life. Others joined Laith and Fahd al-Balous in the Sheikh of Dignity Movement. In July's fighting, the Men of Dignity fought the Syrian army and security forces, with more than 50 killed and wounded before the ceasefire was announced.
Sheikh of Dignity
Founded by the sons of the late Sheikh Wahid al-Balous in 2018, the Sheikh of Dignity Movement has attracted dozens of fighters primarily based in the al-Mazra'a area and the city of Suweida. It has also opposed National Defence Forces recruitment campaigns and was instrumental in organising widespread demonstrations against the Assad regime in recent years.
When Assad fled, the Sheikh of Dignity Movement embraced the idea of unifying local forces under the new Syrian Ministry of Defence. Unlike other factions, it imposed few preconditions. It was among the groups that participated in military operations leading to the downfall of Assad, securing large quantities of weaponry from military installations and handing them over to the emerging Syrian state. It also played a key role in mediating conflicts in two Druze areas: Ashrafiyat Sahnaya and Jaramana.
The Men of Dignity remains one of the Syrian factions that has steadfastly refused to surrender its weapons
During this month's fighting, the Sheikh of Dignity Movement backed efforts to de-escalate violence, showing a greater inclination towards formal state authority over Suweida's institutions. Laith al-Balous gave several video messages reaffirming his commitment to national unity and denouncing Israeli interference.
According to reports, the movement is expected to play an active role in implementing the ceasefire agreement between the Syrian government and representatives from Suweida, potentially taking part in local governance with the support of the state. However, its alignment with Damascus has led to the group's headquarters coming under repeated attack from rival factions in Suweida.
Ahrar Jabal al-Arab
The Ahrar Jabal al-Arab Gathering, led by Sheikh Salman Abdul-Baqi, launched in 2022. It is closely aligned with the Men of Dignity Movement and shares many of its core principles. In November 2024, Abdul-Baqi survived an assassination attempt, which he attributed to the Assad regime.
Druze fighters on the back of a pick-up truck as they transport bodies of people killed during sectarian violence, recovered from the streets of Suweida on July 21, 2025.
Ahrar Jabal al-Arab (The Freemen of the Mountain) developed relations with President Ahmed al-Sharaa's Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) then helped to resolve longstanding tensions between HTS and the Druze community in northern Syria. The group's relationship with HTS deepened during the military operation that ultimately led to the overthrow of the Assad regime.
In recent months, Abdul-Baqi has emerged as a vocal opponent of international protection for the Druze, arguing that they require no external support and that Suweida remains an integral part of the Syrian homeland. He has also served as a vital intermediary between the Syrian Ministry of Defence and local armed factions, his group having multiple meetings with Defence Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra. The priority has been the end of factional fragmentation and the re-establishment of state authority in Suweida by integrating all local armed groups into a unified Syrian army.
The Military Council
The Military Council is one of the most powerful armed factions in Suweida. It was formed only very recently, in February 2025, just two months after the fall of the Assad regime, under the leadership of Tariq al-Shoufi. It consolidated several pre-existing factions, many of which had operated as auxiliaries to regime forces. Some had Russian support, others coordinated with Iranian-backed militias.
The Military Council is distinguished by its composition: it includes former officers from the Syrian army and security services, retired regime-era military personnel, and younger recruits who joined with the aim of defending Suweida and its people—especially from Bedouin groups to the south. While it portrays itself as a neutral force to protect residents and curbing smuggling, local sources allege that several of its leaders are themselves directly involved in arms and drugs smuggling for illicit gain.
The Military Council is one of the most powerful armed factions in Suweida. Formed in February 2025, it consolidated several pre-existing factions
The Military Council claims to follow the spiritual guidance of Sheikh al-'Aql Hikmat al-Hijri, although he has not publicly acknowledged any formal affiliation or coordination. The Council played a major role in sparking the latest wave of violence, having led tit-for-tat kidnappings involving Bedouin groups, and was a primary actor in the clashes that escalated into a full-blown confrontation by mid-July.
The Military Council generally favours the idea of local self-governance and supports al-Hijri's calls for international protection. Its forces have been accused of carrying out the mass killings of Bedouins, internal security forces, and Syrian army personnel. There are also reports that it is in contact with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria's north-east, and may even be getting financial backing from the SDF.
Counter-Terrorism Forces
The Counter-Terrorism Forces comprise approximately 700 fighters and were formed as the armed wing of the Syrian Brigade Party, which publicly emerged in 2021. The party is led by Malik Abu al-Khair, a France-based figure who also heads the humanitarian organisation 'I Am Human,' while military forces—which coordinate with the Military Council—are led by Samer al-Hakim.
Druze gunmen deploying in al-Dur village in Syria's southern Suweida governorate on July 17, 2025, following the retreat of government forces.
According to available information, the Syrian Brigade Party leads foreign relations on behalf of both the Counter-Terrorism Forces and the Military Council. It is also responsible for fundraising, securing external support, and running social campaigns in Suweida promoting the idea of secession and the transformation of the governorate into an autonomous, self-governing region. At minimum, it advocates for a decentralised governance model within Syria. Its goals closely mirror those of the SDF, and reports suggest ongoing coordination between the two.
Family-based groups
Suweida is home to many smaller factions. Comprising no more than 20 fighters, they include the Army of Monotheists and the Higher Forces. There are also dozens of other family-based micro-groups, often with five or less members, including the Fahd Forces, Fahd Banner, Azz al-Jabal Banner, Suweida Hawks, Al-Haq Forces, Shield of the East, Al-Fajr Forces, Nafez Asad Allah Group, Fares Saimou'a Group, Popular Resistance, Ariqah, Nihad al-Mueyyed Group, Al-Miqdad Brigades, and Asyaj al-Jabal Group.
Many align themselves with the Military Council, or coordinate with it. Others operate independently, often engaging in criminal activities such as kidnapping, extortion, and smuggling. Some formerly allied with Iranian militias fled southward following the collapse of the regime. One such group, the Al-Arin Forces, is now concentrated in southern Suweida and is primarily engaged in smuggling, reportedly maintaining contact with remnants of Iranian-backed militias in Daraa and Deir ez-Zor.
Family-based influence
Religious leadership plays a decisive role in shaping the political and social orientation of Suweida's population. Among the most historically influential clans are the Jarbu', Hannawi, and al-Hijri, whose leaders can play pivotal roles in either fostering alignment with the Syrian government, or deepening internal divisions.
Born in 1970 in Suweida, Sheikh Youssef al-Jarbu' assumed the position of Sheikh al-'Aql for his family in 2012, following the death of the former leader, Hussein al-Jarbu'. The Jarbu' family is among the most prominent and long-standing lineages in the religious leadership of Suweida, with a history spanning more than two centuries.
Druze men gather ahead of the arrival of Syrian Druze clerics at the tomb of Nabi Shuaib in northern Israel on March 14, 2025.
Sheikh al-Jarbu' did not adopt a hardline stance against Assad and has also refrained from opposing the newly formed Syrian state. He has been an active mediator between Suweida and Damascus, speaking to military and political leaders, advocating for civil peace over sectarian violence, urging restraint. It was al-Jarbu' who announced the text of the agreement reached between the Syrian government and Suweida's leadership on the night of 16 July.
This agreement quickly collapsed after Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri rejected it, and military operations resumed. Ever since, Sheikh al-Jarbu' has repeatedly criticised al-Hijri for obstructing negotiations and preventing an accord with the Syrian state, calling for an end to the violence in the province and demanding accountability for those responsible for atrocities and civilian bloodshed.
