Politics

After Suweida: the path to peace just got more complicated

The terrible violence in southern Syria this month shows what needs to be done by all actors, and shows what fate awaits if they do not.

Karam al-Masri/Reuters

A member of Syrian security forces stands near a vehicle carrying aid as they make their way to Suweida, at Bosra al-Sham town, near Deraa, Syria July 23, 2025.

After Suweida: the path to peace just got more complicated

Michael Harari

last update on 24 Jul 2025

The violence in Suweida over recent days has illustrated not only Syria’s deep complexity but also the need for patience and prudent policymaking to bring calm to the country. While not necessarily suggestive of a complete failure of leadership in Damascus, it shows definitively that there is still a pressing need to integrate ethnic and religious minorities into the broader Syrian state-building project.

The severity of the violence in the southern Syrian city marks a critical juncture for the new regime’s trajectory, as well as for all other actors, both internal and external. To understand where things may be heading, it is essential to understand the region’s demographic composition, with Suweida being home to a significant concentration of Druze, alongside Bedouin tribes.

Tensions between these two communities stretch back many years, with various militias emerging with different agendas. Some were based on familial or clan loyalties, some maintained relatively stable relations with the Assad regime, while others took a more independent stance, determined to hold on to the autonomy they had de facto established during the war years. On the Bedouin side, divisions tend to follow tribal lines.

Leverage and authority

Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa was compelled to intervene in the clashes that broke out between the rival factions and sought to leverage the moment to reinforce central authority. It remains unclear whether the brutality and cruelty displayed by his forces were carried out at his directive or were a result of local escalation on the ground, possibly influenced by the composition of the forces involved, including foreign fighters.

What is clear, however, is that he lost some political capital, both internationally and domestically, particularly in the eyes of Syria’s ethnically and religiously diverse population.

In Suweida, al-Sharaa lost political capital, particularly in the eyes of Syria's ethnically and religiously diverse population

In relation to Israel, it appears that despite ongoing contact between the two sides, the level of coordination and mutual understanding of signals was not completely clear. From an Israeli perspective, the situation is no less complex. Its decision to intervene in Syria's ethnic and religious fabric highlighted just how fraught, dangerous, and problematic such involvement can be.

Israel and the Druze

The Druze component in Israel's strategic calculus is understandable and, in some respects, justified. In its view, it cannot ignore the relationship with the Druze community in Israel, which impressively integrates into Israeli society, including service in the army, despite problems caused by Israel's Nation-State law and rising polarisation in recent years.

Khalil Ashawi/Reuters — An Internal Security Forces member stands guard as Syrian Arab Red Crescent vehicles (not pictured) arrive to evacuate more civilians from Suweida on 23 July 2025.

The solidarity between the Druze living in Israel and the Druze living in Syria obliged the Israeli state to intervene to protect the latter, but clearly there is also an internal political angle—a desire to earn Israeli Druze votes in future elections. Yet the way Israel intervened, in particular the direct attacks on Damascus, was not constructive, nor was the way it positioned itself as "responsible" for the Druze community in Syria.

Nevertheless, when it comes to southern Syria, Israel's strategic interests appear relatively clear. It seeks to maintain demilitarisation of the area, including agreement on the composition of forces securing the buffer zone. It also demands a Syrian commitment to protect the Druze minority, conditioning the withdrawal of its forces on these terms.

Calibration needed

Israel's military strength—combined with American political and diplomatic backing—allows it to act assertively, hastily, and fast in pursuit of its interests. Suweida has not shut the door on broader Israel-Syria understandings, but both will now need to calibrate their moves with greater sobriety.

Al-Sharaa is likely to forfeit the diplomatic gains he has made in the regional and internationally in recent months, and he appears to recognise that a prerequisite for the generous international assistance Syria requires is the consolidation of central authority—not through brute force, and certainly not through brutality, but rather through the avoidance of clashes with Syria's neighbours, first and foremost Israel.

The door is not shut on broader Israel-Syria understandings, but they need to calibrate their moves with greater sobriety

For its part, Israel must address the gaps in its Syria strategy. It remains suspicious and unconvinced that al-Sharaa, a former jihadist, has transformed. Furthermore, Israel is yet to determine whether it prefers a weak and fragmented Syria, or a strong and stable Syria that could effectively address its strategic interests but that may also take a more Islamist turn.

Bakr Alkasem/AFP — Syrian security forces stand by as a United Nations convoy evacuating families from Suweida.

At face value, the interests of both Israel and Syria point toward the need for continued efforts to formulate mutual understandings, particularly in southern Syria, in a manner that could influence the rest of the country.

The violence in Suweida can, and should, serve as a catalyst for a better grasp of shared interests, which, as noted, are not few. The US has a significant role signalling, in a clear-cut way, what needs to be done by both sides. It should 'assist' them in identifying their strategic interests.

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