Barbara Leaf: sectarian power-sharing not the answer in Syria

Against Iran's nuclear programme, yes, Trump did use a set of munitions that have been available to other presidents who judged it not the time to do so. Whether this leads to a wider peace, that chapter is still to be written.

Do you think that this is just a phase in a region that is already on edge?

I think it's a phase. Unfortunately, because of the kind of regime we face in Iran, I don't think they have given up on their quest to dominate the region, to dominate its neighbourhood, and ultimately do great damage to Israel, if not destroy it. So, for the Iranians, it is not 'game over,' nor is it for Israel.

In recent days, Israeli officials have made it very clear that if they see any regeneration of Iran's ballistic missile programme, or efforts to reconstitute the nuclear sites, they'll go back in. You don't only get peace through military means. You must have the political end-game, and we're not there yet.

Why should US administrations, whether Democrat or Republican, be trusted with Middle East policy? No weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq. Why should they be trusted on Iran and nuclear weapons?

Listen to people like the IAEA director-general, who said Iran has highly-enriched uranium stockpiles. He doesn't know how much of it is left, but he believes a significant amount. Nobody enriches uranium to 60% underground in hidden facilities for civil nuclear purposes. Weapons grade uranium is 90%.

Why hide everything underground? Why build generation after generation of advanced centrifuges? Why do the research on what it would take to weaponise if you don't intend to do so? It isn't just the US (that warns of Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons), that's the conclusion of the international community.

You met Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa a few months ago, during the last days of the Biden administration. Trump lifted sanctions on Syria in July. How did the US manage to trust al-Sharaa so quickly?

In terms of trust, I recall President Ronald Reagan's famous phrase about arms control negotiations with the Soviets, when he said: "Trust but verify." You typically don't make these kind of agreements with friends, you make them with adversaries, and people like al-Sharaa have been our adversary—he once spent time in a US military detention facility in Iraq.

After I spoke privately to al-Sharaa, I reported back to (then) Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and to the White House. I also briefed members of the incoming (Trump) team. There were strongly divergent views within the Trump administration as to whether to engage with Damascus at all.

Certainly, there was hostility from some about lifting sanctions. Ultimately, the president listened to the advice he got from (current) Secretary of State Marco Rubio and others. Importantly, he also heard the same thing from Saudi Arabia and from President Erdogan of Turkey, and he puts great weight in their advice.

It's not a question of whether you have endless trust in al-Sharaa, but since December 2024 he's been saying all the right things on the issues that we care about, that the region cares about, and that many Syrians care about.

The main criticisms at this point concerns his advisors and governing circle—mostly people from Idlib. It's far too small, too insular. He needs to widen his circle and allow other parts of Syrian society to have a voice. That then links to the question of whether he is doing enough to protect Syria's communities, like the Alawites or the Christians, from being attacked.

What lies behind al-Sharaa's political survival, do you think? Is it his charisma? Trump described him in May as a young, attractive leader.

I'm not going to use those words because they'd be misinterpreted, but he is charismatic, and has a very high degree of legitimacy with Syrians, which is key in this war-shattered country. He fought for so long, and ultimately, it was under his command that forces pushed Assad out.

Part of it is also his ability to move in different circles, beginning from really extreme groups like al Qaeda and Nusra. He is very astute, politically. He's not just a militia commander, that was very clear in our conversation. His mindset is not just that of a fighter, whether extremist or otherwise. He has a politician's mentality, and is very astute in his analysis, notably on the things that are most important to Syrians, like the economy and security.

He has also clearly studied the mistakes of the United States and of Iraq, and doesn't want to see those replicated in Syria. He can flex to the circumstances and make decisions based on that, as opposed to operating some rigid model that he wants to impose.

You mentioned Alawites in Syria and other minorities. Do you think Syria needs a power-sharing agreement between Sunnis, Alawites, and Kurds?

I don't, actually, and that's based on my own experience in Bosnia after the war. We had a brilliant diplomat, Ambassador Richard Holbrook, who drove the negotiations among the three leaders of the three warring communities, to bring the war to an end. To do this, they set up a structure of power sharing at every level. Today, Bosnians will tell you that it has become a trap for them. They feel stuck in these very rigid separations. It hasn't brought them closer together; quite the reverse.

Al-Sharaa said to me several times in our conversations that he did not want the Muhassasa model (a power-sharing system based on sectarian quotas) that he saw in Lebanon or in Iraq. Indeed, I have heard from Syrians both inside and outside Syria that there is real irritation about the way Western governments keep talking about minorities.

It seems that there were secret channels between Syria and Israel. How long were these channels running?

Intelligence professionals meet often, and constantly look to create communication channels to pass messages between adversaries. Sometimes the other side doesn't want the channel, but they still have to receive messages. There have been such channels over the years.

I have every reason to think that those channels still exist now. Frankly, that's a good thing. It doesn't mean that they want full diplomatic relations, but it can be really important for deconfliction and clarification. It's useful for both sides. I hope such channels help Israel and Syria come to some sort of agreement, something like a non-aggression pact.

Given where we are, do you think talk of a Palestinian state is now delusional?

It looks grim on every level, but when people say it's delusional, my question is: what's your alternative? Gaza may be in a state of advanced destruction, but you have two million Palestinians who claim it as their land and the place where they want to live and rebuild, then you have more than three million Palestinians in the West Bank, whose quest for nationhood has not ended, but the Israeli government has some very right-wing elements that are completely hostile to the idea of national rights for Palestinians. In fact, they talk openly about working to expel them.

More so now than in recent decades, the region is very polarised. I think many in the Arab world cannot understand the acute sense of trauma and existential anxiety that Israelis live with today. The hostages still being held by Hamas is an open wound for them that will not heal.

Israelis cannot move on from it. Every day is 7 October for them, I hear this constantly. So yes, it's grim on every side, but there is no alternative. I may be wrong, but I don't think President Trump will agree to (Israel's) annexation (of Palestinian territory). He bills himself as a peacemaker.