The Middle East’s latest battle is the fight for the state

Meanwhile, in a recent interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani reaffirmed that the country would not tolerate any weapons outside official state institutions, calling this "one of the fundamental pillars of building the Iraqi state". The situation is complicated, however, by the legalisation of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) and the integration of sectarian factions under its umbrella. Put simply, the state envisioned by Sudani cannot emerge as long as armed groups act according to their own sectarian or ideological agenda, rather than under state orders.

Syria's armed groups

Perhaps nowhere is the situation more complex than in Syria. After 14 years of civil conflict, the proliferation of unregulated weapons throughout the country has been untrammelled. Tribal loyalties mix with economic incentives, not least in the north-east, where the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control the oil wells, or in the south, where the semi-autonomous Druze dominate cities like Suweida.

The crux of the issue in Syria is the crux of the issue elsewhere, too. No weapons outside the framework of the state can be allowed or ignored. States must be built on solid foundations. In this, the experiences of Lebanon and Iraq are cautionary. If armed groups exist beyond a state's control, the state can struggle to establish itself, or to act in an independent, unobstructed manner. After all, a state is not a ruler, a party, or a faction; it is the institutional framework that guarantees the rights of all its citizens.

Some justify the retention of arms on the grounds that the Damascus regime is unelected or sectarian. Ironically, these same voices often opposed the use of arms during the revolution to oust Bashar al-Assad. Others denounce certain militias yet endorse others. Such inconsistency betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the broader picture: the primacy of the state is absolute and paramount.

Dialogue over guns

In Syria, there have indeed been grave errors and failings on the part of the authorities, yet the answer is not armed struggle. Rather, it is political engagement involving both those who are loyal to the new rulers, those who have doubts, and those who are ostensibly hostile, but who nevertheless consider themselves 'Syrian'. This is where a national dialogue becomes so important. Syrians must debate, agree, and disagree through dialogue—not violence.

Arab and international support for the new Syrian government is evidence that the era of militias is coming to an end. Few in the Middle East have backed more militias than Iran, but its own strategy of doing so must currently be under review, given the battering it took directly, and the destruction its proxies—from Yemen to Gaza—have endured.

It is rare to voluntarily lay down one's arms, renounce violence, and instead commit to a political strategy of using a country's legitimate means to achieve one's aims, yet that (on the face of it) is exactly what Öcalan and the PKK are doing in Türkiye, and what the SDF might do in Syria, if nudged that way by their American sponsors. It is rare because it is courageous, yet there is no alternative if we are to transition from sects and tribes to citizens, from arenas of conflict to functioning states.

At the same time, governments must uphold its side of the bargain and build institutional states. Syria, in particular, must avoid the Iraqi trap of legitimising armed militias simply because they are loyal to the regime. That path leads only to state failure and the capture of state apparatus by armed non-state actors, such as in Lebanon. If states rebuild their security institutions such that they are capable of protecting all citizens, this will help ensure the primacy of the state by conferring popular legitimacy.