Volker Perthes: fragmentation and stalemate awaits Sudan

The SAF's General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has just appointed a prime minister, and the RSF has decided, along with other political parties, to set up a counter-government, likely under the protection of the RSF, which means it will be an RSF-led government. And, of course, we still have other areas under the control of militia leaders, warlords, or rebel movements. That looks like fragmentation to me. There is very little interest from the regional or international community to do something diplomatically—or by force—to end the war. So, those who suffer are the people, and this has become one of the world's biggest humanitarian catastrophes.

Considering the military situation, do you think the SAF is capable of recontrolling all of Sudan?

It doesn't look like it at the moment. It very much looks like the RSF is holding fast to at least four out of five states of Darfur, while the SAF is in control of the east, centre, and probably North Darfur, or at least Al Fasher or parts of it. So, it looks more like a division of the country, where no party is capable of defeating the other. They can gain victories, bomb or send drones to make life difficult for the respective authorities or rulers in another area, and, of course, make life uncomfortable or even miserable for the citizens. But you cannot occupy territory with barrel bombs or drones. You only destroy infrastructure and livelihoods.

So, no victory for either party?

No total victory. We have political players here. I mean, all wars are for political ends, and I suppose if that continues and it becomes a stalemate, then the parties will define victory in different ways. If the SAF controls the centre and the east, it will be called a victory. And, of course, recapturing the capital has changed the international discourse.

The SAF is now generally viewed as the government of Sudan, which wasn't really the case in the first two years of the war. So, from a Khartoum perspective, it feels similar to the period before the separation of South Sudan in 2011—when you had a rather stable centre and people had a more or less good life. It was seen as a city and a country you could visit, only there was a civil war somewhere far off in the periphery. And that is probably what at least some of the political forces behind the SAF will try to say. 'Oh, we have won the war, it's just somewhere in the periphery that we have some rebel holdouts and an ongoing war.'

Do you think we are going to face a stalemate, fragmentation, or division?

I don't know. I think a clear division—similar to Sudan and South Sudan—is unlikely, given the way the different forces are composed. They all have different militias with local agendas, so stalemate and fragmentation are more likely. But even if we develop these potential scenarios, it all supposes that not much changes in the external context. We have seen that the external context is important. When the SAF received support from the outside world, particularly from Iran and Russia, it altered the war's dynamics, enabling it to go on the offensive. And if we assume that things remain largely unchanged, I see a fragmented stalemate as the most likely outcome.

The SAF and RSF have established opposing governments. How do you view this?

Well, it appears to be an attempt from both sides to consolidate what they have, which seems like division, right? Why is such a division an unstable scenario? Because both sides, particularly the RSF, are internally fragmented.

This is not an organised, institutionalised army. It is an ethnically-based private militia owned by the Hemedti family, which has been trying to reach out, with some success, to minorities and peripheral groups across the country. But these militias from other ethnic and tribal groups have agendas and will not take orders from Hemedti indefinitely. They would rather try to consolidate their territory.

Now there is a coalition between Abdelaziz al-Hilu in the Nuba Mountains and Hemedti, which I think will be temporary. They have a common enemy—the military in Khartoum—but not a common agenda for governance. I think that will split again. We have Abdul Wahid al-Nour in Jabal al Marra, who is not a friend of the RSF. He has been fighting the same Arab tribal fighters since the early 2000s and will try to keep his autonomous status in Jabal al Marra. So, I don't think there is much consolidation in today's RSF-controlled areas. I see a clear key division.

Additionally, both sides have a vested interest in continuing the war. And the RSF has been trying—and will probably try again if it sees weaknesses in the SAF—to reach the Red Sea, or at least another neighbouring country. Meanwhile, the SAF will have to consolidate—at least its hold over Al Fasher—and probably try to make inroads into the other states of Darfur.

It was interesting to see General al-Burhan speak about a possible ceasefire a few weeks ago. He sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General, saying he could imagine a ceasefire with the RSF if it leaves Al Fasher and withdraws to the tribal areas from where it comes. I think a military leader like al-Burhan would probably say, 'If we cannot win the war outright in the whole country, then let's cut our losses and accept a ceasefire on this basis.' But then you also have political forces behind the military government—the Islamic movement—and they benefit from war. They wanted it in the beginning, and I think they have an interest in it continuing.

Is a ceasefire possible when there is regional and international division? Russia, Iran, and some Arab countries support Hemedti, while others support al-Burhan...

Well, a ceasefire is always possible—but it's not the same as peace. A ceasefire is something military leaders can agree upon and implement. Peace, on the other hand, is beyond their power. For peace, you need the civilians of Sudan—civil society, grassroots movements, political parties, intellectuals, and tribal leaders. Everybody.

You need this very, very broad societal dialogue to find a common basis for the future of Sudan. But a ceasefire is relatively easy, particularly now the RSF has been driven out of Khartoum. It's a question of the will of the two sides and the external powers with influence over the fighting parties.

Do you think Sudan is part of a proxy war between regional and international players?

I reject the idea that it is a proxy war. It is an internal war about control of Sudan and its resources. Once you have such a war, then, of course, regional and other external parties attempt to pursue their interests. That is obviously happening. Recent advances by the SAF and, in a way, the defeats faced by Hemedti—are they related to regional powers? Some people believe Hemedti suffered these defeats because of a reduction in Russian, Iranian, and Emirati support.

How much is the shift in the military balance related to the international military balance? Russia has shifted towards the SAF because it controls the Red Sea coast, and the Russians want a naval base on the coast. The UAE has faced pressure from the US to reduce its support for the RSF, and Iran has come in on the south side with drones. So, quality weapons are making a difference. But in the end, it's the parties themselves who use these weapons and mobilise the fighters that control what happens. If you have less war on the ground—less fighting in the cities—and it is all about missiles and drones, then, yes, the military balance of power will be more affected by international support.

But what we also see is that, to an extent, both warring parties are working with the same international actors. Both are exporting gold to the UAE, for example, and acquiring the resources to buy weapons, ammunition, and fuel from there. If it was only about regional support, then the military balance wouldn't have shifted as quickly as it has. If you look at the African countries that surround Sudan, certainly more would lean towards the RSF and Hemedti than al-Burhan and the SAF. It's only Egypt that is a staunch supporter of the SAF, and probably Eritrea.

But that's not why Hemedti would win, or the SAF would lose, or the SAF would win and Hemedti would lose. It's more important that the SAF is an institution, even though it also recruits tribal militias now. The RSF is a private army and has never made an effort to display governance in the areas it controlled. You had all the looting and raping and murdering, and once the situation became militarily difficult in Khartoum, the RSF fighters had nothing to fight for. It wasn't their territory in the first place, so they were probably happy to go home.

If we zoom out, do you see any links between what's happening in Sudan and what's taking place in Libya and Syria?

Look, everything is linked to everything else. We know that.

Help us understand. To see the links between the three crises...

We shouldn't exaggerate the links. They are there—the RSF getting fuel from Haftar forces in Libya, for example, that's important. But Darfur armed groups have always traded licit and illicit goods towards Libya and Chad, so it's nothing new. What we do have, geopolitically speaking, is a growing link between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa.

So, UAE and Saudi interest in Sudan, which, of course, predates the war and extends to tribal relations between the two shores of the Red Sea. That ties into Hemedti's business dealings in the UAE, where Emirati support served as both political and material backing for the RSF.

We know the UAE says it is not delivering weapons, but there are other forms of support that can be provided. You also see growing relations between the Islamists in Sudan and the Houthis in Yemen, and between Al Shabab in Somalia and the Houthis. So, these two regions are growing together.

There are far fewer links with Syria. There are coincidences, and there may be new interest from Russia to seek an alternative position for its navy. But Sudan is not on the Mediterranean, so it is probably better served with a port in Libya.

We have war in Sudan, stalemate in Libya, war between Israel and the Houthis, a ceasefire between the Houthis and the US, and a huge shift in Lebanon and Syria, where Iran has lost its influence. In light of all this, where are we headed?

It's all a result of October 7. The most interesting geopolitical development is the strategic defeat of Iran and the Axis of Resistance. Iran was able to mobilise its proxies and supporters, but it wasn't able to defend them. It wasn't able to defend Hezbollah. It wasn't able to defend Assad. And that is, of course, a major strategic loss, which may be good for Iran in the long run. Because it means it can concentrate on its internal affairs, on building its economy, on building good relations with its neighbours, which it has been trying to do with Saudi Arabia and the UAE for a while. And I think that is what President Masoud Pezeshkian wants to do.

Iran's military weakness and its interest in developing the country explains the ongoing negotiations with the Trump administration, which offers a strategic opportunity for the entire region.

While it's difficult to judge or prejudge what President Trump's next moves will be, it seems that his vision is not a Middle Eastern one. It's an American vision. An American business vision, where the US gets the best deals.

It also means—more or less—that all the powerful countries in the Middle East can do what they want. He has excellent relations with the Gulf states. He negotiates with Iran because he probably understands that Iran is too big to vanish and doesn't want to get into a war with it. Nor does he want a regional war between Israel and Iran, so he does things that the Israeli government doesn't like at all, even making a bilateral ceasefire with Houthis.

At the same time, he lets Israel do whatever it wants in the Gaza Strip. So, he obviously sees the Gaza Strip as part of an Israeli zone of influence. But he's also telling the Israelis that Iran—and even Syria—is not theirs.

The world order led by the US is over. How do you see the new world order? And how do you view the position of the Middle East in that new order?

We're entering a multi-polar system where the rules haven't been established. For the time being, global and regional powers are largely committed to international law. But the more powerful they are, the more they are violating the rules of the game. And the smaller powers, or those who have a multilateral rather than a multipolar mindset, including the European Union and individual countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, are trying to stabilise the rules of the road.

The Middle East is not in the middle but in between. It doesn't believe in the liberal values of the EU or the US before Trump, but it does believe in some strong rules of the road, because otherwise it would be very, very difficult for middle and small powers to survive. They need the patterns of international arrangements and international cooperation.

What I see happening in the Middle East—driven by the leadership of the Gulf states—is a redefinition of the region not only in geo-economic terms but also in political and strategic ones. Geo-economically, the Gulf powers are positioning the region for a post-oil, post-carbon future. They will utilise oil income for as long as possible, but they are aware that it will eventually come to an end. Look at the discourse of the Saudis and the Emiratis. It's all about future technologies, artificial intelligence, and connectivity, rather than exporting a commodity.

And in a political sense, everybody wants the Arab-Israeli conflict, which defines the entire region, to be over. The Gulf countries have basically decided it's over for them. Even Ahmed al-Sharaa, the president of Syria, seems to be prepared to make peace with Israel.

Of course, they have conditions. They say 'we want our country back' or 'our territory back'. So, everybody would have settled—or said that the conflict is over—if it wasn't for the Palestinians. The intent of at least parts of the current Israeli government to drive the Palestinians out of their homeland, rather than accepting a two-state solution, is an obstacle to anything we could call peace in the Middle East.

We also see that some countries, which in the past would have been counted as part of the Middle East—Morocco, Tunisia—are no longer interested in what happens east of Suez. They are interested in their own relations with Europe, producing for the European market, and in the opportunities they see in Africa. Morocco, for example, is building bridges across the Sahel and the Sahara, rather than spending time on Israeli-Palestinian issues.